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• ( U醒观丨為 
Abstract of thesis entitled: An Empirical Analysis of the Gender Wage 
Differential in Urban China. 
The Chinese government has embarked on a gradual and continuous economic 
transformation on its more than one billion people since 1978, thereby evolving 
profound transitions in its urban labor market system. It is of our interest to carry out 
an empirical analysis on urban Chinese gender wage differential to provide a thorough 
investigation and complete characterization of gender pay gaps in urban Chinese labor 
market. 
Using 1988 to 1999 urban household survey data from China's State Statistical 
Bureau from several representative provinces and cities, we analyze the gender wage 
gap and its changes over the period and call for comparisons and explanations. W e 
find that both the gender total wage gap and the basic wage gap widen slightly 
between 1988 and 1999. Specifically, the female/male total wage ratio declines from 
82.6% in 1988 to 80% in 1999. The basic wage gap reflects most of the total wage 
gap especially after mid 1990s. Moreover, the returns to education in various 
specifications started to surge in the 1990s. Apparently, our regressions also support 
the proposition of rising provincial income inequality especially inequality between 
coastal and interior regions in China. 
Utilizing the Blinder-Oaxaca and Cotton's decompositions, we show that over 
half of the gender gap is due to differences in coefficients between genders. The fact 
that unexplained part of the wage gap increased a little may carry the message of 
increasing gender discrimination in the 1990s. Furthermore, the small divergence in 
the gender wage gap over the 12 years is due to the effect of increasing rewards to 
observed and unobserved skills slightly dominating the effect of converging skill 
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levels of males and females. Lastly, the study of cohort wage gap supports the 
hypothesis that increasing gender discrimination plays a role in the slight widening of 
the wage gap. 
Submitted by Kung Ching-yi. 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy. 
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (September, 2002). 
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中國城市男女薪酬水平之差距硏究論文摘要 
中國政府自一九七八年起在其包括了十億人口的土地上，推行了漸進但持續的經 
濟改革，中國的勞動市場也產生了巨大的變化。本文特別就中國城市男女收入不 
均的現象進行分析，以提供較完整及深入的描述和硏究。 
我們從中國國家統計局的數據，抽取了多個具代表性的省分和城市，對一九八八 
年至一九九九年這段時期，男女性別收入差距的大小和改變進行比較及分析。我 
們發現在這段期間男女的總收入和基本收入的差距都稍微加大了。女性總平均收 
入佔男性總平均收入的比例，由一九八八年的百份之八十二點六下降至一九九九 
年的百份之八十。九〇年代中以後，男女總收入的差距主要由基本收入的差距構 
成。分析也發現在這個時期教育回報激增。另外，我們的回歸法分析也印證了中 
國不同省市地區，特別是沿海地區和內陸地區收入不均問題加劇的現象。 
利用Blinder-Oaxaca和Cotton的分解方法，顯示出超過一半的男女平均收入差距 
是由兩方的係數差別弓丨起。對於部份未能解釋的工資差距輕微增加，可能是九〇 
年代性別歧視問題加劇的結果。此外，在這十二年期間，男女收入差距只是輕微 
擴大，主要因爲工作技能〔可測量及不可測量的〕回報增加的影響，稍稍大於男 
女工作技能差異減少的影響。最後，我們對不同群體工資差距的硏究結果，支持 
了性別歧視加劇拉大工資差距的假設。 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Gender wage differential has long been not only an important subject of interest 
for labor economists, but also a principal concern for many governments. Gender 
inequality may affect the solidarity between male and female workers and the 
necessity to set up any anti wage-discrimination scheme in a country. However, 
literature on gender pay gap is dominated by the analysis of most industrialized 
nations such as the United States (Blau and Kahn, 1997). In particular, little research 
has as yet been conducted on trends in gender wage inequality in China whose reform 
policies affect the well being of both men and women through her emerging labor 
market. Gustafsson and Li (2000) analyze the gap between the wages of men and 
women and its change between two sampled years，1988 and 1995. They report a 
modest increase in the gender earnings gap. In 1988 average female earnings were 
15.6 percent lower than average male earnings, but in 1995 females earned on average 
17.5 percent less than males. Existing studies lack thorough investigation and 
complete characterization of gender pay gaps for consecutive years and provides little 
account on the changes of gender wage gap. Hence, this thesis tries to examine how 
the urban Chinese labor market progresses by signifying changes of the gender wage 
gap, if any, from 1988 to 1999 and calls for comparisons and explanations. 
To enhance our study of the gender wage differential, we should first grasp a 
general picture of the economic developments of China in the past fifty years because 
the impact of institutional changes on the gender wage gap is inevitable. There has 
been a gradual economic transformation from a centrally planned to a market oriented 
economy in China for the last two decades. However, the question of whether and 
how the economic reform brings greater gender wage differential and especially 
1 
gender wage discrimination in China can only be answered empirically as suggested 
by Liu et al. (2000). The present thesis describes the institutional changes and 
presents a comprehensive picture of gender pay gaps^  throughout the period. To shed 
light on any changes in discrimination or employers' personal tastes, a dissection of 
each sampled year's cross-sectional gender wage gap into a part due to differences in 
average observable demographic characteristics and a part due to differences in 
estimated returns associated with those characteristics is therefore provided. Besides, 
as the labor market evolved, previously suppressed returns to human capital may be 
recovered. Therefore, rising returns to schooling are expected from the results of our 
wage regressions. Furthermore, rather than disregarding the changes of residual wage 
gap when decomposing the wage gap into changes in the distribution of the 
characteristics and changes in the prices to observable skills, Juhn et al. (1993) 
propose that changes in residual distribution can be further decomposed. Changes in 
the distribution of the residuals are considered as the changes in unmeasured prices 
and quantities. However, Juhn et al.'s method is bound to find rising returns to 
unmeasured skills and falling differences in unmeasured skill levels even when there 
is no change in either prices or quantities. Suen (1997) therefore suggests that an 
unmeasured skill model or a discrimination model may explain the change in residual 
wage gap. To resolve the two alternative interpretations of the change in residual 
wage gap, we study cohorts' gender wage gap and restrict the unmeasured skill level 
between males and females to be constant over time for each cohort. 
The rest of Chapter one discusses the background of the pre-reform labor 
arrangements in the cities and the wage and labor reforms in the past two decades. 
1 This thesis examines the basic wage gap as well as total wage gap, and conjectures any gender gap of 
bonuses. 
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Chapter two reviews relevant literature on application of mainstream economic theory 
to issues of gender differentials and on empirical studies of gender wage differentials 
in China. Chapter three is a description of the sampling frame and the demographic 
characteristics of the sample. The core of Chapter four is a descriptive introduction to 
the presence of gender differences in wages in urban China. In Chapter five, the data 
are used to explore the significant issue of education and wages (including basic wage) 
in urban China. The wage functions estimated separately for men and women in 
Chapter five are used in Chapter six to decompose the male/female wage differential 
and to determine the shares of this differential, which are attributable to different 
characteristics. Chapter seven broadens the analysis to analyze the changes of the 
wage differentials over time. Chapter eight draws some conclusions from the findings. 
1.1 Pre-reform labor arrangements in cities 
People's Republic of China was founded in mainland China in 1949, and from 
then until 1978, the State Ministry of Labor and Personnel had virtually sole 
responsibility to assign an employment quota to each provincial or city government. 
Then, the provincial and city governments allocated quotas to lower hierarchical 
levels. Individuals were assigned to jobs, but were not allowed, and were unable as 
well, to find jobs by themselves (Gao, 1998). The Bureau of Labor and Personnel 
centrally determined and controlled wages of all workers in urban areas through the 
grade wage system in the late 1950s to the late 1970s. There were eight distinct levels 
for factory workers and technicians (working-class wage ranking) and 24 levels for 
administrative and managerial workers (cadres' wage ranking). The rankings for the 8 
working-class levels were placed in ascending order—that is, the lowest was level 1 
3 
and the highest was level 8. The rankings for the cadres were placed in descending 
order, with level 1 being the highest and level 24 the lowest (Wang and Li, 1995). The 
wage grade system valued too heavily on qualifications and age rather than on actual 
labor productivity (Shan, 1991). Workers were employed for a lifetime with one 
workplace. The lifetime employment system encouraged over-staffing, shirking and 
low productivity. The state-owned enterprises provided most welfare benefits such as 
housing, medical care, pensions, and sometimes even schooling and hospital 
treatments. Every worker was also entitled to a pension upon retirement. 
During the Cultural Revolution (1967-77), production stagnated whereas schools 
and universities closed down. About seventeen million high school and university 
students were forced to move to countryside between 1967 and 1970 (Chen and Yu, 
1993). Over 90% of these young people returned to the cities when the Cultural 
Revolution came to an end (Gao, 1998). The return of young people created a huge 
unemployment in cities. In August 1980, the State Council promulgated "Three 
alliance" which states that under the ruling and guidance of the state, all employment 
agencies, voluntary organizations and individual job seekers were encouraged to form 
alliance to create more job opportunities. The introduction of "Three alliance" aimed 
to adjust the employment structure and mitigate the problem of unemployment. 
1.2 Urban labor market reform and labor contract system 
In order to break the "iron rice bowl" and to change lifetime employment, the 
labor market reform began in the early 1980s. The government has avoided the ‘shock 
therapy' applied in Eastern Europe to reform labor markets, and has picked a 
4 
piecemeal approach. The experimental rules of the labor contract system were first 
implemented in 9 provinces, cities and municipalities to cover 160,000 new workers. 
In 1986, the State Council declared four codes of reforming labor infrastructure. 
One of them is the ‘Temporary Regulations on the Use of Labor Contracts in 
State-Run Enterprises'. Employers and employees are assigned to sign a new contract, 
normally up to a maximum of four years. Contract workers】 share some of the rights 
of permanent workers and enterprises are difficult to fire them before the contracts 
expired (Groves, Hong, McMillan and Naughton, 1994). The contract stated a basic 
requirement of employee to be aged 16 or above, and if the work is suitable for 
women, enterprises should recruit women (Gao, 1998). At first, this labor contract 
system was used in supplement to the permanent employment system. The coverage 
of contractual employment was first limited to 4 percent of total employment in 1985 
and later extended to 13 percent of total employment in 1990 and further to 39 percent 
in 1995 (Meng, 2000). Till 1997, one hundred million employees, around 97 percent 
of total employment, have signed labor contracts with their employers (Beiping she 
hui diao cha bu, 1998). The 1986 regulations required enterprises to use the contract 
employment system instead of permanent employment system in hiring production 
workers after October 1988 (Zhu, 1995). 
The second code of reform is the open recruitment of new employees through 
negotiations of employers and employees. The labor authorities were no longer 
responsible for allocating workers. The third code is that workers should attend 
training before they take up their posts. The fourth one is to accord greater power in 
labor management to enterprise directors, in particular, directors have more power 
2 Contract workers should be differentiated from temporary workers as the latter can be dismissed 
easily and have little rights compared to permanent or contract workers. 
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over the hiring and dismissal of workers (Child, 1994). 
"Labor Law" which was passed in July 1994, states the regulations of the labor 
contract system. The labor contract system allows firms to select and hire suitable 
individuals. Besides, the system increases the flexibility of labor allocation 
mechanism. Employees have the right to resign and negotiate for the duration of 
employment and terms and conditions. Firms have begun to use examinations and to 
conduct interviews to aid the selection and recruitment process since the late 1980s. 
Managers of state-owned enterprises have been given much more decision-making 
power over recruitment and selection, dismissal, promotion, reward, punishment and 
even arrangement of vocational training programs after the reform (Warner, Goodall 
and Ding, 1999). 
Furthermore, the statutory law protects rights of women, children and minority. 
In particular, according to the Ordinance in the second Chapter of Labor Law, 
women have the same employment rights as men. Except some positions specified by 
the State, women must not be rejected to be workers and the entry requirements of 
female workers should not be raised due to sex. The 15 Ordinance in the same 
Chapter stresses that people under the age of 16 are prohibited to be workers. 
1. 3 Wage reform in urban labor market 
The centrally fixed enterprise's total wage quota system was changed to a 
floating total wage bill system, which relates the enterprise's total wage bill to its 
profitability. Enterprises were permitted to retain some profits after remitting the 
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required ratio of the profits to the central government. They had the right to design 
production schedules for output as well. This kind of production responsibility system 
not only increased the output autonomy but also accompanied management's 
autonomy power over wage setting decisions. In October 1984, the Communist Party 
passed "the resolution of economic institutional reform". The resolution aimed to 
better relate wages and bonuses to the enterprise's economic efficiency. The floating 
wage system was carried out from 1985 (Dai, 1994). The wages of individuals were 
attempted to link to their labor productivity within firms. After all, the 'wage plus 
bonus system' was most frequently adopted (Meng 2000). Although different regions 
and industries have different versions of this reform to promote appropriate incentive 
structure for workers, the Labor Law states that the minimum wage security policy 
has been established and determined by the regional governments under the approval 
of the State Council. 
To sum up, the labor market condition in urban China has gone through 
substantial changes since the introduction of economic reform. Without doubts, 
reforms in the urban Chinese labor market are still in progress and all bits and pieces 
of evidences point towards the fact that a more open and autonomous labor market 
has been created. This subsequently not only provides room for employers and 
employees to interact, but also establishes link between human capital and 
productivity. 
7 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Literature review on empirical evidence of gender wage differential 
As Psacharopoulos (1992) puts it“for a variety of reasons, women in all 
countries earn on average substantially less than men," studies from various countries 
show that there is always a gender pay gap between men and women, though the gap 
varies across time. For instance, Ferber (1991) calculates a range of female to male 
wage ratios in different O E C D countries from 48% in Japan to 95.3% in Sweden, and 
shows that women's average earnings are lower than those of men. Willbom (1991) 
reports the gender gap in wages declined between 1960 and 1988, though to a various 
degree in different countries. In the United States, the wage ratio was 61% in 1960 
and it changed to 65% in 1988. Blau and Kahn (1992) report that the median woman 
earns less than the median man in all nine industrial countries. 
2.2 Literature review on human capital and earnings equations 
Smith (1937) states, "the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different employments of labor and stock must, in the same neighborhood, be either 
perfectly equal or continually tend to equality. If in the same neighborhood there was 
any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many 
people would crowd into it in one case, and so many would desert it in the other, that 
its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments." His notion 
implies the essence of equalizing or compensating differential theory. The theory 
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suggests that higher pay is required to induce workers to take up the more unpleasant 
work because of the greater disutility associated. 
More specifically, according to the neoclassical theory, wages will equate 
corresponding productivity of respective employees since employers maximize their 
profits. Each worker is endowed with a given productivity known as human capital. 
People make choices to invest in themselves and or in their children. They can choose 
the level of education they would attain, the occupation they would enter and the 
on-the-job training they will take. 
Attempts have been made to derive an earning equation on the basis of 
wealth-maximizing individuals choosing career paths and forms of human capital 
formation, subject to their utility functions and inter-temporal budget constraints. 
Willis (1986) emphasizes that these attempts have generally been unsuccessful in that 
so far it has proven impossible to obtain closed form solutions to such inter-temporal 
problems. A statistical earnings function such as Inwi = f (Xi) + ui (where i = l,.",n) 
may be viewed as approximations to the solutions of inter-temporal choice problems. 
The most widely adopted earnings function is by Mincer (1974) who originates a 
semi-logarithmic specification of the earnings equation: In Wj = In wo + biSi+ b2Pi + 
bsPi^  + Ui，where bi is the rate of return to schooling, Si is the year of schooling and b! 
+ 2b3Pi is the rate of return to the worker's years of potential labor market experience, 
Pi, measured as age minus schooling years minus six, and. It implicitly assumes that 
all workers begin elementary school at age six and that no time is spent outside the 
labor force or school. Given experience and experience squared, the effect of more 
education on wages can be expressed as the derivative of w with respect to s: dw/dS = 
biw. The percentage change in w, due to a change in S is equal to (dw/dS)/w =bi, that 
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is the estimated parameter for S in the Mincerian equation. 
2. 3 Literature review on gender wage gap decomposition 
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) establish a standard technique to decompose 
wage differentials between gender into a part attributable to endowments and a part 
attributable to difference in coefficients. The equation for the average of the logarithm 
of the wage is: 
lnwi= pXi 
where Xi is the vector of means of the independent variables for sex i. The sex 
variable, i is either male (as represented by m) or female (as represented by f). The 
difference between the male and female averages of the logarithmic wages is: 
A = Inwm-lnwf 二 Xmpm-Xfpf 
A = (Xm-Xf)Pm + Xf(Pm-Pf) (1) 
A = (Xm-Xf)P — Xm(Pm-pf) (2) 
The first term in equation (1) is described as the difference attributable to the X's 
or the differences in endowments or characteristics. The second term is the difference 
attributable to differences in parameters, including the intercept. In equation (1), we 
use the male wage function as the benchmark whereas in equation (2), we use the 
female wage function as the benchmark. However, a well-known index problem arises 
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from the choice between the two. 
The main idea of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition can be understood by a 
fictitious example. Suppose that the only difference between male and female workers 
is that 20 percent of men hold medical degrees and 10 percent of women do. Assume 
also male surgeons earn 100 yuan more than other men while female surgeons earn 
only 80 yuan extra for being surgeons. Following equation (2), the difference in 
number of male and female surgeons times the wage premium for female surgeons is 
(0.2-0.1) X 80 = 8. The wage gap would be reduced by 8 yuans if as many women as 
men were surgeons. But there is also a difference due to the fact that the 20% male 
surgeons receive 100-80 = 20 yuans more. On average this makes 4 yuans, (that is, 
20% X 20 yuans) due to preferential treatment of male surgeons. In this case, the total 
gender wage gap (A) would be 12 yuans. 
Cotton (1988) generalizes equations (1) and (2) to: 
A = Inwm - Inwf 
=(Xm - Xf)P* + Xm(Pm • P* ) + Xf{P* - Pf) (3) 
where P |Lipm+(1-^ )P f using ja for the proportion of men in the sample. 
The first term is the difference due to endowments weighted by the 
non-discriminatory wage function. The second term is nepotism~how much men's 
earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory 
treatment. The last term is called discrimination~how much women's earnings 
deviate from the non-discriminatory level. The interpretation of the weights for AX 
(that is, Xm - Xf) in the above decomposition as the proportion of the wage differential 
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that are explained by changes in endowments assumes that “labor supply and 
individual characteristics are fixed and would not respond to the changes in wages 
that would result from the elimination of discrimination" (Neumark, 1988). The 
implicit assumption is that if both sexes had equal power, possibilities and access, 
equal responsibilities and equal rewards in all aspects of life, jobs would require and 
reward exactly the same skills and characteristics in exactly the same way and the 
overall distribution of time and energy between different activities would be exactly 
the same. 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) construct an estimator for the 'non-discriminatory 
wage function'. Oaxaca and Ransom propose the |li in Cotton's specification would be 
changed to a weighting matrix. Their method of decomposition seems to have an 
advantage that the estimated parameters for the whole labor force reflect the market's 
evaluation' of the corresponding characteristics. However, as Katz (1999) points out, 
their method "disregards that the evaluation of a characteristic by participants in this 
market is consistently biased according to how strongly it is associated with 
‘masculinity，or 'femininity'". Therefore a sex dummy is necessary for a pooled 
regression of wage. 
M m , Murphy and Pierce (1991, 1993) introduce an innovative method of 
decomposing residual wage differentials among groups of workers based on 
percentile rankings. Each worker is assigned a percentile rank in the residual wage 
distribution. Changes in the residual differential between two groups are then 
decomposed into changes in the difference in their mean percentile ranks and changes 
in the dispersion of the residual wage distribution. Following Juhn et al. (1991), Blau 
and Kahn (1997) implement the decomposition of the 1979-88 difference in the 
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gender pay gap into a portion due to gender specific factors and a portion due to 
changes in the overall level of wage inequality. The male-female log wage gap for 
year t is 
Dt = Inwmt - Inwft = AXt Pt + at A0t (4) 
Equation (4) states that the pay gap can be decomposed into a portion due to 
gender differences in measured qualifications, AXt, weighted by the male returns at 
year t, (31, and a portion due to gender differences in the standardized residual from the 
male equation, A0t, multiplied by the money value per unit difference in the 
standardized residual, at. 
The difference in the male (m)/ female (f) wage gap between 2 years, 0 and 1, 
can then be decomposed using equation (4): 
Di - Do=(AXi -AXo)Pi+ AXo(Pi - Po) 
+ (A0i-A0o )ai + AGo (Aai - Aao) 
=[(Xim - Xif) - (Xom - Xof)]pim 
+ (Xom - Xof XPlm- Pom ) 
+ [(Qlm-Qlf) - (Qom-Oof)] dim 
+ (e。m-eof)(C7im-CJom) (5) 
The first term in equation (5), the "observed X's effect" reflects the contribution 
of changing male-female differences in observed labor market qualifications, X. The 
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second term, the "observed prices effect," reflects the effect of changing prices of 
observed labor market qualifications for males. The third term, the “gap effect," 
measures the effect of changing differences in the relative wage positions of men and 
women after controlling for observed characteristics. That is, it gives the contribution 
to the change in the gender gap that would result if the level of residual male wage 
inequality had remained the same and only the percentile rankings of the female wage 
residuals had changed. In other words, it gives whether women rank higher or lower 
within the male residual wage distribution. This is the relative quantity effect for 
unobserved skills. The fourth term, the "unobserved prices effect," reflects the effect 
of differences in residual inequality between the two years. It measures the 
contribution to the change in the gender gap that would result if the percentile 
rankings of the female wage residuals had remained unchanged and only the male 
residual wage inequality had changed. This is the general price effect for unobserved 
skills. For example, given that women have lower relative unobserved skills levels, a 
rising male return to the unobserved skill, would weight the female unobserved skill 
deficit more heavily and hence a larger pay gap arises. 
Since average of 6i and average of Go of males are both zero, the last two terms in 
(5), ( A6i - A6o )ai and A6o ( Aai - Agq ) reduce to (Oofcrim - Qif ciim) and (6of aom -
QofC^ im) respectively. To compute QofC^ im, the authors give each woman in year 0 a 
percentile number based on the ranking of her wage residual from the year 0 male 
wage regression in the distribution of male wage residuals. They then impute the 
wage residual of each woman in year 0, given her percentile ranking in year 0 and the 
distribution of male wage residuals in year 1. The average of the imputed residuals is 
Oofaim. OofC^ om and 0 if aim are the averages of the actual year 0 and year 1 female 
residual from the year 0 and year 1 male wage regressions respectively. 
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Blau and Kahn go further to claim that the sum of the first and third terms in 
equation (5) reflects the full effect of gender-specific factors—the total effect of 
gender differences in qualifications and of gender differences in wage rankings for 
given level of observed characteristics. On the other hand, the sum of the second and 
fourth terms reflect the wage structuresthe total effect of changing returns to 
observed and unobserved characteristics. Within the context of traditional 
decomposition, the first and the second terms constitute to the explained portion of the 
wage gap whereas the last two terms attribute to the unexplained portion. 
Suen (1997) points out that Juhn et al.'s method (of using the standard deviation 
of residual wages to measure the price of unmeasured skill and using the average 
percentile rank to measure the quantity) presupposes that the unexplained differences 
in gender wage gap is due to differences in unobservable skills only and implicitly 
assumes that labor market discrimination is unimportant. Since more dispersed 
distributions tend to have thicker tails, for a fixed wage at the lower end of the 
residual wage distribution, any increase in the dispersion will raise its percentile 
ranking of the female wage residuals. Juhn et al.'s decomposition is bound to be 
upward-biased and will produce the false impression that the unmeasured skill 
differential has declined while unmeasured skill price has risen whenever the 
discrimination or measurement errors exist. 
According to Suen, the change in the gender wage gap between 2 years, 1 and 0, 
in equation (5) should be rewritten as: 
Di —Do = [(Xim - Xif)- (Xom - Xof)]Plm 
+ (Xom - Xof XPlm- Pom ) 
15 
+ [ ( U l m - U i f ) - ( U o m _ Uof) ] ( 6 ) 
where the subscript ft (mt) denotes the average of the female (male) values and Uit 
equals at6 it + Su . 6 it is a random variable with mean Sft if individual i is female, and it 
is distributed with mean Smt if i is male. The variance of 6 it is normalized to one. The 
term Sit is a constant that is equal to 0 for men and to —d for women. 
Suen subsumes two models of the wage residual gap under the general model in 
equation (6). In one polar case of unobservable skills interpretation of the wage 
residual gap, 0 it represents some unidimensional measure of labor market ability and 
at represents the price of such ability. In the other extreme, the pure discrimination 
model of the wage gap assumes that d is positive and there is no difference in mean 
unobserved skills. A general formula embraces both the unmeasured skills term and 
the discrimination term, and the empirical decomposition of the residual wage gap is 
given by: 
CJtA①((Sft - Smt) - (d/cJt ) ) + [ 0 ( ( S f t - Smt) — ( d / c j t ) ) - . 5 ] AcTt ( 7 ) 
Here, at is the standard deviation of residual at year t, d is the discrimination term, AO 
is the difference of the mean of the cumulative distribution functions of females and 
males. As long as d is greater than zero, an increase in at will increase 0((sft — Smt)— 
(d/cTt)). For Juhn et al. (1991, 1993) method's interpretation of unmeasured skills and 
unmeasured prices effect to be meaningful, changes in the first and the second term 
should be independent. This will only be true if d equals zero, that is the unobserved 
skills interpretation of the residual wage gap. 
If the wage gap is calculated for synthetic cohorts, one can plausibly impose the 
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restriction of that the unobserved skills of each individual are fixed over time. That is, 
Sft - Smt is constant over time. Under the pure discrimination theory of the wage gap, 
the "convergence in (unmeasured) skills", which is the first term in equation (7), is 
merely a statistical artifact associated with any increase in the variance of the residual 
wage distribution. The use of synthetic cohorts will then provide a way of resolving 
the two alternative interpretation of the change in residual wage gap. One should 
expect the "convergence in (unmeasured) skills" to be zero if the hypothesis of 
unmeasured skills theory holds, and the term is expected to be positive when at has 
risen if the pure discrimination theory holds. 
2.4 Literature review of empirical findings on China 
Gender wage gaps 
According to Liu, Meng and Zhang (2000), economic reform brings about two 
institutional changes that have impact on gender wage discrimination. First, 
employers' personal preferences against females shaped by traditional culture are 
unleashed, so one may expect an increase in gender wage inequality. Second, market 
competition drives employers to remunerate each employee in accordance with one's 
productivity. Employers will be driven out of business if they reward their workers on 
criteria other than productivity under perfect competition, thereby reducing 
discrimination. A new institutional setting that is different from the tradition setting 
may have changed personal tastes over time. The authors therefore argue that the 
relative importance of the impact of economic reform on gender wage gap or gender 
wage discrimination can only be resolved by appealing to empirical data. They rely on 
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the assumption that the economic reform has affected various ownership sectors to 
different degree, and go further to compare gender wage differentials across the least 
market-oriented state sector, the more liberalized collective sector and the most freely 
labour-market institutionally featured private sector. They use two data sets from 
Shanghai and Jinan to demonstrate that gender wage gaps widens from state to 
collective or private sectors in absolute terms. This result strengthens the broadening 
effect of discrimination resulting from increased economic decentralization 
overwhelms the narrowing effect arising from market competition. 
An interesting finding is that the relative share of discrimination in the overall 
gender wage differential reduces substantially across the three sectors. This shows 
that market competition actually lessens the importance of gender wage 
discrimination as a share of overall gender wage differential. Gender personal 
endowment differentials may contribute to a larger share of overall differential. In 
consequence, the authors suggest further marketization and development of the 
Chinese economy to eliminate gender wage discrimination. 
However, as acknowledged by the authors, their paper only reveal the direction 
and the lower bound of the impact of privatization and marketization on gender wage 
gaps because the state firms had also been reformed, albeit to a lesser extent. Another 
shortcoming of this paper is that it neglects how sectoral differences in self-selection 
affect sectoral gender wage discrimination. 
Gustafsson and Li (2000) analyze the gender earnings gap in urban China 
making use of Urban Household Income Surveys covering 10 provinces for both 1988 
and 1995. Similar to Liu et al., they run regression of earnings-functions for females 
and males to attribute the crude gender wage gap to differences in variables and 
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differences in coefficients. Results from estimating earnings functions indicate the 
size of earnings in urban China depends heavily on geographic location and 
ownership types of enterprises. 
The decomposition of the average crude earnings-gap between men and women 
shows that different forces drive the explained part of the average gender wage gap 
towards different directions. The most important source of the increase in the 
explained part is education. Nevertheless, a substantial increasing average 
earnings-gap cannot be explained by differences in variables. It is indeed attributable 
to differences in coefficients, which may be due to an increased earnings 
discrimination of women and/ or lower unobserved productivity of women on average 
than men do. 
The authors add a new element to their paper by calculating Jenkins' indices to 
investigate if discrimination experience is homogeneous in the sample given. Earning 
discrimination has increased for most subgroups. Largest increases in group-specific 
discrimination are found in the youngest group and primary educated group. This is 
consistent with development of the crude gender gap reported. A major defect of their 
work, however, is that they fail to discuss how the correlation arises among choice 
variables specified in the earning functions. 
Knight and Song (1993) measure the effect of the 1988 sex differences in 
characteristics on the mean urban wage difference by means of Oaxaca decomposition. 
Less than half of the difference in pay can be explained by the inferior 
income-earning characteristics of women. In spite of this, the premium on education 
is in fact more favourable to women while men benefit particularly from higher 
returns to age and to having permanent employment. Another important result rests on 
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the appearance of gender wage discrimination increases with age. The authors insert 
two possible types of explanation here. The first one is in terms of cohort effects. 
Specifically, the young are subject to less discrimination than the old were, and the 
old have not been able to shake off that discrimination. The second explanation is in 
terms of aging, if discrimination takes the form of differential promotion and access to 
higher-paid jobs over the life. 
In addition, the mean income of women notably falls sharply after age group 51 
to 55 due to a large deterioration in the quality of female characteristics (e.g. low 
education). The differences in characteristics of the 51 to 55 and 56 to 60 age groups 
are so great that a decomposition analysis shows the change in characteristics account 
for more than the actual fall in the mean income. Female workers tend to retire earlier 
than male workers. This may be a consequence of those who stand to lose most from 
retirement continue working. Some women may choose to engage in part-time job if 
these women are in low-paid jobs carrying inadequate pension rights and are forced to 
retire from permanent jobs. The authors claim that possession of education protects 
women against discrimination apparently as it gives women access to jobs in which 
there is less discrimination. 
Rather than focusing on the urban areas, Meng (1998a) examines the male and 
female wage determination patterns in the newly developed rural industrial sector in 
China using 1985 cross-sectional survey of the Chinese township-, village- or 
privately-owned (TVP) enterprises. Additionally, her paper attempts to sketch the 
extent of gender wage discrimination in both tightly controlled TVP sector by the 
local authorities (non-market group) and market-oriented TVP sector (market group). 
She adopts the decomposition approaches proposed by Blinder and Cotton to estimate 
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the ratio of discrimination to endowment in wage differential. Discrimination 
accounts for a large portion of the total wage differential because of the tradition of 
discrimination in income distribution against women and the continuation of this 
practice in the monopsony TVP employers. However, the proportion of gender 
pay-gap due to discrimination is larger in the non-market groups. This finding 
indicates as the market becomes more liberalized, wages are increasingly determined 
by productivity. 
The paper concludes that education is a significant determinant of both men's 
and women's earnings in the market group, but it is insignificant for neither gender in 
the non-market group. Furthermore, the firm-tenure earnings profiles for the market 
sector are steeper than their counterparts for the non-market sector. These 
cross-sectional differences may lead to a dynamic interpretation that the changing 
wage determination pattern may be due to technological evolution along the economic 
reform in the TVP labour market. The advancement in technology appears to have 
been in association with more education opportunities and higher investment in 
firm-specific training. 
Another paper of Meng (1998b) examines whether gender occupational 
segregation has an impact on the gender wage differential among migrants using data 
on 1504 migrants collected in Jinan city, Shandong province in 1995. Models of 
occupational attainment suggest that occupational segregation may be explained by 
the differences between males and females in personal endowments, the impact of 
occupational segregation that prevents employees from finding the most suitable job, 
and employers' prejudice against female employees. The paper argues that the latter 
two factors are the main contributing elements to occupational segregation. Among 
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these total unexplained portions, discrimination within an occupation is more 
important than the impact of discrimination in occupational attainment, which on the 
other hand, accounts for 67% of the total inter-occupational differential. 
The intra-occupation wage discrimination in the rural industrial labour market is 
higher than in the urban migrant labour market. This contends that employers in the 
former sector have greater discriminatory attitude towards women. One plausible 
solution is that urban labour market can be further opened up to rural migrants, and 
more occupations would then be available to reduce the degree of gender occupational 
segregation among migrants. 
Returns to schooling 
This section devotes to document the rate of returns to education in urban China^. 
The theme of this objective follows a well-established body of empirical literature on 
human capital. Psacharopoulos (1992) updates a data set of documented rate of return 
to education patterns to cover 61 countries using the Mincer-type earnings function. 
The coefficient on years of schooling is 11% for Asia. In comparison with the 11% 
rate of return in Asia, Byron and Manaloto (1990) access a survey of 800 adults in 
Nanjing and find a low figure of only about 1.4% for each additional year of 
schooling in China in 1986. 
Maurer-Fazio (1999) adopts Mincer's earnings function as well: In Yi 二 In Yo + 
biSi+b2Xi+b3Xi^+ Ui. She uses the 1988 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 
3 Findings on returns to schooling are summarized in table 2.1. 
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data and the 1992 Chinese Labor Market Research Project (CLMRP) sample to 
analyze the rate of return to education. Utilizing 1988 CHIP data, the rates of return to 
education are 2.9 % and 4.5 % for all males and all females respectively whereas the 
rates are 6.4% and 6.8% young males and young females under age 30. In the 1992 
C L M R P sample, the returns to education rise from 3.7% and 4.9% for all males and 
all females respectively to 5.2% and 5.9% young males and young females under age 
30. A reason for this higher rate of returns of the younger cohorts may be that young 
people face more market-like work environments than their elders. Another finding in 
this paper is that workers who have recently secured new jobs or employers have 
higher returns to schooling than those obtained their jobs or employment in the 
pre-reform era. Likewise, firms founded in the reform period reward human capital to 
a greater extent than firms founded earlier. 
Liu (1998) obtains estimates of the same Mincer earnings specifications using 
cross-sectional data from 1988 CHIP data and yields 3.61% for rate of return to 
education. Both Maurer-Fazio and Liu agree that part of the low returns to education 
is attributable to the job assignment and the egalitarian income distribution policy in 
the past, both of which lead to the mismatch of jobs and skills. Liu then turns to an 
alternative specification with dummy variables for education levels. The estimated 
rates of return are 37.5% for university education, 19.1% for secondary education, and 
7.5% for primary education. 
Interestingly, Liu attempts to capture any vintage effect of education. In other 
words, returns from an extra year of recent schooling may not equate an extra year of 
schooling in the distant past. Liu presents the estimates of the earnings equation for 
three groups of different work experience. The return declines from 5.26% to 2.07% 
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as experience increases. This reflects a higher return for more recently obtained 
education. 
Another interesting finding of Liu is that male workers have a significant 
earnings premium over female workers. However, female workers have one 
percentage point higher rate of return than male workers. Liu goes on to examine the 
effects of economic reforms on earnings and on return to education. He estimates 
separate earnings equations for Guangdong and the non-Guangdong control group. 
Using a sample of junior workers with less than ten year work experience, his 
estimated return is five percentage points higher than that in other regions. Therefore, 
he argues that the economic reforms have benefited coastal provinces and cities more 
than other regions resulting in higher returns to schooling in the coastal region. 
Using a Mincer specification, Meng and Kidd (1997) find similar results of low 
rate of returns to education2.5% in 1981 and 2.7% in 1987—for China's state sector. 
The major focus of their paper is to examine the changes in wage setting structures in 
the urban state sector over the reform period 1981 to 1987 and to evaluate the success 
of the first half of the reform program. The data set is restricted to males employed in 
enterprise-based state sector in 1981 and 1987, which respectively represent pre- and 
post-reform era. 
They conduct F-test to support a structural change in the system of wage 
determination over the period. 25 out of the 29 industry dummy variables play a 
significant different role in wage determination in 1987 versus 1981. However, with 
the presence of multicollinearity between industry affiliation and the other included 
regressors, the analysis is unable to quantify the impact of each particular group of 
variables on the overall change in wage structure over the period. They employ 
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several methods to see the potential importance of the role of industry affiliation in 
the changing pattern of wage structure. For instance, they estimate the partial R 
squared for the human capital variables plus occupation dummies, and the industrial 
dummy variables. Alternatively, they check the correlation between estimated 
regression coefficients for the two years. The writers explain that the dominant role of 
industrial wage differentials may be owing to the introduction of enterprise profit 
retention. Due to the cost of monitoring worker effort, bonuses tend to be equally 
distributed among workers in a given enterprise; one would observe a changing 
pattern of industry wage effects. Unfortunately, the data is unable to conclude whether 
the change in industrial wage variation is because of a change in the basic wage 
structure or a change in bonus determination. Another restriction is that the data used 
in their study refers only to the first installment of labor market reform. 
On the other hand, the paper provides a comparison of the experience-earnings 
profiles of China with that of other Western market economies. It argues that the 
profiles are productivity-lined in the selected market economies while it is more likely 
to be seniority-related in China. Although China has a similar experience-earnings 
relationship with Japan, Japanese wage determination system has evolved to keep 
workers with the firm whereas Chinese wage system has no need to play such a role. 
However, the authors fail to address the reason why no direct link with productivity 
can be seen in the Chinese profile. 
Johnson and Chow (1997) examine how the rate of return to education differs by 
gender and communist membership in China by using the Chinese Income Project 
1988. They allow interaction terms of gender with experience and schooling to be 
present in the Mincer-type earnings equations for subsamples of rural and urban areas. 
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The rate of return to schooling for women is higher than that of males as the 
coefficient of gender and schooling is 1.87 percent in rural subsample and 1.68 
percent in urban subsample. 
Li (2000) uses a more recent data from 1995 Chinese Household Income Project 
(CHIP) to investigate whether returns to education in urban China have been 
underestimated in previous works and whether the returns have increased as reforms 
deepens. The study finds that returns to education is higher using wage rates'^  instead 
of earnings because highly educated people work fewer hours on average. It also 
provides results for workers who started jobs prior to economic reform, the early stage 
of urban reform and the advancing stage of the reform. Returns to education are 
highest for the newly hired cohort. It also shows that the rates of return are higher in a 
less-developed, low-income province, Gansu, than in a relatively developed, 
high-income province, Guangdong. Lastly, the sex dummy is significant among the 
state-owned, local publically owned and urban collective sectors; and interestingly, 
the sex dummy is insignificant in the non-publicly owned sector. 
4 Using the wage rate, the returns to schooling is 5.5% whereas using earnings, the returns to schooling 
is 5.0%. Using the wage rate, education premium of college over elementary school is 66% whereas 
using earnings the premium is 60%. 
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Table 2,1: Return to schooling in China (continued) 
luthors Data Specification Estimates 
Gustafsson and Li (2000) CHIP (1988 and 1995). Specification 1: Regress 1988 Specification!: 4-year college 
male log earnings on age 0.089 [0.016]; 2-year college 
groups, years of working 0.027 [0.015]; professional 
experience, its squared, marital school 0.016 [0.013]; lower 
status, minority, communist middle school 0.014 [0.009]; 
party member, education, primary school -0.012 [0.015]; 
ownership dummies, less than primary school -0.082 
occupation dummies, industry [0.031], 
dummies, full-time/part-time Specification 2: 4-year college 
employment, work unit 0.102 [0.026]； 2-year college 
dummies, job status and 0.043 [0.021]; professional 
province dummies. school 0.030 [0.016]; lower 
Specification 2: Similar to middle school -0.016 [0.011]; 
specification 1 but using 1988 primary school -0.090 [0.027]; 
female log earnings as less than primary school -0.194 
dependent variable. [0.027]. 
Specification 3: Similar to Specification 3: 4-year college 
specification! but using 1995 0.155 [0.030]; 2-year college 
male log earnings as dependent 0.068 [0.024]; professional 
variable. school 0.033 [0.024]; lower 
Specification 4: Similar to middle school -0.038 [0.021]; 
specification! but using 1995 primary school -0.161 [0.041]; 
female log earnings as less than primary school -0.302 
dependent variable. [0.136], 
Specification 4: 4-year college 
0.208 [0.043]; 2-year college 
0.122 [0.031]; professional 
school 0.063 [0.028]; lower 
middle school -0.062 [0.023]; 
primary school -0.294 [0.041]; 
less than primary school -0.184 
[0.101], 
Liu (1998) CHIP (1988). Specification 1: regress log Specification 1: years of 
total earnings on years of education 0.0361 (32.54). 
education, experience, Specification 2: university 
experience squared and male 0.375 (16.35); secondary 0.191 
dummy. (8.87); primary 0.075 (3.33). 
Specificaiton 2: regress log Specification 3: years of 
total earnings on university, education 0.0283 (22.01). 
secondary school, primary Specification 4: years of 
school, experience, experience education 0.0298 (21.56). 
squared and male dummy. 
Specification 3: regress log 
total earnings on years of 
education, experience, 
experience squared, male 
dummy, ownership dummies, 
occupation dummies, industry 
dummies and regional 
dummies. 
Specification 4: regress log 
cash earnings on years of 
education, experience, 
experience squared, male 
dummy, ownership dummies, 
occupation dummies, industry 
dummies and regional 
dummies. 
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Table 2,1: Return to schooling in China (continued) 
Authors Data Specification Estimates 
Maruer-Fazio (1999) CHIP (1988); the Chinese Specification 1: regress logSpecif icat ion 1: years of 
Labor Market Research Project annual earnings of males (in education 0.029 (21.275). 
(1992). 1988) on years of schooling. Specification 2: years of 
potential experience and education 0.045 (25.258). 
experience squared. Specification 3: years of 
Specification 2: similar to education 0.0374 (13.923). 
specification 1 except it is for Specification 4: years of 
females instead of males. education 0.0494 (13.816). 
Specification 3: regress log 
monthly earnings (in 1991) on 
years of schooling, potential 
experience and experience 
squared. 
Specification 4: similar to 
specification 3 except it is for 
females instead of males. 
Meng and Kidd (1997) A firm-based state sector Specification 1: regress 1981Specification 1: bachelor 
employee panel survey for the monthly wage on educational 0.2905 (43.24); semi-bachelor 
period of 1981 and 1987 by the dummies, potential experience 0.2222 (39.03); senior 
Institue of quantitative in level and quadartic form, secondary 0.1143 (27.82); 
Economics of the Chinese occupation dummies and junior secondary 0.0666 
Academy of Social Sciences industrial affiliation variables. (20.09). 
conducted in 1989 . Specification 2: similar to Specification 2: bachelor 
specification 1 except using 0.3130 (52.35); semi-bachelor 
1987 monthly wage as 0.2221 (42.36); senior 
dependent variable. secondary 0.1162 (30.85); 
junior secondary 0.0553 
(18.21). 
Li (2000) CHIP (1995) Specification 1: regress hourly Specification 1: years of 
wage rate on years of schooling 0.054 (16.90). 
schooling, experience, Specification 2: years of 
experience squared, sex, ethnic schooling 0.050 (16.09). 
minority, party, rectified youth, Specification 3: college 0.66 
ownership, industry and (13.72); professional school 
province dummies. 0.54 (11.68); middle 
Specification 2: Similar to professional 0.48 (11.41); 
specification 1 using annual upper middle 0.36 (8.00); lower 
earnings instead of hourly wage middle 0.27 (6.09). 
as dependent variable. Specification 4: college 0.60 
Specification 3: Similar to (13.04); professional school 
specification 1 using 0.50 (11.32); middle 
categorical educational professional 0.45 (10.10); 
variables instead of years of upper middle 0.34 (7.85); lower 
schooling. middle 0.26 (6.09). 
Specification 4: Similar to Specification 5: college 0.54 
specification 2 using (10.83); professional school 
categorical educational 0.44 (9.24); middle 
variables instead of years of professional 0.39 (8.34); upper 
schooling. middle 0.31 (6.95); lower 
Specification 5: Similar to middle 0.25 (5.58). 
specification 3 with the Specification 6: years of 
addition of occupation schooling 0.042 (11.61). 
dummies as controlling 
variables. 
Specification 6: Similar to 
specification 1 with the 
addition of occupation 
dummies as controlling 
variables. 
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Table 2,1: Return to schooling in China (continued) 
Authors Data Specification Estimates 
Byron and Manaloto (1990) 800 adults in Nanjing conducted Specification 1: OLS Specification 1: year of 
by the International Wool regression of basic monthly schooling 0.0143 (1.71); 
Secretariate in 1986. salary on schooling, Specification 2: year of 
experience, experience squared, schooling 0.0120 
schooling-experience 
interaction variable and female 
dummy. 
Specification 2: WLS 
regression of basic monthly 
salary on same control 
variables as specification 1. 
Knight and Song (1991) Urban survey of 6132 household Specification 1: regress Specification 1: university and 
(1986) by the Chinese State monthly income of household college 0.149; technical high 
Statistical Bureau. head on education level school 0.118; high school 
dummies, sex, age and area in 0.088; middle school 0.066; 
the state-owned sector. illiterate -0.061. 
Specification 2: similar to 1 but Specification 2: university and 
in the collective-owned sector college 0.040; technical high 
instead. school 0.042; high school 
Specification 3: similar to 1 butO.055; middle school 0.015; 
in the private sector. illiterate -0.156. 
Specification 3: university and 
college 0.350; technical high 
school -0.021; high school 
-0.211; middle school 0.061; 
illiterate -0.626. 
Johnson and Chow (1997) CHIP (1988). Specification 1: regress log Specification 1: years of 
wage on years of schooling, schooling 0.0329 [0.0010], 
experience, experience squared, Specification 2: years of 
female dummy, communist and schooling 0.0368 [0.0013], 
minority in urban areas. Specification 3: years of 
Specificaiton 2: simliar to schooling 0.0278 [0.0017], 
specification 1 except adding 
interaction terms between 
female and schooling as 
controlling variable. 
Specification 3: similar to 
specification 2 except adding 
interaction terms between 
communist and schooling, 
communist and experience and 
communist and experience 
squared. 
The numbers in ( ) are t ratios. 
The numbers in [ ] are standard errors of coefficients. 
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2.5 Literature review of returns to schooling on Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries 
Flanagan (1994) estimates rates of returns to education in the Czech Republic 
based on 1988 and 1991 surveys of monthly wages. The estimated return is 4.4% in 
1988 and 4.9% in 1991. The estimated gender-specific coefficients are 3.4% (5.4%) 
for men (women) in 1988 and by 1991, the coefficient for men is 4.4% and that for 
women is 5.3%. Flanagan (1994) also estimates the categorical variables of education 
and finds a decrease in the rate of return to vocational education and an increase in the 
rate of return to university education for men. Similar to Flanagan, Chase (1997) 
examines changes in the earnings structure between Communist and post-Communist 
Czech Republic in 1984 and 1993. The author finds that return to education rises from 
2.4% (4.2%) to 5.2% (5.8%) for males (females) between the two years in Czech 
Republic. In addition, the author also provides estimates in Solvakia for the two years. 
The returns are found to increase from 2.8% (4.4%) to 4.9% (5.4%) for males 
(females) in Solvakia. Besides, Rutkowski (1997) finds the rate of return to education 
rises from 5% in 1987 to 7% in 1992 for Poland using Polish Household Budget 
Survey. The paper also uses 1992, 1995 and 1996 Labor Force Surveys. The estimated 
return is 8% in 1992, 7% in 1995 and 8% in 1996. 
Contrary to the above studies, Krueger and Pischke (1995) use the 1988 Survey 
on Income of Blue- and White-Collar Households in East Germany and the 1991 
German Socio-Economic Panel of Households and they find point estimate of the rate 
of return to education dropped from 7.7% to 6.2% across the two years. Bird et al. 
(1994) exploit micro data from 1989 and 1991 East German surveys and find the 
returns fell slightly from 4.4% in 1989 to 4.1% in 1991. However, the 1989-1991 
30 
、/ decline is not statistically significant. 
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Chapter 3. Data 
3.1 Source of data 
The data used in this thesis come from twelve consecutive annual urban 
household surveys, from 1988 to 1999, conducted by the State Statistical Bureau. 
These surveys are served to provide information on household population, 
employment status, income, consumption, saving, cash holdings, demand for goods 
and housings in cities, and so on. It therefore helps the state and researchers to grasp a 
better picture of income inequality, consumption patterns, and more importantly it 
helps the government in planning future social policies for the well being of the entire 
community. Rural households living in an urban area without an urban household 
registration (hukou) are not in the sample. 
There are over 200 cities covered in surveys each year. Respondents are chosen 
to represent conditions in various regions of China and of cities and towns of various 
size. The present study use data from the following five city and provinces surveyed: 
Beijing, Liaoning^, Zhejiang^, Sichuan? and Guangdong8. Beijing is a rapidly 
growing municipality in the north; Guangdong and Zhejiang are dynamic economic 
provinces in the southern coastal region; Liaoning is a heavy industry province in the 
5 The surveyed cities for Liaoning include Dandong, Shenyang, Dalian, Anshan, Fushun, Jinzhou, 
Changtu, Suizhong and Wafangdian. 
6 The surveyed cities for Zhejiang include Putuo，Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Jinhua, Zhoushan, 
Xinchang and Anji. 
7 The surveyed cities for Sichuan include Luzhou, Gimgyuan, Leshan, Wanxian, Dianjiang, Zhongqing, 
Chengdu, Zigong, Nanchong, Wenjian, Pingchang, Emei, Hanyuan and Xuyong. 
The surveyed cities for Guangdong include Foshan, Wenchang, Qiongzhong, Haikou, Shaoguan, 
Zhaoqing, Huizhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Shenzhen Puning and Shunde. 
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northeast; and Sichuan is a relatively less developed province in the west. There are 
about five thousand individual workers in each sampled year. 
A map of China is shown below: 
L f � 
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3.2 Sample selection 
Table 3.1: Male employment rate 
Male 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Counts of non-selected males: 
private employer/self-employed 12 0 1 1 32 35 36 39 44 80 86 92 
wait for job 72 56 79 68 63 71 63 76 79 77 103 103 
lose work ability 11 13 13 23 5 8 5 1 1 6 6 11 
retirees networking 322 280 348 328 489 478 508 529 542 545 600 643 
students 244 199 286 236 347 312 297 284 317 349 359 36 
wait for study 7 0 1 4 4 7 4 3 8 3 11 7 
house work 10 6 2 4 1 4 2 3 3 3 2 5 
retirees worked 87 67 85 87 131 118 138 106 117 96 109 87 
No. of selected workers 2796 2340 3003 2907 3669 3225 3090 3106 3048 2978 2858 2570 
Employment number* 2895 2407 3089 2995 3832 3378 3264 3251 3209 3154 3053 2749 
Labor force number** 2967 2463 3168 3063 3895 3449 3327 3327 3288 3231 3156 2852 
Employment rate*** 97.6% 97.7% 97.5% 97.8% 98.4% 97.9% 98.1% 97.7% 97.6% 97.6% 96.7% 96.4% 
*The employment number is the sum of number of selected workers, number of private employer/self-employed and the number 
of retirees worked. 
** The labor force number is the sum of number of selected workers, number of private employer/self-employed, the number of 
retirees worked and the number of those waiting for jobs. 
*** The employment rate is the employment number / the labor force number. 
Table 3.2: Female employment rate 
Female 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Counts of non-selected females: 
private employer/self-employed 16 1 1 1 42 42 36 38 38 53 70 82 
wait for job 65 34 70 77 72 68 84 85 74 99 135 146 
lose work ability 89 95 91 93 20 22 17 19 13 23 12 18 
retirees not working 405 389 495 476 664 632 700 715 756 749 849 829 
students 227 202 237 234 282 274 253 252 299 346 372 348 
wait for study 2 5 4 3 4 4 8 2 4 2 4 3 
house work 97 68 84 102 84 83 80 69 71 73 65 86 
retirees worked 45 43 71 58 130 95 142 124 142 139 137 183 
No. of selected workers 2688 2194 2779 2698 3380 2969 2813 2788 2728 2693 2491 2244 
Employment number* 2993 2470 3171 3068 3938 3495 3365 3368 3329 3287 3228 2939 
Labor force number** 3058 2504 3241 3145 4010 3563 3449 3453 3403 3386 3363 3085 
Employment rate*** 97.9%98.6% 97.8% 97.6% 98.2% 98.1% 97.6% 97.5% 97.8% 97.1% 96.0% 95.3% 
*The employment number is the sum of number of selected workers, number of private employer/self-employed and the number 
of retirees worked. 
** The labor force number is the sum of number of selected workers, number of private employer/self-employed, the number of 
retirees worked and the number of those waiting for jobs. 
*** The employment rate is the employment number / the labor force number. 
Table 3.3: Percentage of multiple job holders 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 5484 4534 5782 5605 7049 6194 5903 5894 5776 5671 5349 4814 
% of multiple job holders 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 
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Our sample is restricted to employees in the surveyed years. Employers, 
self-employed people, retirees, students, house workers, those losing work ability and 
those waiting for jobs are therefore not included in the estimation of wage equations. 
The distributions of the non-selected males and females are shown in Tables 3.1 and 
3.2 respectively. W e can see that the majority of these people are retirees and students. 
Moreover, as the Labor Law explicitly states the work-age to be 16 or over, we have 
selected workers aged 16 or above for our sample. Because the percentages of 
multiple jobholders in the sample are all less than 0.5% (Table 3.3), we concentrate on 
the primary jobs only. For 1988 to 1991 surveys, wage income for the state-owned or 
collectively owned sectors consists of six components: regular wage, floating wage, 
contract income, bonus, subsidy and other wage income. For 1992 to 1996 
questionnaires, wage income for the state-owned or collectively owned sectors is 
made up of: time-rate wage, piecework wage, bonus, subsidy, overtime wage and 
other wage income. For 1997 to 1999 data, wage income for the two sectors has only 
two parts—basic wage and bonuses. For consistency, basic wage is therefore defined 
as total wage income minus bonus for all years in our analysis. For employees in 
private ownership sector and other ownership sector, their wage income has only one 
figure, so we cannot calculate their basic wage. 
3.3 A First look at the data 
In general, the working population ages over time (Table 3.4). This may be an 
outcome of the falling birth rates consistent with the official one-child policy and 
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increased life expectancy. According to World Bank 1998，the total fertility rate 
calculated as births per woman is 5.8 in 1970 and 1.9 in 1995. Male workers on 
average are older than female workers. The mean work age of males rises from 39 in 
1988 to 41 in 1999 and that of females grows from 35 in 1988 to 38 in 1999 (Tables 
3.5 & 3.6). The median men age ranges from 38 in 1988 to 42 in 1999 while the 
median women age ranges from 36 in 1988 to 40 in 1999 (Tables 3.7 & 3.8). 
Table 3.4: General statistics of all employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 5484 4534 5782 5605 7049 6194 5903 5894 5776 5671 5349 4814 
age 37.08 37.26 37.90 37.80 38.00 38.40 38.54 38.81 39.27 39.57 39.73 39.87 
married 63.7% 63.3% 63.4% 64.1% 64.0% 63.9% 64.7% 65.1% 65.2% 66.2% 64.5% 64.2% 
university 12.3% 13.1% 14.5% 15.3% 7.8% 7.5% 7.6% 6.8% 6.6% 7.2% 7.6% 8.9% 
college 11.0% 11.3% 13.3% 14.8% 15.1% 15.0% 16.5% 17.7% 
vocational school 11.5% 11.8% 12.6% 12.3% 13.2% 12.6% 13.7% 13.1% 13.2% 12.9% 14.1% 14.8% 
senior high 22.4% 23.4% 24.0% 24.0% 24.5% 24.8% 25.6% 26.6% 27.0% 26.8% 27.1% 26.2% 
junior high 42.3% 41.3% 39.4% 37.7% 36.0% 37.5% 34.8% 33.7% 33.6% 33.8% 30.9% 29.0% 
primary or below 11.5% 10.4% 9.5% 10.7% 7.6% 6.3% 4.9% 5.0% 4.5% 4.3% 3.8% 3.4% 
year of schooling 10.53 10.66 10.83 10.84 11.00 11.03 11.23 11.26 11.29 11.31 11.48 11.63 
s.d. of schooling year 2.83 2.81 2.86 2.92 2.68 2.61 2.58 2.55 2.52 2.52 2.53 2.52 
potential experience 20.56 20.61 21.08 20.97 21.01 21.37 21.32 21.55 21.98 22.26 22.25 22.24 
Table 3.5: General statistics of male employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 2796 2340 3003 2907 3669 3225 3090 3106 3048 2978 2858 2570 
age 38.65 38.70 39.44 39.49 39.37 39.72 39.91 40.14 40.60 41.03 41.15 41.31 
married 59.2% 59.0% 58.5% 56.3% 57.4% 57.1% 59.1% 59.6% 59.4% 61.6% 61.1% 61.4% 
university 17.6% 18.0% 19.1% 20.6% 10.5% 10.0% 10.4% 9.4% 9.1% 9.7% 9.8% 10.9% 
college 12.7% 13.6% 15.5% 17.0% 17.3% 17.0% 18.0% 18.7% 
university or college 17.6% 18.0% 19.1% 20.6% 23.2% 23.6% 26.0% 26.4% 26.4% 26.7% 27.8% 29.6% 
vocational school 11.4% 11.5% 11.5% 11.6% 12.4% 11.3% 12.2% 11.7% 11.8% 11.7% 12.2% 13.1% 
senior high 22.0% 23.6% 24.1% 22.7% 23.3% 23.2% 23.6% 25.3% 25.3% 25.5% 26.5% 25.4% 
junior high 40.2% 38.5% 37.6% 36.4% 34.5% 36.7% 33.5% 32.2% 32.3% 31.9% 29.8% 28.6% 
primary or below 8.9% 8.4% 7.6% 8.6% 6.6% 5.1% 4.8% 4.4% 4.2% 4.3% 3.7% 3.3% 
year of schooling 10.96 11.06 11.18 11.21 11.24 11.26 11.44 11.48 11.49 11.52 11.63 11.76 
s.d. of schooling year 2.94 2.91 2.92 3.01 2.68 2.62 2.61 2.55 2.54 2.55 2.51 2.49 
potential experience 21.69 21.64 22.26 22.29 22.13 22.46 22.47 22.65 23.11 23.51 23.52 23.56 
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Table 3.6: General statistics of female employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 2688 2194 2779 2698 3380 2969 2813 2788 2728 2693 2491 2244 
age 35.46 35.73 36.24 35.98 36.51 36.96 37.05 37.32 37.78 37.97 38.10 38.23 
married 68.3% 67.9% 68.6% 72.5% 71.1% 71.2% 70.8% 71.2% 71.6% 71.3% 68.5% 67.3% 
university 6.8% 7.8% 9.4% 9.7% 4.9% 4.8% 4.4% 4.0% 3.7% 4.3% 5.0% 6.5% 
college 9.2% 8.8% 10.9% 12.2% 12.7% 12.8% 14.8% 16.6% 
university or college 6.8% 7.8% 9.4% 9.7% 14.1% 13.6% 15.4% 16.2% 16.4% 17.2% 19.8% 23.1% 
vocational school 11.6% 12.2% 13.7% 13.0% 14.0% 13.9% 15.3% 14.7% 14.7% 14.4% 16.3% 16.8% 
senior high 22.9% 23.1% 24.0% 25.4% 25.7% 26.6% 27.8% 28.2% 29.0% 28.2% 27.9% 27.1% 
junior high 44.4% 44.3% 41.2% 39.1% 37.5% 38.3% 36.3% 35.3% 35.2% 35.9% 32.1% 29.5% 
primary or below 14.3% 12.5% 11.6% 12.9% 8.7% 7.5% 5.2% 5.6% 4.8% 4.3% 3.9% 3.6% 
year of schooling 10.08 10.23 10.44 10.44 10.73 10.77 11.00 11.01 11.06 11.09 11.30 11.49 
s.d. of schooling year 2.63 2.62 2.73 2.75 2.63 2.56 2.51 2.50 2.45 2.44 2.52 2.53 
potential experience 19.38 19.51 19.80 19.55 19.79 20.20 20.05 20.32 20.72 20.88 20.80 20.73 
Table 3.7: Male age distribution for selected percentiles 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
1% 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 19.08 
5% 21 20 21 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 24 22.17 
10% 24 23 24 26 24 24 25 26 26 27 27 28 25.33 
25% 31 31 33 32 32 33 33 33 34 34 35 35 33.00 
50% 38 39 40 39 39 40 40 40 41 42 42 42 40.17 
75% 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 48 48 48 47.25 
90% 53 53 54 54 54 54 54 53 54 53 53 53 53.50 
95% 56 56 57 57 57 56 56 56 57 57 56 55 56.33 
99% 59 59 60 60 59 59 60 59 59 59 59 59 59.25 
Table 3.8: Female age distribution for selected percentiles 
— 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
1% 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 19 18.83 
5% 20 20 20 21 21 21 22 22 23 23 23 23 21.58 
10% 23 23 23 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 26 24.25 
25% 30 30 31 30 30 31 31 31 32 33 33 33 31.25 
50% 36 36 36 36 37 38 38 38 39 39 39 40 37.67 
75% 42 42 42 42 42 43 43 43 44 44 44 45 43.00 
90% 47 47 48 47 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47.75 
95% 50 50 50 50 51 51 51 51 51 50 50 50 50.42 
99% 54 54 55 54 55 55 55 55 55 54 53 54 ^ 
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Besides, men have a larger spread of work age than women. For instance, the 
99th percentile of age for male workers is about 59 years whereas the 99th percentile 
of age for working women is around about 54 years. We might say that women and 
men workers have more or less same number of work years in their lives. From the 
synthetic age cohorts (which is obtained by dividing the whole sample into cohorts 
according to the individual's birth year with a 5-year interval), we can see that women 
have shorter average years of schooling from Table 3.6, so probably women start 
working at an earlier age after they complete their education. From Table 3.7 and 3.8， 
the first percentile of the male (female) age distribution is around the age of 19 (19) 
and the percentile is around the age of 59 (55). From Table 3.9, the percentage of 
the male synthetic cohort bom between year 1938 and year 1942 is around 13% in 
1988 and it drops eventually to 3% in 1999; but from Table 3.10, the corresponding 
percentage of the female cohort drops from 11% in 1988 to zero in 1999. Therefore, 
men stay in the labor market for a longer period. 
Table 3.9: Composition of synthetic male cohorts by birth years 
Birth year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
after 1978 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 3% 1% 
1973-77 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 3% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6% 3% 
1968-72 5% 7% 7% 7% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8% 7% 8% 8% 8% 
1963-67 8% 8% 7% 8% 8% 8% 10% 11% 11% 13% 13% 13% 10% 
1958-62 10% 10% 9% 12% 11% 12% 13% 14% 14% 15% 17% 16% 13% 
1953-57 16% 17% 18% 20% 21% 21% 21% 18% 26% 22% 21% 24% 20% 
1948-52 19% 18% 20% 17% 17% 17% 18% 17% 17% 19% 18% 18% 18% 
1943-47 14% 14% 14% 13% 12% 13% 12% 12% 12% 11% 11% 9% 12% 
1938-42 13% 12% 12% 11% 11% 10% 10% 8% 8% 7% 5% 3% 9% 
1933-37 10% 8% 9% 9% 8% 6% 5% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 5% 
1928-32 5% 5% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
1923-27 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Table 3.10: Composition of synthetic female cohorts by birth years 
Birth year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
after 1978 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 
1973-77 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 4% 
1968-72 6% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 10% 12% 9% 
1963-67 9% 9% 9% 12% 11% 11% 13% 14% 15% 15% 16% 15% 13% 
1958-62 13% 13% 12% 14% 15% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 22% 21% 16% 
1953-57 21% 23% 24% 25% 25% 26% 27% 22% 31% 25% 23% 25% 25% 
1948-52 21% 21% 22% 19% 18% 18% 18% 18% 17% 17% 16% 13% 18% 
1943-47 14% 15% 13% 13% 11% 10% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 9% 
1938-42 11% 9% 8% 6% 6% 5% 4% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 4% 
1933-37 3% 3% 3% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
1928-32 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1923-27 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
As expected, the educational profiles of men and women have improved a lot 
over the 12-year span. In 1988, only half of the workers received educational level 
higher than junior high; in 1999, the ratio mounted to 0.7 (Table 3.4). Men increase 
their schooling years from 11 to 11.8 over the 12 year-period; women increase theirs 
more rapidly from 10 to 11.5 over the same period (Tables 3.5 & 3.6). Around 10% 
more men received education of college or above in 1999 than in 1988; around 16% 
more women attained tertiary education level over the same period. Apart from this, 
the difference between average years of schooling of male and female workers drops 
steadily from 0.89 year in 1988 to 0.26 year in 1999. As the economy grows, men and 
women tend to get similar length of education in school. The standard deviation of 
years of schooling drops slightly from 2.83 in 1988 to 2.52 in 1999. We can infer that 
the working population's distribution of years of education became less dispersed 
over time. 
Potential experience is imputed by age minus years of schooling minus six. Since 
female work force has a younger age profile, the potential experience for women is 
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about 2.5 years less than that of men (Table 3.4). Over time, men and women both 
gain more potential experience on average (Tables 3.5 & 3.6). The potential 
experience for men rises from 21.7 to 23.6 years and that for women rises from 19.4 
to 20.7 years. However, the gap of average potential experience rises from 2.3 years 
to 2.8 years (Table 3.11). This means that gender experience skill levels diverge 
slightly during the 1990s. 
Table 3.11: General statistics, male - female difference 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
age 3.19 2.97 3.20 3.51 2.86 2.76 2.86 2.81 2.82 3.06 3.05 3.08 
married -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 
university 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
college 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 
vocational school 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
senior high -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
junior high -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
primary or below -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
year of schooling 0.88 0.83 0.74 0.77 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.33 0.26 
potential experience 2.31 2.13 2.46 2.74 2.35 2.26 2.42 2.33 2.39 2.63 2.72 2.82 
Around 80% of employees work in the state-owned sector whereas about a 
quarter of total employment is in the collective sector in the late 1980s. The 
percentage of employees working in the collectively owned sector drops to 16% in 
1999. This trend of diminishing collective sector employment is prominent in both 
male and female work force. The composition of women participating in the 
collectively owned sector is always around 10% higher than that of men every year. In 
contrast, the composition of men participating in the state-owned sector is always 
around 10% higher than that of women (Tables 3.12-3.15). Private and other 
ownership accounts for less than 5% of each year's ownership composition. Even if 
we would include the number of self-employed people and employers in the private 
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ownership sector, the percentage of private and other ownership would still be less 
than 8%. Thus, our sample has a much lower composition of the private and other 
ownership than the widely known high share of private and other forms of ownership 
in China. In 1999, about half of the 21014 urban employed people are in private 
enterprises, self-employed units, foreign funded units, limited liability corporation, 
shareholding corporation and other ownership units (China Statistical Yearbook 
2001). 
Table 3.12: Ownership distribution of all employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 5484 4534 5782 5605 7049 6194 5903 5894 5776 5671 5349 4814 
state-owned 73.2% 72.7% 75.3% 76.3% 76.8% 76.2% 78.7% 80.9% 81.0% 80.7% 81.0% 79.2% 
collective 26.0% 26.7% 24.1% 23.0% 21.8% 22.0% 19.3% 17.2% 16.8% 17.1% 16.3% 16.3% 
private 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.6% 1.7% 2.1% 3.4% 
other ownership 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 1.0% 
Table 3.13: Ownership distribution of male employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 2796 2340 3003 2907 3669 3225 3090 3106 3048 2978 2858 2570 
state-owned 81.3% 80.2% 82.2% 82.6% 83.3% 82.3% 84.3% 85.8% 86.2% 86.6% 85.0% 84.2% 
collective 18.2% 19.4% 17.2% 17.0% 15.7% 16.4% 13.9% 12.5% 11.7% 11.6% 12.3% 11.5% 
private 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.6% 1.5% 2.2% 3.5% 
other ownership 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.5% 0.8% 
Table 3.14: Ownership distribution of female employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 2688 2194 2779 2698 3380 2969 2813 2788 2728 2693 2491 2244 
state-owned 64.8% 64.8% 67.7% 69.4% 69.8% 69.6% 72.6% 75.5% 75.1% 74.2% 76.4% 73.5% 
collective 34.2% 34.5% 31.5% 29.5% 28.4% 28.2% 25.2% 22.5% 22.5% 23.1% 20.9% 21.9% 
private 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.0% 1.2% 1.3% 1.6% 1.9% 2.0% 3.3% 
other ownership 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 0.6% 1.2% 1.0% 0.8% 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 1.3% 
Table 3.15: Ownership distribution, male-female difference 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
state-owned 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.11 
collective -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 
private 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
other ownership 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
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In 1988, 40% of total employment worked as production workers and the figure 
dropped rapidly to 32% after 12 years. The rising composition of professional and 
technicians, and administrative workers displaces the declining composition of 
production workers. About one fifth of total workers are professionals and technicians, 
and another one fifth are administrative or office workers. Further, the percentage 
drop of the female production workers is more severe than that of males. On the other 
hand, the percentage gain of female professionals and technicians are more profound 
than that of males. More men —over 13% of males take the position of cadres, 
whereas only less than 5% of women are cadres although the percentage does slightly 
improve. Conversely, women are more involved as commerce and service staff 
members throughout the period (Tables 3.16-3.19) albeit the percentages decline for 
both males and females. 
Table 3.16: Occupation distribution of all employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 5484 4534 5782 5605 7049 6194 5903 5894 5776 5671 5349 4814 
professional 17.3% 17.4% 20.8% 20.8% 21.6% 21.8% 23.9% 23.7% 23.1% 21.0% 21.5% 23.1% 
cadre 8.0% 8.8% 7.0% 7.0% 8.0% 8.3% 8.7% 7.3% 7.6% 7.7% 8.2% 9.2% 
administrative worker 20.4% 19.9% 20.1% 20.1% 18.2% 19.0% 19.6% 20.1% 20.9% 21.7% 23.1% 23.2% 
business worker 7.5% 7.2% 6.9% 6.9% 5.7% 6.5% 6.3% 6.2% 6.0% 6.2% 5.4% 5.4% 
service worker 6.0% 4.9% 5.1% 5.1% 5.2% 4.6% 4.1% 4.3% 4.5% 4.8% 5.1% 5.2% 
agricultural worker 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
production worker 40.0% 41.1% 39.4% 39.4% 40.5% 38.8% 36.4% 37.5% 36.9% 37.7% 35.7% 32.4% 
other worker 0-5% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 1—0% 1.0% 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 1.0% 1.5% 
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Table 3.17: Occupation distribution of male employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 2796 2340 3003 2907 3669 3225 3090 3106 3048 2978 2858 2570 
professional 17.3% 16.6% 20.9% 20.9% 20.5% 20.8% 21.2% 22.3% 21.9% 20.2% 19.8% 21.2% 
cadre 13.4% 14.2% 11.2% 11.2% 12.6% 12.6% 13.6% 10.9% 11.0% 11.0% 11.4% 12.5% 
administrative worker 22.0% 20.9% 22.2% 22.2% 19.2% 19.4% 20.2% 20.7% 21.5% 22.4% 23.5% 23.9% 
business worker 4.4% 4.0% 4.1% 4.1% 3.4% 3.8% 3.9% 3.7% 3.5% 3.5% 3.3% 3.5% 
service worker 2.9% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.6% 2.4% 2.0% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.8% 3.3% 
agricultural worker 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
production worker 39.4% 41.2% 38.9% 38.9% 41.3% 40.5% 38.3% 39.1% 38.8% 39.8% 38.2% 34.3% 
other worker 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.5% 0.9% 1.3% 
Table 3.18: Occupation distribution of female employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 2688 2194 2779 2698 3380 2969 2813 2788 2728 2693 2491 2244 
professional 17.2% 18.4% 20.6% 20.6% 22.8% 22.8% 26.7% 25.1% 24.5% 21.9% 23.4% 25.3% 
cadre 2.4% 3.0% 2.4% 2.4% 3.0% 3.7% 3.4% 3.3% 3.8% 4.0% 4.5% 5.3% 
administrative worker 18.8% 18.8% 17.9% 17.9% 17.1% 18.6% 19.0% 19.4% 20.3% 20.9% 22.6% 22.5% 
business worker 10.8% 10.6% 9.9% 9.9% 8.3% 9.3% 8.9% 9.0% 8.7% 9.2% 7.7% 7.6% 
service worker 9.3% 7.5% 8.2% 8.2% 8.1% 6.9% 6.3% 6.5% 6.9% 7.5% 7.7% 7.4% 
agricultural worker 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
production worker 40.6% 40.9% 39.8% 39.8% 39.6% 37.0% 34.3% 35.8% 34.7% 35.3% 32.9% 30.1% 
other worker 0.7% 0.6% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.5% 1.3% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.2% 1.7% 
Table 3.19: Occupation distribution, male - female difference 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
professional & technician 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 0.00 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0,04) (0.04) 
cadre 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
administrative worker 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
business worker (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0,06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05 ) (0,06) (0,04) (0.04) 
service worker (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0,06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
agricultural worker (0,00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 
production worker (0,01) 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 
other worker (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (().01) (O.OI) (0.0 i.) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0!) (0.00) (0.00) 
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A substantial number of workers—about 35% to 40% of total employment 
engage in the manufacturing, mining, electrical and industrial sector. Men are 
relatively more active in sector of construction, sector of traffic, transportation, post 
and telecommunication, sector of science, research and technology, as well as sector 
of state and institutions, party and government agencies across all years. Alternatively, 
women have a higher participation ratio in sector of commerce, catering trade, 
material supply industry, real estate and social services, sector of health care, sports 
and social welfare, and sector of education, culture and arts each year (Tables 
3.20-3.22). The composition of each industry sector does not vary much over the 
whole period. We can see that the sector of commerce, catering trade, material supply 
industry shrinks slightly and the 2% loss is taken up by the traffic, transportation, post 
and telecommunication sector. 
Table 3.20: Industry distribution of all employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 5484 4534 5782 5605 7049 6194 5903 5894 5776 5671 5349 4814 
agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry, sideline 
& fishery 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 
gelogical exploration, 
wagter conservancy & 
census 8.7% 2.2% 2.8% 1.8% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 
construction 2.8% 2.8% 2.2% 2.7% 3.4% 3.8% 3.6% 4.3% 4.3% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 
traffic, transportation, post 
& telecommunication 6.3% 7.8% 6.9% 7.0% 7.0% 7.2% 7.3% 6.2% 6.1% 6.6% 7.4% 8.0% 
commerce, catering trade, 
material supply industry 14.2% 15.2% 14.8% 15.3% 13.5% 13.8% 13.7% 14.3% 14.7% 13.3% 12.2% 12.1% 
real estate & social 
services 6.6% 3.8% 3.9% 4.5% 4.1% 3.9% 4.2% 4.8% 4.7% 5.5% 1.3% 0.9% 
health care, sports & 
social welfare 4.5% 5.2% 5.2% 4.7% 5.1% 4.8% 5.0% 4.7% 4.3% 4.1% 4.9% 5.5% 
education, culture and arts 6.7% 6.1% 6.7% 8.1% 7.1% 7.2% 7.6% 7.5% 7.4% 7.1% 7.4% 7.9% 
science, research and 
technology services 3.4% 1.5% 2.8% 1.9% 2.2% 2.2% 2.5% 2.2% 2.0% 2.1% 2.8% 2.7% 
finance and insurance 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 2.1% 1.8% 2.1% 2.1% 2.5% 2.3% 2.4% 3.1% 3.4% 
government, part agencies 
and social organizations 8.7% 8.0% 9.7% 9.8% 10.8% 10.8% 11.7% 10.8% 11.1% 10.4% 11.3% 11.4% 
mining, manufacturing, 
electrical & industrial 34.7% 44.5% 41.7% 39.9% 42.8% 41.5% 39.8% 40.1% 40.3% 42.1% 37.7% 36.4% 
other industry 1.2% 1.3% 1.0% 1.5% 0.6% 1.0% 0.9% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 
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Table 3.21: Industry distribution of male employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 2796 2340 3003 2907 3669 3225 3090 3106 3048 2978 2858 2570 
agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry, sideline 
& fishery 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 1.4% 1.5% 1.3% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 
gelogical exploration, 
wagter conservancy & 
census 8.8% 2.1% 2.8% 1.8% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 
construction 3.4% 3.1% 2.6% 3.4% 4.3% 4.6% 4.2% 5.0% 4.7% 4.9% 4.8% 4.7% 
traffic, transportation, post 
& telecommunication 8.0% 10.2% 8.7% 8.7% 8.9% 8.9% 9.0% 7.2% 7.4% 7.7% 8.3% 9.5% 
commerce, catering trade, 
material supply industry 12.3% 12.0% 12.1% 12.5% 10.2% 10.7% 10.7% 11.8% 11.5% 10.1% 9.5% 10.3% 
real estate & social 
services 5.0% 3.7% 3.3% 3.8% 3.8% 3.6% 4.0% 4.7% 4.8% 4.7% 5.7% 5.3% 
health care, sports & 
social welfare 3.3% 3.4% 3.5% 3.8% 4.0% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.0% 3.2% 3.8% 4.0% 
education, culture and arts 6.4% 5.6% 6.1% 7.4% 6.3% 6.6% 6.4% 6.3% 6.1% 6.1% 6.4% 6.7% 
science, research and 
technology services 3.5% 2.1% 3.2% 2.3% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7% 2.4% 2.6% 3.4% 3.2% 
finance and insurance 1.5% 1.4% 1.6% 2.2% 1.8% 2.2% 2.1% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.8% 3.2% 
government, part agencies 
and social organizations 12.3% 11.1% 13.9% 13.1% 14.2% 13.8% 14.5% 13.2% 13.5% 12.5% 13.8% 13.7% 
mining, manufacturing, 
electrical & industrial 33.2% 43.8% 40.7% 38.6% 41.8% 40.7% 40.2% 40.1% 41.0% 43.5% 39.0% 37.2% 
other industry 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.9% 0.6% 0.9% 0.6% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 1.2% 
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Table 3.22: Industry distribution of female employees 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 2688 2194 2779 2698 3380 2969 2813 2788 2728 2693 2491 2244 
agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry, sideline 
& fishery 0.4% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 
gelogical exploration, 
wagter conservancy & 
census 8.6% 2.3% 2.9% 1.9% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 0.3% 0.5% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 
construction 2.2% 2.5% 1.8% 1.9% 2.4% 3.0% 2.9% 3.5% 3.9% 3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 
traffic, transportation, post 
& telecommunication 4.6% 5.2% 5.0% 5.3% 5.0% 5.3% 5.5% 5.0% 4.7% 5.4% 6.4% 6.3% 
commerce, catering trade, 
material supply industry 16.3% 18.6% 17.8% 18.3% 17.1% 17.2% 16.9% 17.1% 18.3% 16.8% 15.2% 14.1% 
real estate & social 
services 8.3% 3.9% 4.5% 5.2% 4.4% 4.3% 4.4% 4.8% 4.6% 6.3% 8.1% 7.5% 
health care, sports & 
social welfare 5.7% 7.1% 7.1% 5.6% 6.2% 6.2% 6.5% 6.2% 5.6% 5.1% 6.1% 7.1% 
education, culture and arts 7.1% 6.5% 7.4% 8.9% 7.9% 8.0% 8.8% 8.7% 8.8% 8.1% 8.5% 9.4% 
science, research and 
technology services 3.2% 0.9% 2.4% 1.5% 1.9% 1.9% 2.3% 1.7% 1.5% 1.7% 2.1% 2.2% 
finance and insurance 1.4% 1.4% 1.7% 2.1% 1.8% 2.0% 2.2% 2.5% 2.2% 2.4% 3.4% 3.7% 
government, part agencies 
and social organizations 4.9% 4.8% 5.3% 6.3% 7.2% 7.5% 8.6% 8.0% 8.4% 8.1% 8.4% 8.7% 
mining, manufacturing, 
electrical & industrial 36.2% 45.9% 42.8% 41.2% 43.9% 42.3% 39.4% 40.1% 39.6% 40.4% 36.3% 35.3% 
other industry 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 1.2% 0.6% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 
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Table 3.23: Industry distribution, male - female difference 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry, sideline & 
fisheW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
gelogical exploration, 
wagter conservancy & 
census 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) {0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 rO.OO) 0 00 (0 00) 
construction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
traffic, transportation, post 
& telecommunication 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
commerce, catering trade, 
material supply industry ( 0 . 0 4 ) ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 6 ) ( 0 . 0 6 ) ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 6 ) ( 0 . 0 6 ) ( 0 . 0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 ) ( 0 , 0 6 ) ( 0 . 0 4 ) 
real estate & social services ( 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 0 ) 0.00 < 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) 
health care, sports & social 
welf肌 （ 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 4 ) ( 0 . 0 4 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 3 ) 
education, culture and arts (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0,01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03} 
science, research and 
technology services 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
finance and insurance 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
government, part agencies 
and social organizations 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
mining, manufacturing, 
electrical & industrial ( 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 2 ) 0.01 ( 0 . 0 0 ) 0.01 0.03 0.03 0 02 
other industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 Q.QQ (Q.QQ) (Q.Qii q.qq (Q.qq) (Q.qq) q.qq q.OO 
Table 3.24: Occupation segregation indices 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Occ叩ation segregation index 0.143 0.136 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.132 0.154 0.123 0.125 0.131 0.131 0.127 
Table 3.25: Industry segregation indices 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Industry segregation index 0.132 0.138 0.145 0.133 0.136 0.130 0.126 0.107 0.121 0.123 0.129 0.126 
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The occupational segregation indices, which are calculated as 0.5 Z(Mi-Fi), 
where Mi and Fi are the share of respective males and females in the ith occupational 
category, ranges between 0.123 and 0.154 in Table 3.24. The industry segregation 
indices, calculated as 0.5 i:(Mi-Fi), where Mi and Fi are the share of respective males 
and females in the ith industry category, has fluctuated between 0.107 and 0.132 in 
Table 3.25. These segregation indices tell us that women and men do have their own 
dominated industry or occupational fields, although no clear conclusion can be drawn 
from the time trend of the indices. Furthermore, Table 3.26 shows the province 
distribution of all employees. 
Table 3.26: Distribution of provinces in the whole sample 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of cases 5484 4534 5782 5605 7049 6194 5903 5894 5776 5671 5349 4814 
Beijing 6% 4% 6% 3% 13% 15% 15% 14% 14% 13% 13% 15% 
Liaoning 26% 32% 25% 24% 27% 31% 31% 31% 30% 30% 29% 29% 
Zhejian 16% 18% 16% 16% 15% 16% 16% 16% 15% 16% 16% 16% 
Sichuan 28% 22% 25% 28% 28% 20% 21% 21% 22% 23% 23% 24% 
Guangdong 24% 25% 28% 28% 16% 17% 18% 17% 18% 19% 19% 17% 
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Chapter 4. The Gender Wage Differential; a First Look 
Gustafsson and Li (1998) use the Urban Household Income Surveys conducted 
in 1989 and 1996 by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
for the reference years of 1988 and 1995, and they report a modest increase of the 
gender wage gap from 84.4% to 82.5%. Their findings stimulate our further 
investigation of the gender wage gap in urban China for the late 1980s and the whole 
decade of 1990s. The objective of this chapter is to provide a simple description of the 
gender wage gap for the various breakdown of population. 
4.1 Overall gender log wage gap 
Real wages are deflated using consumer price index of Beijing and the relevant 
cities of Guangdong, Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan. The CPI is set to be 100 for 
each city in year 1988. Figure 4.1 and the associated numbers given in Table 4.1 
illustrate the differential of male mean log real wage and female mean log real wage 
for the period of 1988 through 1999. Overall, the unadjusted log wage differential 
shows pattern of slight divergence, suggesting the overall gender wage differential 
widens the gap. Between 1988 and 1999，the implied gender ratio declines over 2.6 
percentage points from 82.6% in 1988 to 80.0% in 1999. In a descriptive sense, the 
widening of the gender differential reflects a trend toward a more rapid rise of male 
real wages of 85.4% and a comparatively moderate rise of female real wages of 
79.7%. There is a slight closing of the gender wage gap from 1994 to 1995 in Figure 
4.1; this might be due to the enforcement of Labor Law that discourages 
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discrimination against female workers since 1995. In addition, Table 4.2 indicates the 
standard deviation of male and female log wage distribution. The spread of both 
female and male wage distributions increased more over the period 1988 to 1999. 
Table 4.1: Gender mean log wage gap 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.232 7.423 0.191 
89 7.196 7.364 0.169 
90 7.277 7.449 0.173 
91 7.322 7.500 0.179 
92 7.453 7.626 0.174 
93 7.503 7.696 0.193 
94 7.580 7.809 0.228 
95 7.628 7.850 0.223 
96 7.627 7.852 0.225 
97 7.657 7.894 0.237 
98 7.748 7.943 0.195 
^ 7.818 8.040 0.223 
Figure 4.1. Gender mean log wage gap 
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Table 4.2: Female and male log wage standard deviation 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 0.547 0.512 -0.035 
89 0.589 0.606 0.017 
90 0.535 0.520 -0.015 
91 0.570 0.547 -0.023 
92 0.549 0.542 -0.006 
93 0.589 0.571 -0.018 
94 0.701 0.633 -0.068 
95 0.703 0.647 -0.056 
96 0.743 0.682 -0.061 
97 0.790 0.713 -0.077 
98 0.790 0.744 -0.046 
99 g ^ -0.111 
Table 4.3: Gender median log wage sap 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.278 7.462 0.183 
89 7.258 7.422 0.164 
90 7.324 7.487 0.163 
91 7.341 7.507 0.166 
92 7.485 7.641 0.156 
93 7.525 7.687 0.161 
94 7.615 7.826 0.212 
95 7.690 7.884 0.194 
96 7.676 7.867 0.191 
97 7.718 7.935 0.217 
98 7.825 7.999 0.174 
99 7.929 8.097 0.168 
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Figure 4.2. Gender median log wage gap 
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From Figure 4.2 and the associated Table 4.3, the median log wage gap 
illustrates similar trend as that shown by the mean log wage gap. The median log 
wage gap is slightly lower than the mean log wage gap every year. Since the mean of 
male log wage is smaller than the median male log wage across all years, the male log 
wage distribution of each year is skewed to the letf. Likewise, the female log wage is 
also skewed to the left. 
Figures 4.3 to 4.6 show the male and female log wage distribution for year 1988 
and 1999. The skewness of male (female) distribution is -1.4926 (-1.8371) in 1988 
and -1.0131 (-1.1951) in 1999. Female log wage distributions in both years are more 
skewed to the left than male distribution are. However, the difference of male-female 
leftward skewness drops extensively. In other words, the female wage distribution has 
reduced its extent of leftward skewness more than the male wage distribution has. In a 
9 Typically, wage distribution are skewed to the right (Borjas, 2000). The leftward skewness of the 
wage distribution found in this study requires further research work. 
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descriptive sense, female log wage distribution has a longer left tail when compared to 
males' left tail in the male distribution; and the shortening of the left tail for females is 
more serious than that for males. Therefore, female median tends to climb up the 
distribution of the male wage distribution. From Table 4.4 we see that median females 
climbs up from 32th to 38th percentile of the male log wage distribution across the 12 
years. Females therefore seem to gain their ground relative to the males. The rise in 
the median female percentile may reflect relative improvements in women's measured 
labor skills and/or declines in the unexplained gender gap. Moreover, the spread of 
female wage distribution increased more over the period 1988 to 1999 than the spread 
of male wage distribution did. From Table 4.2, the overall inequality rising a bit more 
for women (0.266 log points) than for men (0.190 log points). 
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Table 4.4: Percentage of males earning less than female median, from 1988 to 1999 
Year Percentage 
88 32 
89 34 
90 34 
91 35 
92 35 
93 34 
94 35 
95 36 
96 36 
97 35 
98 38 
99 ^ 
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Figure 4.7 and the associated numbers given in Table 4.5 indicates that the 
gender log wage gap at the tenth percentile diverges by more than 0.12 log points 
between 1988 and 1999. The slope becomes steeper from 1992 to 1997 and the 
magnitude of the 10th percentile gap has nearly doubled the median gap in 1999. This 
implies that the lower skilled workers have wider gender wage gap. The returns 
received by lower skilled workers are more unequal between men and women over 
time. 
Table 4.5: Gender log wage gap at tenth percentile 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 6.683 6.891 0.207 
89 6.556 6.756 0.200 
90 6.690 6.879 0.189 
91 6.703 6.916 0.213 
92 6.879 7.078 0.199 
93 6.851 7.091 0.240 
94 6.745 7.059 0.313 
95 6.832 7.148 0.316 
96 6.717 7.060 0.343 
97 6.735 7.126 0.391 
98 6.802 7.104 0.302 
^ 6.892 7.221 0.329 
Figure 4.7. Gender log wage gap at tenth percentile 
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Alternatively, Figure 4.4 and the associated Table 4.6 give the gender log wage 
gap at the ninetieth percentile from 1988 through 1999. The gap closes a bit over the 
specified period. The returns received by highly skilled male and female workers 
converge. 
Table 4.6: Gender log wage gap at the ninetieth percentile 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.792 7.961 0.170 
89 7.802 7.997 0.194 
90 7.839 8.014 0.175 
91 7.978 8.157 0.179 
92 8.041 8.229 0.188 
93 8.182 8.363 0.181 
94 8.377 8.568 0.192 
95 8.393 8.597 0.204 
96 8.487 8.642 0.155 
97 8.511 8.676 0.164 
98 8.608 8.781 0.174 
^ 8.714 8.836 0.122 
Figure 4.8. Gender log wage gap at ninetieth percentile 
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Table 4.7 shows the gender log wage gap by every ten percentile of male and 
female distributions. Figure 4.5 demonstrates the gender log wage gap for year 1988, 
1994 and 1999. When comparing year 1988 and year 1994, gender log wage gap at 
nearly all percentiles of 1988 is below the gap at the corresponding percentiles of 
1994. W e can see that the gender wage gap widens and the magnitude of widening is 
larger for lower wage groups. The gender wage gap in 1999 for those earning less 
than the median enlarges when compared to that in 1994, but interestingly the gap 
closes for those earning above the median wage levels. As a result, we can say that 
highly skilled females are better off in the sense that the gender wage differential of 
highly skilled workers has been smaller and has diminished over time. 
Table 4.7: Gender log wage gap by distribution percentile 
Year/ Percentile 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
88 0.207 0.188 0.183 0.181 0.183 0.171 0.156 0.157 0.170 
89 0.200 0.206 0.193 0.168 0.164 0.155 0.150 0.164 0.194 
90 0.189 0.203 0.181 0.174 0.163 0.154 0.140 0.150 0.175 
91 0.213 0.188 0.181 0.178 0.166 0.153 0.168 0.148 0.179 
92 0.199 0.179 0.166 0.163 0.156 0.142 0.134 0.130 0.188 
93 0.240 0.198 0.185 0.174 0.161 0.171 0.179 0.156 0.181 
94 0.313 0.254 0.228 0.207 0.212 0.183 0.162 0.145 0.192 
95 0.316 0.249 0.222 0.194 0.194 0.188 0.189 0.183 0.204 
96 0.343 0.271 0.251 0.206 0.191 0.187 0.188 0.196 0.155 
97 0.391 0.276 0.254 0.230 0.217 0.186 0.167 0.145 0.164 
98 0.302 0.266 0.229 0.196 0.174 0.158 0.141 0.147 0.174 
99 0.329 0.293 0.255 0.223 0.168 0.159 0.137 0.133 0.122 
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Figure 4.9 
Gender log wage gaps by distribution percentile 
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4.2 Gender log wage gap by experience cohorts 
N e w female and male entrantsthose with less than 10 years of experience have 
similar pay levels since the gender wage gap for this particular cohort is less than 0.10 
log points (Table 4.8 and Figure 4.10). Young female workers' wages are on average 
over 90% of male young workers'. Gender discrimination, if any, does not seem 
serious for young workers. On the contrary, experienced workers, say the group with 
20 to 30 years of experience, have a more severe wage gap as shown in Figure 4.11 
and Table 4.9. In fact there is a diverging trend of the wage gap for this experience 
cohort. 
Furthermore, if we compare the wage differential between the above two 
experience cohorts, we can easily see from Figure 4.12 and Table 4.10 that the wage 
differential between old and young workers diminishes over time. Seniority or 
experience skills may have played a less significant role in determining wages in the 
late 1990s. 
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Table 4.8: Gender log wage sap for those with less than 10 years experience 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 6.841 6.919 0.078 
89 6.858 6.884 0.026 
90 6.894 6.955 0.061 
91 7.048 7.030 -0.018 
92 7.132 7.231 0.099 
93 7.268 7.354 0.086 
94 7.397 7.482 0.085 
95 7.450 7.518 0.068 
96 7.490 7.490 0.000 
97 7.540 7.603 0.063 
98 7.578 7.660 0.082 
^ 7.691 7.769 0.078 
Figure 4.10 
Gender log wage gap for e5q)erienced less than 10 years 
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Table 4.9: Gender log wage sap for those with experience 20 to 30years 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.375 7.551 0.176 
89 7.303 7.491 0.188 
90 7.384 7.556 0.172 
91 7.427 7.605 0.178 
92 7.554 7.689 0.134 
93 7.599 7.744 0.145 
94 7.667 7.856 0.189 
95 7.708 7.903 0.195 
96 7.666 7.902 0.236 
97 7.703 7.960 0.256 
98 7.796 7.964 0.168 
99 7.850 0.251 
Figure 4.11 
Gender log wage gap for experienced 20-30 years 
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4.10: Log wage difference between experience cohorts 0-10 years and 20-30 years. 
Year Female Male 
88 0.534 0.632 
89 0.444 0.607 
90 0.490 0.601 
91 0.379 0.576 
0.422 0.458 
93 0.331 0.391 
94 0.270 0.375 
95 0.258 0.385 
96 0.177 0.412 
97 0.164 0.357 
卯 0.218 0.304 
？9 0.332 
Figure 4.12. Wage differential between experience cohorts, 
0-10 years and 20-30 years. 
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4.3 Gender log wage gap in different occupations 
Figures 4.13 to 4.17 and correspondingly, Tables 4.11 to 4.15 show the gender 
log wage gap for different occupational sectors. We see that female and male cadres, 
followed by professionals and technicians have the highest average wage among all 
other occupational takers. The gender log wage gap is smallest for cadres and 
administrative workers. The gap does not vary much in most occupation sectors, 
though that for cadres seems quite erratic. However, in the lowest paid occupation, 
female production workers' pay deviate more from the male counterparts. Indeed the 
gap diverges from 0.18 log points in 1988 to 0.36 log points in 1999. This reconciles 
with the earlier observation that lower-skilled workers tend to have diverging gender 
log wage gap. 
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Table ‘"•• Gender log wage gap for professionals & technicians 
Female Male Differential 
88 7.422 7.561 0.139 
89 7.362 7.520 0.158 
90 7.463 7.565 0.101 
7.472 7.590 0.118 
92 7.645 7.772 0.128 
93 7.653 7.820 0.168 
94 7.789 7.955 0.166 
95 7.829 7.995 0.167 
96 7.823 7.981 0.158 
97 7.925 8.054 0.129 
98 8.020 8.160 0.141 
?? ^ ^ 0.109 
Figure 4.13. Gender log wage gap for professionals & technicians 
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Table 4.12: Gender log wage sap for cadres 
Year Female Male Differential 
7.543 7.656 0.113 
89 7.523 7.598 0.074 
90 7.605 7.659 0.054 
7.712 7.731 0.019 
7.810 7.835 0.024 
93 7.873 7.928 0.055 
94 8.031 8.102 0.071 
95 8.099 8.134 0.034 
96 8.025 8.146 0.121 
97 8.148 8.198 0.050 
98 8.231 8.287 0.056 
？？ ^ ^ -0.028 
Figure 4.14. Gender log wage gap for cadres 
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• e 4.13: Gender los wage gap for administrative workers 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.346 7.437 0.090 
89 7.338 7.431 0.092 
卯 7.375 7.477 0.103 
91 7.387 7.528 0.141 
92 7.546 7.662 0.116 
93 7.609 7.707 0.098 
94 7.761 7.856 0.095 
95 7.755 7.912 0.157 
96 7.799 7.947 0.148 
97 7.817 7.951 0.133 
98 7.906 7.971 0.066 
？ ^ ^ 0.067 
Figure 4.15. Gender log wage gap for administrative workers 
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4.14: Gender log wase gap for workers in commerce & service sector 
Y e a f F e m a l e M a l e D i f f e ren t ia l 
7.178 7.342 0.165 
89 7.141 7.226 0.086 
90 7.138 7.253 0.114 
91 7.287 7.413 0.126 
92 7.350 7.498 0.148 
93 7.456 7.531 0.075 
94 7.422 7.555 0.134 
95 7.464 7.609 0.144 
96 7.499 7.654 0.155 
97 7.534 7.627 0.093 
98 7.572 7.672 0.100 
99 Ijm 0.197 
Figure 4.16. Gender log wage gap for workers in commerce & service sector 
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Table 4.15: Gender log wage gap for production workers 
Year Female Male Differential 
7.123 7.304 0.181 
89 7.069 7.216 0.147 
90 7.173 7.342 0.170 
91 7.227 7.389 0.162 
92 7.340 7.503 0.162 
93 7.375 7.582 0.206 
94 7.371 7.643 0.271 
95 7.459 7.702 0.243 
96 7.420 7.684 0.265 
97 7.426 7.738 0.312 
98 7.479 7.766 0.287 
?? Z：^ 0.357 
Figure 4.17. Gender log wage gap for production workers 
0.350 'I' “ ： ' : , . “I 
0.300 •• ‘ , „ '�:..''..,,,… � 
0.250 . , : ',:、. ： ^^ ^、^•^^ ^^ ••^^ ^•^ 
0.200 ‘r:,;‘ , ；„ ^ ^ ^ 
0.150 … ？ 、 , : ： ： ； 
0.100 ‘ —j 
0.050 :,:;::”:'::.;：'::::.. ‘ - ： , ‘ ：, ： . - 、一J 
0.000 【 ’ … > ,小 , > ‘ ^ ‘ I丨一 t t I 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
” “ ‘ “ — 
68 
4.4 Gender log wage gap in different ownership sectors 
Figures 4.18 to 4.20 and Tables 4.16 to 4.18 illustrate the gender log wage gap 
for workers in different ownership sectors. The collectively owned sector, which is 
over-represented by females (Table 3.14), has a bigger gender wage gap than the 
state-owned sector, which is over-represented by males (Table 3.13). The log wage 
gap in the collective sector indeed has diverged a little during the 1990s. The log 
wage gap in the state sector is thereby described as more stagnant. Female and male 
workers may be treated more equally in the state-owned enterprises. The pattern of 
the wage gap in the private sector is rather erratic. This might be due to a relatively 
small number of participants—less than 0.5% of total employees in this sector before 
1992. As the private, joint-ventured or foreign-owned enterprises take up the share of 
the total ownership sectors, the gender log wage gap in this third ownership sector 
doses from 1992 to 1998. One plausible explanation is that the private sector 
employers tend to reward employees according to productivity, and as the 
characteristics of females and males converge over time, the gender wage gap would 
reduce. 
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Table 4.16: Gender fog wage gap for state-owned sector 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.336 7.465 0.129 
89 7.294 7.409 0.115 
90 7.371 7.490 0.119 
91 7.413 7.527 0.114 
92 7.539 7.659 0.120 
93 7.606 7.743 0.137 
94 7.699 7.864 0.164 
95 7.731 7.897 0.166 
96 7.756 7.904 0.148 
97 7.792 7.946 0.154 
98 7.865 8.003 0.137 
99 ^ 0.124 
Figure 4.18. Gender log wage gap for state-owned sector 
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Table 4.17: Gender log real wage gap for collectively owned sector 
Year Female Male Differential 
7.068 7.269 0.201 
89 7.029 7.190 0.161 
90 7.092 7.275 0.183 
91 7.134 7.382 0.248 
92 7.283 7.458 0.175 
93 7.293 7.461 0.168 
94 7.292 7.496 0.204 
7.318 7.557 0.239 
96 7.216 7.494 0.279 
97 7.256 7.517 0.261 
98 7.355 7.619 0.265 
99 l_rm 0.292 
Figure 4.19. Gender log wage gap for collectively-owned 
sector 
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Table 4.18: Gender log wage gap for private and other ownership sectors 
Year Female Male Differential 
6.094 6.142 0.048 
6.273 6.818 0.545 
90 6.542 6.760 0.218 
91 6.540 6.954 0.414 
92 6.751 7.552 0.801 
93 6.963 7.738 0.775 
94 6.959 7.657 0.698 
95 7.228 7.655 0.428 
96 7.419 7.670 0.250 
97 7.394 7.795 0.401 
98 7.458 7.533 0.075 
99 Ijm 0.606 
Figure 4.20. Gender log wage gap for private and other 
ownership sectors 
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4.5 Gender log wage gap in different industries 
Figures 4.21 to 4.25 and Tables 4.19 to 4.23 describe an overall picture of how 
gender log wage gap change over time in a variety of industries. The gender gap 
seems to be larger in the male dominated industries such as construction, traffic, 
transport, post and telecommunication, science, research and technology, finance and 
insurance. Not only are males treated well in these industries, in fact these industries 
tend to be paid with higher wages. Male workers are crowded into these higher paid 
industries. The gender wage gap in government, party agencies and social 
organizations is the smallest on average every year. The percentage of female workers 
in this industry doubles over the 12-year horizon (Table 3.23) even though this 
industry is still over-represented by males. In the major industry sector (mining, 
manufacturing, industrial and electrical), the gender log wage gap widens from 1988 
onwards. 
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4.19: Gender log wage gap in government’ party agencies and social organizations 
Year Female Male Differential 
7.278 7.438 0.160 
89 7.344 7.406 0.062 
90 7.455 7.492 0.037 
91 7.492 7.529 0.036 
7.661 7.744 0.082 
93 7.683 7.775 0.092 
94 7.851 7.975 0.123 
95 7.838 7.985 0.147 
96 7.894 8.019 0.126 
97 8.015 8.126 0.111 
98 8.119 8.185 0.066 
^ ^ 0.057 
Figure 4.21. Gender log wage gap in government, party agencies 
and social organizations 
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Table 4.20: Gender log wa^e gap in commerce，catering trade, material supply industry 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.198 7.477 0.280 
89 7.196 7.378 0.183 
90 7.208 7.417 0.209 
91 7.301 7.490 0.189 
92 7.363 7.502 0.139 
93 7.469 7.590 0.121 
94 7.472 7.653 0.181 
7.485 7.629 0.145 
96 7.530 7.713 0.183 
97 7.618 7.719 0.101 
98 7.636 7.803 0.167 
__- 99 0.219 
Figure 4.22. Gender log wage gap in commerce, catering 
trade, material supply industry 
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Table 4.21: Gender log wage gap in real estate，social services 
care，sports, social welfare, education，culture and arts industries 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.342 7.457 0.115 
7.334 7.491 0.158 
90 7.388 7.516 0.129 
91 7.398 7.545 0.147 
92 7.556 7.663 0.107 
93 7.631 7.728 0.097 
94 7.789 7.964 0.175 
95 7.825 7.953 0.128 
96 7.827 7.975 0.148 
97 7.919 8.022 0.104 
98 8.061 8.105 0.044 
99 0.113 
Figure 4.23. Gender log wage gap in real estate, social 
services, health care, sports, social welfare, education, 
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TflA/e 4.22: Gender log wage gap in construction，traffic’ transport，post & 
telecommunication，science, research & technolosv, finance & insurance industries 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.279 7.531 0.251 
89 7.290 7.485 0.195 
90 7.385 7.574 0.189 
91 7.404 7.575 0.171 
92 7.554 7.710 0.156 
93 7.584 7.793 0.209 
94 7.689 7.933 0.244 
95 7.792 8.020 0.227 
96 7.778 8.033 0.255 
97 7.736 8.029 0.293 
98 7.897 8.088 0.191 
99 0.243 
Figure 4.24. Gender log wage gap in construction, traffic, 
transport, post & telecommunication, science, research & 
technology, finance & insurance 
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4.23: Gender log wase gap in mining，manufacturing, industrial & electrical industry 
Year Female Male Differential 
7.192 7.349 0.157 
89 7.112 7.260 0.148 
90 7.215 7.392 0.177 
91 7.261 7.448 0.187 
92 7.406 7.577 0.171 
93 7.433 7.653 0.220 
94 7.446 7.679 0.233 
95 7.506 7.758 0.252 
96 7.474 7.719 0.245 
97 7.500 7.796 0.296 
98 7.560 7.793 0.233 
y ^ 0.204 
Figure 4.25. Gender log wage gap in mining, 
manufacturing, industrial & electrical industry 
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4.6 Gender log wage gap for different education groups 
Figures 4.26 to 4.30 and the related Tables 4.24 to 4.28 show the gender log 
wage gap for a range of school graduates. The gender gap for college or above 
educated people diverges from 0.06 log points in 1988 to 0.13 log points in 1999, but 
the magnitude of the gap is smaller than the overall gender wage gap, which has a 
range of 0.17 log points to 0.23 log points. Less educated people, for example, people 
with only primary school education and junior high school education have more 
significant gender wage gap than those with senior high school or college education. 
The log wage gap for workers with junior high school diverges from 0.21 log points 
in 1988 to 0.33 log points in 1999. 
Given men and women possess same educational qualification, any divergence 
of the gender log wage gap of each educational level should be due to other change of 
levels of characteristics such as experience skills, and/ or increasing discrimination 
within the specific educational group. 
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T遍e 4.24: Gender log wage gap for college or above educated 
Year Female Male Differential 
7.484 7.546 0.062 
89 7.404 7.503 0.099 
90 7.470 7.575 0.106 
91 7.509 7.586 0.077 
7.615 7.743 0.128 
93 7.690 7.829 0.139 
94 7.834 8.018 0.185 
95 7.873 8.051 0.178 
96 7.920 8.095 0.176 
97 7.981 8.101 0.120 
93 8.003 8.194 0.191 
99 ^ ^ 0.131 
Figure 4.26 
Gender log wage gap for college or above 
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Table 4.25: Gender log wage gap for vocational school graduates 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.433 7.460 0.028 
89 7.327 7.453 0.126 
90 7.436 7.487 0.052 
91 7.459 7.565 0.106 
92 7.585 7.707 0.122 
93 7.653 7.769 0.115 
94 7.792 7.853 0.061 
95 7.828 7.868 0.040 
96 7.862 7.858 -0.004 
97 7.922 7.935 0.013 
98 8.006 8.008 0.003 
^ ^ 0.065 
Figure 4.27 
Gender log wage gap for vocational school graduates 
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Table 4.26: Gender log wage gap for senior high school graduates 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.150 7.323 0.173 
89 7.179 7.263 0.083 
90 7.201 7.367 0.166 
91 7.293 7.413 0.121 
92 7.412 7.541 0.129 
93 7.514 7.654 0.140 
94 7.573 7.762 0.189 
95 7.616 7.799 0.183 
96 7.613 7.787 0.174 
97 7.679 7.871 0.192 
98 7.773 7.866 0.092 
99 0.235 
Figure 4.28 
Gender log wage gap for senior high school graduates 
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Table 4.27: Gender log wage gap for junior high school graduates 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.182 7.392 0.210 
89 7.124 7.321 0.196 
90 7.234 7.408 0.174 
91 7.256 7.463 0.207 
92 7.376 7.555 0.179 
93 7.403 7.610 0.207 
94 7.425 7.662 0.237 
95 7.475 7.728 0.253 
96 7.430 7.714 0.284 
97 7.408 7.742 0.335 
98 7.471 7.757 0.285 
^ 7.483 7.807 0.325 
Figure 4.29 
Gender log wage gap for junior high school graduates 
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Table 4.28: Gender los wa^e gap for primary school or below graduates 
Year Female Male Differential 
7.236 7.519 0.283 
89 7.221 7.433 0.212 
90 7.238 7.539 0.301 
91 7.299 7.595 0.296 
92 7.427 7.742 0.315 
93 7.358 7.738 0.380 
94 7.334 7.816 0.482 
95 7.418 7.792 0.374 
96 7.421 7.743 0.322 
97 7.426 7.748 0.322 
98 7.452 7.893 0.440 
99 7.547 7.796 0.249 
Figure 4.30 
Gender log wage gap for primary school or below graduates 
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4.7 Gender log basic wage gap 
Since only bonus can be identified as a separate figure for the state and 
collectively owned sectors, basic wages are defined as total wage minus bonus. The 
two sectors account for more than 95% of all individual workers in each and every 
year,s sample, we try to find any different pattern of the real log basic wage gap over 
time in this section so as to deduce the pattern of real log bonus gap as well. Before 
going further into analysis, we find that the share of bonuses fell, contrary to the 
expectation, from around 30% in the late 1980s to 20% in the late 1990s (Tables 4.29 
& 4.30). This is because the wage reform of 1994 consolidated part of the bonus into 
the basic wage. 
Table 4.29: Bonus share of female employees 
bonus as a percentage 
Year log basic wage log total wage of total wage 
88 6.979 7.232 25% 
89 6.906 7.196 29% 
90 7.041 7.277 24% 
91 7.074 7.322 25% 
92 7.222 7.453 23% 
93 7.237 7.503 27% 
94 7.351 7.580 23% 
95 7.419 7.628 21% 
96 7.514 7.627 IP/o 
97 7.493 7.657 16% 
98 7.578 7.748 17% 
99 7.652 7.818 \1% 
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Table 4.30: Bonus share of male employees 
bonus as a percentage 
Year log basic wage log total wage of total wage 
88 7.071 7.364 2 9 % 
89 7.203 7.449 2 5 % 
90 7.234 7.500 2 7 % 
91 7.369 7.626 2 6 % 
92 7.403 7.696 2 9 % 
93 7.562 7.809 2 5 % 
94 7.635 7.850 2 2 % 
95 7.743 7.852 1 1 % 
96 7.718 7.894 1 8 % 
97 7.783 7.943 1 6 % 
98 7.865 1 8 % 
Table 4.31 and Figure 4.31 exhibit gender log basic wage gaps over the period 
1988 to 1999. Table 4.32 shows the log basic wage standard deviations over the same 
period. We can observe that a divergent pattern again from 1988 to 1999. The 
difference between the dotted line of total wage gap and the solid line of basic wage 
gap should be attributed to the gender bonus gap in Figure 4.32. Most of the total 
wage gap can be accounted for by the basic wage difference, however. The 
significance of the bonus gap increases from 1988 to early 1990s and it drops to 
nearly zero from 1995 onwards. It seems that after the establishment of labor 
legislation in 1995 and the declaration of macroeconomic policy in 1994, the 
distribution of bonus became equalized between genders, and the basic wage gap 
totally reflects the total wage gap. In some later years such as 1996 and 1998, the 
bonus gap even became negative, meaning that women on average earned more 
bonuses than men did in the above two years. 
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Table 4.31: Gender mean log basic wage sap 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 6.979 7.160 0.181 
6.906 7.071 0.166 
90 7.041 7.203 0.161 
91 7.074 7.234 0.160 
92 7.222 7.369 0.147 
7.237 7.403 0.166 
94 7.351 7.562 0.210 
95 7.419 7.635 0.216 
% 7.514 7.743 0.229 
97 7.493 7.718 0.226 
98 7.578 7.783 0.204 
99 0.213 
Table 4.32: Female and male log basic wage standard deviation 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 0.458 0.456 -0.002 
89 0.505 0.553 0.048 
90 0.469 0.456 -0.013 
91 0.487 0.478 -0.008 
92 0.461 0.458 -0.004 
93 0.489 0.484 -0.005 
94 0.607 0.553 -0.055 
95 0.599 0.572 -0.027 
96 0.727 0.670 -0.057 
97 0.706 0.662 -0.044 
98 0.709 0.674 -0.036 
99 q ^ -0.091 
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Figure 4. 31 
Gender mean log basic wage gap 
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Figure 4.32 Gender log total wage gap and basic wage gap 
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Chapter 5. Returns to schooling 
As market reform takes its root, return to schooling should rise if education is a 
good measure of performance-related human capital. Following Mincer (1974), a 
semi-logarithmic specification of the earnings equation is used: 
In Wi =lnwo + biSi + b2Pi + b3Pi2 + Ui， 
where bi is the rate of return to schooling, Si is the year of schooling, Pi is the worker's 
years of potential labor market experience, measured as age minus schooling years 
minus six, and bj + 2b3Pi is its return. 
5.1 Pooled regression over males and females 
The analysis starts with a pooled regression using a standard Mincer 
specification; Model A in Table 5.1 includes years of schooling, potential experience, 
its square and a sex dummy. Length of schooling^ ^ would have to be inferred from 
the kind of education. The years of schooling are 16 for university, 14 for college, 12 
for vocational school and senior high school, 9 for junior high school and 6 for 
primary school or others. For 1988 to 1991 datasets, the educational levels contain no 
choice for college, whereas for 1992 to 1999 datasets, the educational levels contain 
college. Due to the change of choices in questionnaires, we combined college and 
university under one category for 1992 to 1999 datasets in running OLS regressions. 
10 Alternative treatments of imputed schooling years and working experiences are briefly dealt with in 
Appendix. 
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Also, we should note that the conversion from educational dummies to length of 
schooling may lead to some problems since the university level also includes 
postgraduate level which will exceed 16 years of school, and the data also lack 
information on whether the individual has completed the educational level or not. 
Model B in Table 5.2 shows a similar pooled model controlling for province dummies. 
Model C in Table 5.3 shows a regression model adding an ownership dummy as the 
control variable. Model D in Table 5.4 controls for occupational dummies. Model E in 
Table 5.5 controls for industry dummies, and Model F in Table 5.6 is a full 
specification with all the control variables. 
Models G to L use dummy variables for different kinds of education instead to 
see the premia for various education levels. Model G is exactly the same as Model A 
except the schooling terms. Likewise Models H, I, J, K and L correspond to Models B, 
C, D, E and F respectively. 
From Model A in Table 5.1, the rate of returns to schooling increases steadily 
from 3.8% to 11.7% over the 12-year horizons. The low rate of returns to schooling 
found in late 1980s appears to be consistent with the previous study by Maurer-Fazio 
(1999), Liu (1998), Johnson and Chow (1997), and Liu, Meng and Zhang (2000). 
Psacharopoulos (1994) reports that the higher average rates in late 1980s are 10.3% 
for Argentina, 14.7% for Brazil, 12.0% for Chile, 11.8 for Ecuador, 8.1% for Peru, 
8.0O/O for Philippines, and 8.4% for Venezuela. For low-income countries, a 1-year 
increase in schooling on average increases earnings by 11.2%, and for Asian countries 
(not including Japan) the figure is 9.6%. If we compare the returns found in the late 
1980s for China to those of the developing countries, we could see that China's rate of 
returns are far below the rates of these less developed countries although the sign and 
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statistical significance of her human capital variable are similar to other economies. 
Psacharopoulos also reports a lower rate of returns to education for developed 
countries, for example, 4.9% for Germany, 6.8% for Great Britain and 6.0% for 
Switzerland. It is surprising to see that her rate of returns is also below those of the 
developed countries after reforms had taken place for ten years. We may draw a 
tentative conclusion that China appears to have a lower rate of return to human capital 
relative to the other countries. 
Meng and Kidd (1997) report in 1981 the rate of returns to education is 2.46% 
and in 1987 the rate of returns rises to 2.66%. Their findings hint that in late 1980s 
China's rate of returns to schooling was higher than that before the reform because 
wage compression was relatively more serious before the reform. The Chinese 
government advocated egalitarian income distribution prior to 1978 and she could not 
afford to pay the less educated a high wage, so she chose to suppress the wages of the 
educated people. After ten years of reform, the wage compression has been unleashed; 
rewards to human capital therefore became more subject to market forces. The 
functions of a labor market were distorted in the pre-reform period, but they started to 
operate after the reform. However, the return to education in China is still low 
compared to other transitional countries^ ^ such as Poland and East Germany in the 
late 1980s. The reason for this might be that, as in the initial period of the reform, 
labor mobility was still low. Although enterprises have gradually been given power to 
recruit and dismiss, managers are unwilling to use the power because they need to 
satisfy their subordinates for the fear that lack of harmony can curb the performance 
of the firm, thereby damaging their own careers. Most employees are unwilling to 
leave out the state-owned companies as these enterprises provide most of the social 
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welfare functions. Meng (2000) concludes "most of structural change in wages 
therefore came from equal distribution of profit-related bonuses rather than from 
productivity-related factors." 
Liu (1998) brings out an important hypothesis concerning the relationship 
between economic growth and education, advanced by Nelson and Phelps (1966) and 
by Schultz (1975). He summarizes the hypothesis as, "that the return to education is 
highly responsive to growth; that is, economic growth propelled by technological 
change, for example, increases the return to education. Therefore, in a stagnant 
environment the return to education would be low, and in a high-growth environment 
the return to education would be high." Changes in the rules governing economic 
activities together with changes in technological advances made China become an 
environment where the ability to learn has large payoffs, and this would raise her rate 
of returns to schooling. The magnitude of the rate of returns to education for China 
has become similar to most of developing economies. Our empirical study supports 
the surge in returns to human capital from late 1980s to late 1990s because of high 
economic growth in China. 
In 1990s, the labor market in urban China seems to better reward educational 
skills and place less importance to seniority or experience skills. The returns to 
experience skills drop however from 2.4% in 1988 to around 1.6% in 1999 evaluated 
using the mean of potential experience for the simplest specification (Table 5.1). The 
estimates of 1988 are lower to Liu's (1998) estimated 5% returns to potential 
experience of 1988. The significantly negative squared term of experience found in all 
specification is in line with the traditional concave relationship between experience 
11 See literature review of returns to schooling on CEE countries in Chapter 2. 
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and wage levels for market economies. Moreover, the female dummy in the model has 
a value less than —0.1 log points. The magnitude of sex dummy is similar to Liu's 
12 
(1998) paper . This suggests that women on average have a lower pay than men. 
The estimates in Table 5.2 have similar patterns as that in Table 5.1 albeit the R 
squared increased quite a lot. With Guangdong as the reference province, all other 
cities or provinces display significantly negative values. This suggests a well-known 
phenomenon that Guangdong as a wealthier coastal province has greater market 
orientation and has attained higher acceleration of economic reforms. Guangdong has 
commercial shipping ports and has a tradition of international as well as domestic 
commercial interaction. Consequently, it has been a major center of economic growth 
and development. If we look at the magnitude of each province's estimate, we can see 
that the income disparities have widened between provinces. In particular, the 
coefficient of Sichuan and Liaoning are more negative than other province dummies 
over the period. Sichuan has been overpopulated, economically poor and physically 
distant from the dynamic markets in the coastal areas. Liaoning has many redundant 
workers and has a high proportion of assets in inefficient and financially distressed 
state-owned enterprises. Zhejiang and Beijing have undergone faster pace of 
economic reform than Sichuan and Liaoning. 
Many researchers have noted that inequality between coastal and interior regions, 
especially those in the west, has widened sharply; this is apparent in our data as well. 
Knight, Li and Zhao (2001) establish that average provincial household income and 
earnings diverged substantially between 1988 and 1995. The richer a province was in 
12 • 
In Liu's paper, he uses male dummy and finds 0.1 log points for the male dummy in his Mincerian 
wage equations. 
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1988, the faster its per capita income and earnings rose. For instance, earnings per 
worker rose by 84% in Beijing and 79% in Guangdong, but only 33.5% in Liaoning 
and 26.8% in interior region. Gustafsson and Li (2001) find that the average income 
premium received by residents of eastern coastal regions relative to that received in 
the western interior regions rose from 58% in 1988 to 76% in 1995. 
Rates of returns to schooling in Tables 5.3 through 5.6 are lower than the 
specification in simpler model in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, but the increasing trend can still 
be found across all Tables. A lower rate of return to schooling may be explained by 
the correlation of education and occupation, ownership or industry dummies. For 
instance, more years of schooling go with better-paid jobs. The state-owned dummy 
in Tables 5.3 and 5.5 indicates an increasing trend, which suggests the fact that 
income inequality enlarges between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. 
The female dummy coefficients in all cases are significantly negative. 
Education is also measured as highest achieved level instead of years of 
schooling. Dummy variables for different categories of schooling levels are 
introduced in Tables 5.7 to 5.12. The reference group is primary education or below. 
The coefficients for tertiary education increase from 0.34 log points in 1988 to 0.77 
log points in 1999 in the simplest model, Table 5.7. In fact in all the six tables (Tables 
> 
5.7-5.12), the premium for college or university education has been more than 
doubled over the 12 years. The premium for vocational schooling is slightly higher 
than that for senior high schooling each year. The senior-high educated coefficients 
are approximately twice as large as the junior-high educated coefficients. Reform 
policies bring market forces that in turn are expected to stimulate faster growth into 
play. The interacting forces of growth and reform in urban China seem to create 
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shortages of skilled labor and thus drive up wages of skilled and educated personnel. 
5.2 Gender-specific regression and results 
Wage functions are estimated for men and women separately for annual wages in 
Tables 5.13-5.24 and Tables 5.25-5.36 respectively. The rate of returns to schooling 
for males increases from 2.7% in 1988 to 9.8% in 1999 using the simplest Model A in 
Table 5.13. In the full specification Model F in Table 5.18, the rate increases from 
l.io/o in 1988 to 5.8% in 1999. On the other hand, the rate of returns to schooling for 
females is substantially higher than that for males. Using the simplest Model A, Table 
5.25 demonstrates that the figure increases from 5.3% to 14.4% over the 12 years. 
Using the full specification, Table 5.30 demonstrates that the rate of returns to 
schooling rises from 2.8% in 1988 to 6.3% in 1999. The rates actually drop more than 
half when the full specification is implemented. The drop of the rates when more 
variables are controlled for hints positive correlation between years of schooling and 
the added control variables. Indeed, the inclusion of the occupational dummies makes 
a large difference for the estimates of rates of return to schooling. 
When educational levels are introduced instead of the length of schooling, the 
wage premium for higher education is still higher for women than for men. If most 
salaried men are in an occupation for example, manufacturing industry and if the 
manufacturing technology is such that physical strength is important, the wage 
premium for men in unskilled factory positions and with low schooling would be 
considerable. The estimated returns to schooling would be higher for females than for 
males. Another explanation may be that women are selected out of the paid labor 
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force because only earners at higher education levels and higher ability are heavily 
selected. 
The premium for vocational schooling of males is lower than that for senior high 
schooling of males in the late 1980s but the former exceeds the later in the late 1990s. 
The coefficients for junior high school dummy are insignificant for both men and 
women, so the premium of junior high school education may be negligible. 
Another issue to note is that women may be positively or negatively selected in 
terms of their unmeasured characteristics, and conventionally Heckman selectivity 
bias correction is employed to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients in the 
earnings equation. However, the coefficient for selection is very sensitive to the 
selection of instrumental variables^ ^ and the estimate lack robustness. Therefore, we 
failed to follow through the selection bias correction. 
5.3 Results using basic wage equations 
This section aims to study whether the returns to schooling using an alternative 
measure follow the same pattern as before. When the basic wage^ "^  is used instead of 
total wage in the wage equation, the rates of returns to schooling still have persistent 
upward trend for males and females. Tables 5.37 to 5.39 show several regressions of 
13 Household non-labor income, ownership of housing property, and size of the house are used as 
instruments in the first stage of the selection bias corrected regression. The significance of the 
“selection bias" variable derived from the estimated parameters of the first stage appears to the volatile 
to the year under examination and to the different choices or combination of instruments used. 
14 The basic wage is defined as the total wage minus bonus. 
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log basic wage of male workers and Tables 5.40 to 5.42 show those of female workers. 
The returns surge from 3.45% (5.43%) in 1988 to 8.91% (13.15%) in 1999 for men 
(women) using the simplest model A. When province dummies are added, the returns 
show similar patterns. As expected, females have a higher rate of returns to education 
than males. An interesting point to note is that both the male and female rates of 
return to education increase dramatically from 1993 to 1994. For example, it jumps up 
from 4.7% in 1993 to 7.3% in 1994 for males (Table 5.37) and it also jumps for 
females from 6.5% to 9.4% in one-year time. Using the full specification, the rates of 
return increase from 2% in 1988 to 5.4% in 1999 for males and the rates of return 
increase from 3% to 6% correspondingly for females. These percentages reveal that 
the rates of total wage returns to education and the rates of basic wage return are 
similar and schooling tend to have a greater impact on wage measures either basic 
wages or bonuses in later 1990s than in late 1980s. 
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Chapter 6. Decomposition of the Gender Wage Differential 
Since 1970s it has been a standard practice to decompose wage differentials 
between men and women into parts attributable to different factors (Blinder, 1973, 
Oaxaca, 1973). The basic distinction is between a part of the differential due to 
difference in the observable characteristics for men and women and a part measured 
by differences in parameters when a wage equation of the same form is estimated for 
each of them separately. 
Formally, the procedure has been described in Chapter 2.3. In essence, the 
decomposition of the wage differential can be written as: 
A = (Xm-Xf)Pm + Xf(Pm-Pf) 
where Pm and Pf are the OLS estimates of the parameters from the wage equations of 
Models A-L. This is referred to as a male-weighted decomposition in the sense that 
the male wage structure would be adopted in the absence of discrimination. On the 
right hand side of this equation, the first term is attributable to different endowments 
and the second term is the unexplained wage differential due to differences in 
coefficients, which may be attributed to discrimination and difference in unmeasured 
skills. The second term includes differences in both slopes and intercepts. The weights 
used for the first and second terms are pm and Xf respectively. These weights can be 
replaced by pf and Xm to yield a female-weighted decomposition. The 
decomposition of the gap is now written as: 
A = (Xm-Xf)Pf+Xm(Pm-Pf) 
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Cotton (1988) argues that male and female wage structures are both functions of 
discrimination and neither will prevail in the absence of discrimination. He derives 
the non-discriminatory wage structure p * = m+ (1-|li ) P f where jii is the proportion 
of men among the total employees. 
This chapter will report male-weighted, female-weighted and Cotton 
decompositions so as to provide a range for the explained portion of the gap. Using 
the estimated wage functions reported in Tables 5.13-5.24 and Tables 5.25-5.36 and 
the summary statistics in Tables 3.1-3.26, the average gender log wage gaps in 1988 
through 1999 are decomposed in Tables 6.1-6.36. Table 6.37 is a summary table of the 
percentage of the explained part of the gaps using Models A to L. Results from 
decompositions of basic wage gap is also presented in Tables 6.38 to 6.46. 
6.1 Results from the male-weight decomposition of Blinder-Oaxaca 
From Table 6.1, the differences in personal characteristics of the simplest Model 
A can account for around 30% to 37% of the gender difference between the 
logarithms of nominal wages over the sampled years. Using full specification as in 
Models F and L in Table 6.4 and Table 6.34, the explained portion sums up to 
between 34% and 50% of the gender gaps in the period 1988 and 1999. When 
comparing among all models, the explained log differential due to endowments in 
Models C and I, which include ownership dummy, jumps up for all years. Inclusion of 
ownership characteristics of employees helps explain the gender wage gap. 
Ownership dummy constitutes about 6 to 10% increase of the percentage of the 
explained portion over time when comparing Model C and the simpler Model B. 
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Gustafsson and Li (2000) find that age, education and ownership account largely for 
the crude difference in average log-earnings across genders. Our findings of the 
contribution of differential in ownership sectors in explaining the average gender 
wage gap are similar to theirs^ .^ 
Liu et al. (2000) obtain results from Shanghai and Jinan datasets that there are 
substantial widening of wage differentials across ownership sectors from state to 
collective/private sectors. This is in line with our findings that the non-state sectors 
have a larger gender log wage gap and males are over-represented in the state sector 
in Chapter 4.4 as the marketization led by economic reforms influences different 
ownership sectors to various degrees. Besides, Liu et al. provide empirical evidence 
that the explained log differential due to endowments increase from state to 
collective/private firms in the case of Shanghai and Jinan. In the male-weighted 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of Shanghai (Jinan), the explained portion is only 8% 
(27%) for the state sector, but 16% (35%) for the collective sector. It is not di伍cult to 
understand that gender differences in participating in ownership can help to explain 
the gender wage differential. 
Conversely, the addition of industry and occupational dummies into the models 
D, E, J and K does not help explain much of the gender wage gap. The category of 
‘professional and technician' in Models D and J shows a small negative value for 
accounting for the gender wage gap. This means that the percentage of female 
workers as professionals and technicians catches up with the male counterparts, 
resulting in closing the gender gap. 
The authors use age group, minority status, party membership, education, ownership, occupation, 
economic sector, type of job and region in their specification of wage equations for 1988 and 1995 and 
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Our results show that a substantial part of the average wage gap cannot be 
explained by differences in variables between women and men. The overwhelming 
part of the persistent wage gender gap is due to differences in coefficients between 
females and males. If women and men in the sample had had the same endowments, 
men would still have earned more because of the presence of differences in 
coefficients, which might be interpreted as partly due to earnings discrimination 
against women. In other words, women were discriminated againstpaid less 
because they were women. Prior to economic reform in 1978, the Chinese 
government has an egalitarian preference to reduce inequality across gender; she 
chose to compress the gender wage gap and suppress gender discrimination, which is 
a historical feature of nearly all societies. After economic reform, employers' personal 
preferences against females are no longer suppressed and therefore are being revealed 
in the form of unexplained portion of the gender wage gap. Therefore, the 
unexplained part of the gap has been prominent over the 12-year period. From Panel 
C in Table 6.1, the unexplained portion accounts for 68.7% (61.7%) in 1988 and it 
increases slightly to 70.1% (65.7%) in 1999 using simplest (full) specification. 
We should note that neither the standard Blinder-Oaxaca method nor Cotton's 
decomposition method could assign a distinct, well-defined scalar measure to 
discrimination. The numbers it produces depend critically on assumptions about what 
the wage structure would be if no discrimination existed, which in turn assumes 
knowledge of what a society without sexual discrimination would be like. The 
mechanical decomposition of the wage gap into an endowment term and a 
'discrimination' term is subject to criticism that the discrimination term is 
exaggerated and that women's productivity, which is unobserved, is lower than that of 
find that the ownership sector accounts for 10.32% of the gap in 1988 and 8.96% of the gap in 1995. 
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men. However, the decomposition may underestimate the impact of discrimination 
because it takes the explanatory variables as given. After all, occupation, industry, 
ownerships and education are choices made under the knowledge of existing wages 
and discrimination. 
When compared to the female-weighted decomposition, the male-weighted 
decomposition more often yields a higher percentage of the explained gender wage 
gap. 104 out of 144 specifications yield a higher percentage of the explained gender 
wage gap using the male-weighted decomposition than using the female-weighted 
decomposition (Table 6.37 Panels B and C). 
6.2 Results from Cotton's decomposition 
From Table 6.3, the differences in personal characteristics of the simplest Model 
A can account for around 28% to 38% of the gender difference between the 
logarithms of nominal wages over the sampled years. Using full specification as in 
Models F and L in Table 6.18 and Table 6.36, the explained portion sums up to 
between 34% and 50% of the gender gaps in the period 1988 and 1999. As expected, 
the percentage of explained part provided by Cotton's decomposition is some value 
between that provided by the male-weighted and female-weighted wage equations. 
Again, the ownership dummy constitutes about 6 to 10% increase of the percentage of 
the explained portion over time when comparing Model C and the simpler Model B 
using Cotton's decomposition. 
The unexplained part under Cotton's decomposition has two components: 
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nepotism and discrimination. Nepotism refers to how much men's earnings deviate 
from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment; 
discrimination reflects how much women's earnings deviate from the 
non-discriminatory level. Nepotism accounts for 29% to 36% of the total wage gap 
and the portion due to nepotism appears to be leveled over time. Discrimination 
accounts for 33% in the late 1980s to 37% of the total wage gap in 1999. Therefore 
the unexplained part of the gender wage gap increased a little over time. 
6.3 Results from decompositions of basic wage gap 
Using the regression results from Tables 5.37 to 5.42 and the general 
characteristics of mean males and females, we decomposed the basic wage gaps by 
Blinder-Oaxaca and Cotton's decompositions, and obtained results in Tables 6.38 to 
6.46. As discussed in Chapter 4, the basic wage gap totally reflects the total wage gap 
in late 1990s. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the differences of endowments 
can account for a higher share of the basic wage gap than the total wage gap. For 
instance, around 48.2% of the basic wage gap in 1992 is attributable to the 
characteristics of a full specification (Table 6.44), and only around 35.5% of the total 
wage gap in the same year is attributable to differences in endowments in the full 
specification (Table 6.16). In other words, before mid 1990s, a larger portion of the 
total wage gap is left unexplained compared to the unexplained portion of basic wage 
gap. Discrimination treatments seem to occur when we measured a worker's basic 
wage during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
The basic wage gap displays a large increasing time trend of the unexplained part 
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of the gap. From Table 6.44, we see that the unexplained part increased from 36% in 
the late 1980s to over 60% in the late 1990s under the full specification. Though the 
increase in unexplained part is large, the unexplained portion of the basic wage gap 
became similar to the percentages of the unexplained total wage gap in the late 1990s. 
This may be explained by the fact that the basic wage defined here has taken a larger 
share of the total wage after 1994 to such an extent that the total wage gap and the 
basic wage gap were roughly equal in the late 1990s. Thus, the explained 
(unexplained) part of the basic wage gap and the corresponding part of the total wage 
gap had similar percentages during the late 1990s. 
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Table 6.1: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model A) using male wage equation as benchmark 
Model A 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0.225 0.236 0 191 0 221 
year of schooling 0.023 0.032 0.025 0.024 0.020 0.024 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.034 0.029 0 026 
potential experience 0.143 0.122 0.137 0.159 0.107 0.081 0.100 0.097 0.107 0 104 0 101 0 116 
experience squared -0.107 -0.091 -0.098 -0.117 -0.074 -0.047 -0.061 -0.062 -0.071 -0.063 -0 059 -0 075 
Explained 0.060 0.063 0.065 0.067 0.053 0.058 0.071 0.068 0.071 0.074 0.071 0.066 
% of Explained 31.3% 37.3% 37.4% 37.2% 30.5% 29.8% 30.9% 30.8% 31.8% 31.5% 37.4% 29 9% 
Unexplained 0.131 0.106 0,108 0.113 0.121 0.136 0.158 0.153 0.154 0.162 0.120 0 155 
% of Unexplained 68.7% 62.7% 62.6% 62.8% 69.5% 70.2% 69.1% 69.2% 68.2% 68.5% 62.6% 70.1% 
Table 6.2: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model A) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model A 1988 ^ 19W ^ 1992 1993 1994 ^ ^ 1997 ^ 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0.225 0.236 0.191 0.221 
year of schooling 0.046 0.047 0.042 0.044 0.031 0.037 0.044 0.046 0.048 0.055 0.041 0.038 
potential experience 0.164 0.125 0.160 0.147 0.140 0.117 0.117 0.119 0.079 0.082 0.115 0.111 
experience squared -0.148 -0.110 -0.145 -0.122 -0.126 -0.105 -0.095 -0.099 -0.045 -0.042 -0.085 -0.068 
Explained ‘ 0.062 0.061 0.057 0.069 0.045 0.049 0.067 0,066 0.082 0.094 0.072 0 080 
% of Explained 32.6% 36.3% 32,9% 38.5% 25,8% 25.3% 29.2% 29.9% 36.5% 39.9% 37.7% 36.5% 
Unexplained 0.129 0.108 0.116 0.111 0.129 0.144 0.162 0.156 0.143 0.142 0.119 0 140 
% of Unexplained 67.4% 63.7% 67.1% 61.6% 74.2% 74.7% 70.8% 70.1% 63.5% 60.1% 62.3% 63.5% 
Table 6.3: Cotton's decomposition (ModelA) 
Model A 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1995 1997 1993 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.169 o T h 0.180 0.174 o l 9 3 0.229 0.222 0 2 2 5 0 2 3 6 o l ^ 0 2 ^ 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
year of schooling 0.035 0.039 0.033 0.034 0.026 0.030 0.038 0.039 0.041 0.044 0.035 0.031 
potential experience 0.153 0.124 0.148 0.153 0.123 0.098 0.108 0.107 0.094 0.093 0.108 0.114 
experience squared -0.127 -0.100 -0.120 -0.119 -0.099 -0.075 -0,077 -0.079 -0.058 -0.053 -0.071 -0.072 
subtotal 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.068 0.049 0.053 0.069 0.067 0.076 0.084 0.072 0.073 
% of Explained 32.0% 36.8% 35.2% 37.8% 28.3% 27.6% 30.1% 30.4% 34.0% 35.5% 37.5% 33.0% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.063 0.052 0.056 0.053 0.062 0.069 0.077 0.074 0.067 0.067 0.055 0.065 
Nepotism 33.0% 30.8% 32.3% 29.6% 35.6% 35.8% 33.8% 33.2% 30.0% 28.5% 29.0% 29.6% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.067 0.055 0.056 0.059 0.063 0.071 0.083 0.081 0.081 0.085 0.064 0.083 
Discrimination 35.0% 32.4% 32.5% 32.6% 36.2% 36.6% 36.2% 36.5% 36.0% 36.0% 33.5% 37.4% 
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MtddV" •枕 O服a decomposition(Modcl B) usin. equation a. h州rl•附阶L 
Ln nominal wage ^ 丨卩乡� 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 wT 
of school = = • S ^ ^ ^ ~ ~ o F i = i f r 
potential experience 0.147 0 129 0 141 。 似 0,029 0.028 0.026 0.025 0 024 
experience squared -0.112 -0 S -0 二 o n ； S ' 謂 ‘ 0.098 0.109 0.109 0.101 0.122 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 _ 。 ： "o i 二 "Jn -。細 -0.081 -0.078 -0.064 -0.090 
L i a o — 0,003 0.000 OOO - o S S = - 二 -。搬 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Zhejian 0.001 O.OOO . 0 0 0 3 o Z . & 二 V n r ^ 施 "0.013 -0.006 -0.027 -0.017 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 OOO4 0 oS 0 005 n^ 二 。搬 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 
Explained 0.061 0.062 O o S o J e o Z l 。 搬 0.009 0.001 0.011 0.008 
% of Explained 32.1% 36.9% 37 7 % 二。 J ^ . / ？s i ! 二 0.056 0.051 0.053 0.048 0.045 
Unexplained 0.130 0.106 o i l s o u t o 4 n 25.1% 22.5% 22.4% 25.3% 20,6% 
^ 6 2 . 3 % 二； = = = = ； = 二 
If二:拙"d枕 0似腳 decomposition (ModelB) unn. female wa^e eouatinn as benchmark 
Lnnlinalwage ^ ~ .例= 侧 1994 1995 19% 1997 ！..!；：：：；：^^ 
year—。。； 0 二 Vofo . = ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^ 
potential experience 0.161 0 138 0 163 0 152 S m S ??? ° 0.042 � . 0 4 � 0.047 0.038 0.037 
experience squared .0 145 0 3I n S n S 二 二 0.121 0.128 0.131 0.095 0.100 0.123 0 115 
Beijing - a； .0 ：• "0 • • V n S ^ 7 7 -0.100 
Liaoning 0.003 0 000 0 0 Z Z 'OOO o Z . Z 二 ? ' - � 駕 ^,002 0.003 0.004 
Zhejian 0.001 0 000 . 0003 oOOl "onS^ n Z V r l -0.007 -0.032 -0,022 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0 0 4 00 0 . : ； 。 施 -0,001 0.001 -0.06 
Explained 0.068 0 059 0O6I 0O6O n S ^ 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
% of Explained 35 7% 3^7% ^ f f t 0.040 0.054 0.053 0.051 0.066 0.045 0 063 
U n e x p l a L d 0 ,23 0 1 ^ 5 = 2 二 = � = � 23.7% 22.8% 28.2% 23.4% 28.7% 
Table 6.6: Cotton *s decomposition (Model B) 
ModelB . : : : : 1994 例 S 1997 顺 ~ ~ ^ 
Differe„ce-foe„dow 删 tswe 咖 edbythe細-dist>imi„atoryw^eLctio„ 。.口‘ 0.193 " 0.225 0.236 " = O T 
二 二 二 S S 二 0.034 0.036 0.033 0.036 0.031 0.030 
experience squared -0.128 -0 16 -0 25 O u l o n Z ' � “ ‘ 謹 � 0.105 0.111 0.119 
i 1 11獲獲濯舊1舊f孺疆 
� / � � f — 3 3 , % 3 , 8 % 36.5% 3 3 , % . j i 二 。 二 二 二 二 二 二 。 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
C S L ？ 二 ？ 二 二 0.0S3 0.080 _ 0.080 0.068 0.073 
Z� 31.6/» 31.1/0 32.2% 36.6% 38.1% 36.4% 36.1% 36.5% 34.1% 35.7% 33.3% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
^ ^ : = = 二 - 二 = = 二 = = ， , 
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Table 6.7: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model Q using male waee equation as benchmark 
Model C 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999" 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0 225 0 236 0 191 0221 
year of schooling 0.019 0.030 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.017 0,023 0,026 0.024 0.022 0 021 0 022 
potential experience 0.145 0.128 0.141 0.154 0.111 0.092 0.105 0.098 0.107 0 109 0 099 0 118 
expenence squared -0.113 -0.102 -0.106 -0.115 -0.084 -0.065 -0.075 -0.071 -0.082 -0.081 -0.066 -0.090 
Beijing -0.00 丨 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0,003 0 003 
Liaonmg 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.013 -0.006 -0.028 -0.017 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -O.OOl 0.000 -0 004 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.008 0 001 0 011 0 008 
state-owned 0.019 0.016 0.021 0.012 0.022 0.025 0.031 0.026 0.032 0.039 0.029 0 032 
Explained 0.075 0.073 0.081 0.070 0,063 0.067 0.080 0.075 0.075 0.085 0 071 0 073 
% of Explained 39.1% 43.0% 46.7% 38.9% 36.0% 34.9% 34.9% 33.8% 33.6% 36.0% 36.9% 33,2% 
Unexplained 0.116 0.095 0.093 0.110 0.112 0.126 0.149 0.147 0.150 0.151 0 120 0 149 
% of Unexplained 60.8% 56.6% 53.7% 61.2% 64.0% 65.2% 65.0% 66.2% 66.7% 63.8% 62.5% 67.6% 
Table 6.8: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model C) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model C 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0,174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0.225 0.236 0.191 0.221 
year of schooling 0.036 0.039 0.032 0.036 0.023 0.024 0.033 0.034 0.03 丨 0.038 0.032 0.032 
potential experience 0.159 0.137 0.164 0.157 0.144 0.118 0.127 0.131 0.093 0.101 0.124 0.116 
experience squared -0.146 -0.134 -0.153 -0.142 -0.137 -0.110 -0.110 -0.120 -0.077 -0.079 -0.103 -0.080 
Beijing -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0,002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.015 -0.007 -0.032 -0.021 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
How much men's earnings devi 0.035 0.033 0.034 0.026 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.034 0.042 0.047 0.031 0.045 
Explained 0.088 0.077 0.081 0.072 0.060 0.063 0.080 0.075 0.083 0.102 0.069 0.100 
% of Explained 46.1% 45.4% 46.9% 40.3% 34,7% 32.7% 34.8% 33.7% 36.7% 43.1% 35.8% 45.3% 
Unexplained 0.103 0.092 0.093 0.107 0.114 0.130 0.149 0.147 0.143 0.134 0.122 0.123 
% of Unexplained 53.9% 54.2% 53.5% 59.8% 65.4% 67.4% 65.1% 66.3% 63.6% 56.7% 63.5% 55.5% 
Table 6.9: Cotton's decomposition (Model C) 
Model C 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage o l ^ 0.169 o T ^ 0.180 0.174 o T w 0.229 0 2 2 2 0225 0.236 H ? ! O ^ I T 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
year of schooling 0.027 0.034 0.027 0.029 0.020 0.021 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.026 
potential experience 0.152 0.133 0.152 0.155 0.127 0.105 0.115 0.113 0.100 0.105 0.111 0.117 
experience squared -0.129 -0.118 -0.129 -0.128 -0.110 -0.087 -0.092 -0.094 -0.079 -0.080 -0.083 -0.085 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.030 -0.019 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.011 0,009 
state-owned 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.019 0.026 0.029 0.033 0,029 0.036 0.043 0.030 0.038 
subtotal 0.081 0.075 0.081 0.071 0.062 0.065 0,080 0.075 0.079 0.093 0.070 0.086 
% of Explained 42.5% 44.2% 46.8% 39.6% 35.4% 33.9% 34.8% 33.8% 35.0% 39.4% 36.4% 38.8% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.050 0.044 0.045 0.052 0.055 0.062 0.071 0.070 0.068 0.064 0.057 0.057 
Nepotism 26.4% 26.2% 25.7% 28.8% 31.3% 32.3% 31.0% 31.3% 30.0% 26.9% 29.6% 25.9% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.059 0.049 0.048 0.057 0.058 0.066 0.078 0.077 0,079 0.079 0.064 0.080 
Discrimination 31.0% 29.2% 27.9% 31.7% 33.3% 33.9% 34.0% 34.9% 35.2% 33.5% 33.4% 36.1% 
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Toble 6.10: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model D) using male wage equation as benchmark 
Model D 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 l i i T 
Ln nommal wage 0.191 ^ 6 9 K m H i O O m 0 2 2 9 0^22 0^25 U T e 5191 
year of schooling 0.012 0.025 0.019 0.018 0.012 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.021 0 0 1 8 0 016 0 0 1 7 
potential expenence 0.142 0.125 0.138 0.148 0.105 0.085 0,095 0.093 0.104 0 106 0 096 0 118 
«per . ence squared -0.112 -0.102 -0.104 -0.111 -0.079 -0.057 -0.069 -0.070 -0.080 -0 081 -0069 .0 094 
f ^ ' J " ? -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0 003 0 002 
0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0,005 -0.010 -0.013 -0.006 -0 027 -0 017 
fhe j ian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0 001 0 001 -0 004 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0 012 0 008 
professuma 丨 & technician 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0,000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.008 -0 004 -0 003 -0 002 -0 007 -0 007 
cadre 0.016 0.015 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.021 0.014 0,013 0.013 0 017 0 017 
administrative worker 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0 001 0 001 0 001 0 002 
commerce and service -0.003 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.011 0 019 0 015 0011 
E 印丨 a«ned 0.060 0.066 0.074 0.065 0.048 0.058 0.069 0,066 0.061 0 069 0 056 0 053 
% of Explained 31.6% 39.2% 42.6% 36.4% 27.6% 30.3% 30.2% 29.5% 27.2% 29 3% 29 1% 24 0% 
Unexplained 0.131 0.103 0.104 0.114 0.126 0.135 0.160 0.156 0.164 0.167 0 136 0 168 
% of Unexplained 68.4% 60.8% 60.2% 63.6% 72.4% 69.7% 69.8% 70.5% 72.8% 70.7% 70.9% 76.0% 
Table 6.11: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model D) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model D 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0.225 0 236 0 191 0221 
year of schooling 0.031 0.034 0.024 0.032 0.017 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.026 0 030 0 023 0 020 
potential experience 0.155 0.131 0.154 0.145 0.140 0.117 0.124 0.131 0.097 0.103 0 128 0 127 
experience squared -0.144 -0.131 -0.147 -0.132 -0.138 -0.114 -0.119 -0.129 -0.090 -0.092 -0.121 -0.107 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.016 -0.007 -0.031 -0.021 
Zhejian 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.017 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.013 -0.021 
cadre 0.028 0.031 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.044 0.029 0.022 0.030 0.029 0.039 
administrative worker 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 
commerce and service -0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.006 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 
Explained 0.075 0.066 0.067 0.068 0.040 0.039 0.055 0.054 0.047 0.060 0.030 0.045 
% of Explained 39.3% 39.0% 39.0% 37.9% 22.7% 20.2% 23.8% 24.3% 20.9% 25.3% 15.9% 20.4% 
Unexplained 0.116 0.103 0.110 0.112 0.135 0.154 0.174 0.168 0.178 0.176 0.161 0 176 
% of Unexplained 60.7% 61.0% 63.8% 62.1% 77.3% 79.8% 76.2% 75.7% 79.1% 74.7% 84.1% 79.7% 
Table 6.12: Cotton 's decomposition (Model D) 
Model D 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage O ^ I 0.169 K m 0.180 0.174 0J93 0.229 0 2 2 2 0225 0 2 3 6 o U T 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
year of schooling 0.022 0.029 0.021 0.024 0.015 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.019 
potential experience 0.148 0.128 0.146 0.147 0.122 0.100 0.109 0.111 0.100 0.104 0.111 0.122 
experience squared -0.128 -0.116 -0.124 -0.121 -0.107 -0.085 -0.093 -0.098 -0.085 -0.086 -0.093 -0.100 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Liaoning 0.003 0,000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.029 -0.019 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0:005 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0,005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.008 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.012 -0.005 -0,004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.013 
cadre 0.022 0.023 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.032 0.021 0.018 0.021 0.023 0:027 
administrative worker 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 
commerce and service -0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.004 
subtotal 0.068 0.066 0.071 0.067 0.044 0.049 0.062 0.060 0.054 0.065 0.044 0.049 
% of Explained 35.4% 39.1% 40.9% 37.1% 25.2% 25.5% 27.2% 27.1% 24.2% 27.4% 23.0% 22.3% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.057 0.050 0.053 0.054 0.065 0,074 0.083 0.079 0.084 0.084 0.075 0 082 
Nepotism 29.8% 29.5% 30.7% 29.9% 37.1% 38.2% 36.3% 35.8% 37.4% 35.5% 39.2% 37.1% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.067 0.053 0.054 0.059 0.066 0.070 0.084 0,082 0.086 0.088 0.072 0.090 
Discrimination 34.9% 31.4% 31.3% 33.0% 37.7% 36.3% 36.5% 37.1% 38.4% 37.1% 37.9% 40.6% 
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Table 6.13: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model E) usine male wage equation as benchmark 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 ~ i i i T Ln nominal wage ^ ^ ^ ^ OH ~6 
year of schooling 0.022 0.031 0.024 0.024 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.024 0 022 0 021 
potential experience 0.147 0.130 0.141 0.153 0.109 0.088 0.104 0.096 0.109 0.109 0 104 0 129 
«per . ence squared -0.112 -0.104 -0.103 -0.112 -0.080 -0.058 -0.073 -0,069 -0.083 -0.079 -0 070 -0 099 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0,003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0 002 0 003 0 003 
；‘"'!"'"^  0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0.006 -0 027 -0 017 
0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0 001 -0 004 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0 0 1 2 0 008 
catering trade industry 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.008 0,005 0.014 0.014 0 0 1 5 0 017 0 0 1 5 0 0 1 0 
manufacturing & industrial 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0 000 -0 002 -0 003 -0 004 -0 005 
0.061 0.060 0.067 0.062 0.053 0.053 0.064 0.064 0.058 0.063 0 055 0 047 
/ « o f Explained 31.8% 35.5% 38.6% 34.5% 30.6% 27.6% 27.9% 29.0% 25.9% 26.9% 28.7% 212% 
Unexplained 0.130 0.109 0.106 0.118 0.121 0.140 0.165 0.158 0.167 0.172 0 136 0 174 
/ » o f Unexplained 6 8 ^ 64.5% 61.4% 65.5% 69.4% 72.4% 72.1% 71.1% 74.1% 73.1% 71.3% 78.8% 
Table 6.14: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model E) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model E 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0,225 0.236 0 191 0221 
year of schooling 0.046 0.048 0.039 0.045 0.030 0.031 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.043 0 033 0 034 
How much men's earnings devi 0.161 0.138 0,163 0.152 0.144 0.122 0.133 0.141 0.106 0.109 0.140 0 130 
experience squared -0.145 -0.132 -0.149 -0.133 -0.133 -0.115 -0.120 -0.135 -0.095 -0.088 -0.124 -0.094 
Beijing -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0 004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0,011 -0.015 -0.007 -0.032 -0 022 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0 012 0 009 
catering trade industry 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.008 
nwnufacturing & industrial 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0 003 
Explained 0.068 0.057 0.062 0.061 0.046 0.042 0.055 0.052 0.050 0.064 0 043 0 059 
% of Explained 35.8% 34.0% 36.0% 34.1% 26.2% 21.9% 23.9% 23.4% 22.3% 27.3% 22 5% 26 8% 
Unexplained 0.123 0,111 0.111 0.118 0.129 0.151 0.174 0.170 0.175 0.171 0.148 0.162 
% of Unexplained 64.2% 66.0% 64.0% 65.9% 73.8% 78.1% 76.1% 76.6% 77.7% 72.7% 77.5% 73.3% 
Table 6.15: Cotton's decomposition (ModelE) 
Model E 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage o l ? ! 0.169 O m 0.180 0.174 0193 0.229 0.222 0 2 2 5 0 2 3 6 o T ^ U I T 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
year of schooling 0.03 0.04 0.03 0,03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
potential experience 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 
experience squared -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0,09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 
Beijing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0:00 
Liaoning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
Zhejian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0:01 
Sichuan 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0,01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
catering trade industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
manufacturing & industrial 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0:00 
subtotal 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0:05 
% of Explained 33.8% 34.7% 37.3% 34.3% 28.5% 24.9% 26.0% 26.3% 24.2% 27.1% 25.8% 23.8% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.060 0.054 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.072 0.083 0.080 0.083 0.081 0.069 0.075 
Nepotism 31.4% 32.0% 30.8% 31.7% 35.4% 37.4% 36.3% 36.2% 36.7% 34.5% 36.1% 34.1% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.066 0.056 0.055 0.061 0.063 0.073 0.086 0.083 0.088 0.091 0.073 0.093 
Discrimination 34.7% 33.3% 31.9% 33.9% 36.1% 37.7% 37.8% 37.4% 39.1% 38.4% 38.1% 42.1% 
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Table 6.16: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model F) using male wage equation as benchmark 
Model F 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage o l ^ ^ ^ ^ 7 4 ^ ~ 9 ~ 2 ^ O l T m 
year of schooling 0.010 0.022 0.017 0.016 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.017 0 014 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 5 
potential experience 0.142 0.126 0.138 0.149 0.107 0.087 0.100 0.093 0.104 0 107 0 0 9 7 0 122 
Mperience squared -0.113 -0.104 -0.106 -0.113 -0.084 -0.063 -0.077 -0.071 -0.083 -0.084 -0 072 -0 099 
B 叫丨 ng -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0 002 0 003 0 003 
Liaonwig 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0.006 -0 027 -0 017 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0 001 0 001 -0 004 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0 012 0 008 
stateowned 0.018 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.020 0.026 0.028 0,022 0.028 0 035 0 026 0 027 
profess丨ona丨 & technician 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0 002 -0 002 -0 006 -0 003 
cadre 0.014 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.011 0,010 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.013 0 0 1 0 
administrative worker 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
commerce and service -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.000 -0.004 0.002 0.007 0.003 0 005 0 007 0 008 0 010 
catering trade industry -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0 010 0 006 
manufacturing & industrial 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0 003 -0 004 
How much men's earnings devi 0.073 0.076 0.088 0.074 0.062 0.073 0.089 0 080 0 084 0 096 0 074 0 076 
% of Explained ‘ 38.3% 44.9% 50.6% 41.0% 35.5% 37.8% 38.8% 35.9% 37.3% 40.6% 38 9% 34 3% 
Unexplained 0.118 0.093 0.089 0.106 0.112 0.120 0.140 0.142 0.141 0.140 0 117 0 145 
% of Unexplained 61.7% 55.1% 51.6% 59.0% 64.5% 62.2% 61.2% 64.0% 62.8% 59.4% 61.1% 65.7% 
Table 6.17: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model F) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model F 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage ^ o l 6 9 QATi o l i o o T w 0 2 2 9 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 5 0 2 3 6 ^ o ! ^ 
year of schooling 0.025 0.028 0.019 0.028 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.021 0.020 0.025 0.020 0.017 
potential experience 0.154 0.132 0.156 0.149 0.139 0.113 0.124 0.136 0.100 0.106 0.137 0 131 
experience squared -0.144 -0.133 -0.152 -0.139 -0.138 -0.110 -0.119 -0.138 -0.094 -0.096 -0.132 -0.112 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.015 -0.007 -0.031 -0.021 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
stateowned 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.030 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.038 0.043 0.027 0.039 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.014 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.018 
cadre 0.025 0.027 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.039 0.024 0.018 0.024 0.024 0.034 
administrative worker 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 
commerce and service -0.006 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0,008 
catering trade industry 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.002 
manufacturing & industrial -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
Explained 0.092 0.083 0.085 0.079 0.059 0.062 0.079 0.077 0.078 0.093 0.055 0.074 
% of Explained 48.4% 49.1% 48.9% 44.2% 33.6% 32.2% 34.7% 34.5% 34.5% 39.4% 28.5% 33.6% 
Unexplained 0.099 0.086 0.092 0.100 0.116 0.131 0.149 0.145 0.148 0,143 0.137 0.147 
% of Unexplained 51.6% 50.8% 53.3% 55.7% 66.4% 67.8% 65.3% 65.4% 65.6% 60.6% 71.5% 66.4% 
Table 6.18: Cotton 's decomposition (Model F) 
Model F 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0,225 0.236 0.191 0.221 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
year of schooling 0.017 0.025 0.018 0.022 0.011 0.015 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.016 0.016 
potential experience 0.147 0.129 0.147 0.149 0.122 0.100 0.111 0.113 0.102 0.107 0.116 0.126 
experience squared -0.129 -0.118 -0.128 -0.125 -0,110 -0.085 -0.097 -0.103 -0.088 -0.090 -0.100 -0.105 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0,002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.029 -0.019 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
stateowned 0.025 0.022 0.025 0.019 0.025 0.028 0.029 0.026 0.033 0.039 0.026 0.033 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.010 
cadre 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.027 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.018 0.021 
administrative worker 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
commerce and service -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
catering trade industry -0.001 -0,002 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.004 
manufacturing & industrial 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
subtotal 0.083 0.079 0.086 0.076 0.060 0.068 0.084 0.078 0.081 0.094 0.065 0.075 
% of Explained 43.2% 46.9% 49.8% 42.6% 34.6% 35.1% 36.9% 35.2% 36.0% 40,0% 34,0% 34.0% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.048 0.041 0.044 0.048 0.056 0.063 0.071 0.069 0.070 0.068 0,064 0.068 
Nepotism 25.3% 24.6% 25.6% 26.8% 31.8% 32.5% 31.1% 30.9% 31.0% 28.8% 33.3% 30.9% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.060 0.048 0.046 0.055 0.059 0.063 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.062 0.077 
Discrimination 31.5% 28.4% 26.8% 30.6% 33.6% 32.4% 32.0% 33.7% 33.1% 31.2% 32.7% 35.1% 
152 
Table 6.19: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Mode! G) using male wage equation as benchmark 
， d e l G 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999' 
L n n o m m a l w a g e o T S — ^ ^ O S O l m ^ 
university or col ege 0.025 0.034 0.027 0.026 0.020 0.030 0.047 0.051 0.060 0 056 0 043 0 045 
vocational school 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0 010 -0 012 -0 019 
咖 肌 ’ ， -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 -0.012 -0.010 -0003 -0007 
junior high -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0 005 0 001 -0 001 
potential experience 0.146 0.126 0.142 0.164 0.114 0,088 0.108 0.100 0 109 0 104 0 109 0.119 
«per ience squared -0.110 -0.096 -0.103 -0.123 -0.085 -0.055 -0.072 -0.065 -0,073 -0 064 -0072 -0082 
. � 0.058 0.061 0.062 0,062 0.047 0.052 0.067 0.067 0.072 0.071 0 065 0 055 
/ i of Explained 30.5% 36.3% 35.9% 34.5% 26.8% 26.7% 29.5% 30.2% 31.9% 30.1% 34.0% 24 7% 
Unexpamed 0.133 0.108 0.111 0.118 0.128 0.142 0.161 0.155 0.153 0.165 0.126 0.166 
/ » o f Unexplained 617% 64.1% 65.5% 73.2% 73.3% 70.5% 69.8% 68.1% 69.9% 66.0% 75.3% 
Table 6.20: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model G) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model G 1988 1989 1990 1991 丨992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0.225 0 236 0 191 0221 
university or college 0.050 0.045 0.049 0.056 0.039 0.052 0.078 0.069 0.078 0 079 0 065 0 057 
vocational school -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0,019 -0.016 -0.018 -0.019 -0 030 -0 026 
senior high -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 -0.011 -0.018 -0.011 -0.016 -0.013 -0 007 -0 008 
junior high -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0 003 -0 002 0 000 
potential experience 0.168 0.137 0.164 0.154 0,148 0.123 0.119 0.126 0.087 0.092 0 123 0 128 
experience squared -0.157 -0.129 -0.154 -0.134 -0.141 -0.115 -0.100 -0.111 -0.060 -0 059 -0 097 -0 094 
Explained 0.055 0.052 0.050 0.062 0.035 0.038 0.055 0.053 0.067 0 077 0 051 0 057 
% of Explained 28.9% 30.6% 28.8% 34.4% 20.3% 19.7% 24.1% 23.7% 29.8% 32.5% 26 5% 25 9% 
Unexplained 0.136 0.117 0.123 0.118 0.139 0.155 0.174 0.169 0.158 0.159 0 141 0 164 
How much men's earnings devi 71.1% 69.4% 71.2% 65.6% 79.7% 80.3% 75.9% 76.3% 70.2% 67.6% 73.5% 74.1% 
Table 6.21: Cotton's decomposition (Model G) 
Model G 1988 ^ ^ 1993 m i 1996 ^ 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0.225 0.236 0.191 0.221 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
university or college 0.037 0.039 0.037 0.041 0.029 0.041 0.062 0.059 0.068 0 067 0 053 0 051 
vocational school 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0 021 -0 022 
senior high -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.014 -0.010 -0.014 -0.012 -0 005 -0 008 
junior high -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0 001 -0 001 
potential experience 0.157 0.131 0.152 0.159 0.130 0.105 0.113 0.112 0.099 0.098 0.115 0 123 
experience squared -0.133 -0.112 -0.127 -0.128 -0.112 -0.084 -0.085 -0.087 -0.067 -0.062 -0.084 -0.087 
subtotal 0.057 0.057 0.056 0.062 0.041 0.045 0.062 0.060 0 070 0 074 0 058 0 056 
% of Explained 29.7% 33.5% 32.5% 34.5% 23.7% 23.3% 26.9% 27.1% 30.9% 31.2% 30.5% 25.3% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.067 0.057 0.059 0.057 0.067 0.074 0.083 0.080 0.075 0.076 0 065 0 076 
Nepotism 34.8% 33.6% 34.2% 31.6% 38.2% 38.5% 36.2% 36.1% 33.2% 32.1% 34.2% 34.6% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.068 0.056 0.058 0.061 0.066 0.074 0.084 0.082 0.081 0.087 0.067 0.089 
Discrimination 35.5% 32.9% 33.3% 34.0% 38.1% 38.2% 36.9% 36.8% 35.9% 36.7% 35.2% 40.2% 
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Table 6.22: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model H) using male wage equation as benchmark 
M o d d H 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage ^ oItI ^ 0^74 o f w ~9 ^ 2 2 0 2 5 ^ 3 6 ^ 9 1 ~ ~ 
university or college 0.026 0.040 0.027 0.030 0.024 0.034 0.046 0.047 0 049 0 045 0 042 0 047 
vocational school 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0 009 -0 014 -0 019 
senior high -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0 007 -0 002 -0 007 
junior high -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0 004 -0 002 -0 002 
potential experience 0.146 0.129 0.142 0.153 0.112 0.090 0.105 0.099 0,108 0.110 0 103 0 123 
espenence squared -0.112 -0.101 -0.106 -0,114 -0.085 -0.060 -0.075 -0.071 -0.082 -0.081 -0.074 -0.095 
®f'j'"8 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0.006 -0.028 -0.017 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0,000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.00 丨 -0 004 
Si<:hu” 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0,007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.008 
Explained 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.059 0.043 0.049 0.056 0.054 0.052 0 051 0 042 0 037 
% of Explained 31.8% 36.9% 35.9% 32.9% 24.9% 25.1% 24.4% 24.3% 22.9% 21.4% 21.9% 16 6% 
Unexplained 0.130 0.106 0.111 0.121 0.131 0.145 0.173 0.168 0.173 0.185 0 149 0 184 
% of Unexplained 68.2% 63.1% 64.1% 67.1% 75.1% 74.9% 75.6% 75.7% 77.1% 78.6% 78.1% 83.4% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence ofdiscriminatoiy treatment (nepotism) 
Table 6.23: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model H) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model H 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0.225 0.236 0.191 0.221 
university or college 0.054 0.056 0.051 0.061 0.046 0.057 0.084 0.072 0.076 0.083 0,071 0.065 
vocational school -0.001 -0.003 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.021 -0.032 -0.027 
senior high -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.008 -0.006 -0.01 丨 -0.019 -0.012 -0.015 -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 
junior high -0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.010 -0.006 -0.001 
potential experience 0.160 0.140 0.163 0.151 0.147 0.121 0.126 0.132 0.097 0.104 0.131 0.135 
experience squared -0.146 -0.135 -0.151 -0.134 -0.139 -0.114 -0.111 -0.122 -0.083 -0.086 -0.116 -0.106 
•Beijing -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.016 -0.007 -0.032 -0.022 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
Explained 0.064 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.036 0.037 0.048 0.043 0,043 0.052 0.025 0.043 
% of Explained 33.5% 31.3% 31.2% 30.8% 20.8% 19.3% 20.9% 19.5% 19.0% 22.2% 12.9% 19.6% 
Unexplained 0.127 0.116 0.119 0.124 0.138 0.156 0.181 0.179 0.182 0.184 0.167 0.178 
% of Unexplained 66.5% 68.7% 68.8% 69.2% 79.2% 80.7% 79.1% 80.5% 81.0% 77.8% 87.1% 80.4% 
Table 6.24: Cotton's decomposition (ModelH) 
Model H 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage o l ? ! 0 . 1 6 9 ^ o T ^ 0.180 0.174 0 1 ^ 0 2 2 9 0 2 2 2 0225 0 2 3 6 o m a i l F 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
university or college 0.040 0.048 0.039 0.045 0.034 0.045 0.064 0.059 0.061 0.063 0.056 0.055 
vocational school -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.022 -0.023 
senior high -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 
junior high -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 
potential experience 0.153 0.134 0,152 0.152 0.129 0.105 0.115 0.115 0.103 0,107 0.116 0.128 
experience squared -0.129 -0.118 -0.127 -0.124 -0.111 -0.086 -0.092 -0.095 -0.082 -0.083 -0.093 -0.100 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.030 -0.019 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.00 丨 0.001 -0.005 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.008 
subtotal 0.062 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.040 0.043 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.051 0.034 0.040 
% of Explained 32.6% 34.2% 33.6% 31.9% 22.9% 22.3% 22.7% 22.0% 21.1% 21.8% 17.7% 18.0% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.062 0.056 0.057 0.060 0.066 0.075 0.086 0.084 0.086 0.087 0.078 0.083 
Nepotism 32.6% 33.2% 33,1% 33.3% 38.0% 38.7% 37.7% 38.1% 38.3% 36.9% 40.6% 37.5% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.066 0.055 0.058 0.063 0.068 0.075 0.091 0.089 0.092 0.097 0.080 0.098 
Discrimination 34.8% 32.6% 33.3% 34.8% 39.1% 39.0% 39.6% 39.9% 40.7% 41.3% 41.7% 44.5% 
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Table 6.2S: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model I) using male waee equation as benchmark 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
L n n o m m a l w a g e ^ 0.169 0.173 ~Q ~ 4 Om Ow ~ 2 OS ~ 6 H f l 
university or col ege 0.022 0.037 0.023 0.027 0.020 0.028 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.037 0 035 0 041 
vocational school 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0,004 -0,006 -0.007 -0.005 -0 007 -0 011 -0 016 
sen">r，|g， -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0 001 -0 006 
junior high . -0.001 -0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0 003 -0 001 -0 001 
potential experience 0.145 0.128 0.142 0.155 0.114 0.093 0.107 0.098 0.106 0.110 0.102 0.120 
experience squared -0.113 -0.102 -0.108 -0.117 -0.089 -0.066 -0.080 -0.074 -0.083 -0 084 -0 075 -0 095 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0 003 0 003 
0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.013 -0 006 -0 029 -0 017 
Zh印an 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.00 丨 0.001 0.000 0,000 0.002 0.002 -0 001 0 000 -0 004 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0,008 0.001 0 012 0 009 
state-owned 0.019 0.016 0.021 0.012 0.021 0.025 0.031 0.026 0.032 0 039 0 029 0 033 
E 叩 lamed 0.074 0.073 0.078 0.068 0.059 0.068 0,079 0.074 0.077 0 083 0 065 0 066 
% of Explained 38.9% 43.4% 45.2% 37.8% 34.0% 35.0% 34.7% 33.2% 34.3% 35.1% 33.9% 29 7% 
Unexplained 0.116 0.095 0.095 0.112 0.115 0.126 0.149 0.148 0.148 0 152 0 125 0 156 
% of Unexplained ：— — 6 L 0 % 55.2% 62.3% 66.0% 65.2% 65.2% 66.9% 66.0% 64.6% 65.5% 70.7% 
Table 6.26: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model I) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model I 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 m T 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0,173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0.225 0 236 0 191 0221 
university or college 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.050 0.034 0.042 0.067 0.057 0.059 0.067 0.061 0 054 
vocationa丨 school -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.028 -0 022 
senior high -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.015 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 
junior high -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0 005 -0 001 
potential experience 0.158 0.141 0.165 0.157 0.147 0.119 0.125 0.133 0.095 0 105 0 131 0 133 
experience squared -0.147 -0.139 -0.156 -0.145 -0.144 -0.113 -0.111 -0.125 -0.082 -0.089 -0.117 -0.108 
Beijing -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0 003 0 004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.015 -0.007 -0.032 -0 021 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0,002 -0.001 0.000 -0 006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.001 0 012 0 010 
state-owned 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.040 0.045 0.030 0.043 
Explained 0.086 0.073 0.076 0.069 0.056 0.06 丨 0.075 0.067 0.075 0.088 0.050 0.081 
% of Explained 45.0% 43.1% 43.9% 38.4% 32.3% 31,8% 32.7% 30.1% 33.2% 37.2% 26.1% 36 9% 
Unexplained 0.105 0.095 0.098 0.111 0.118 0.132 0.154 0.155 0.151 0.148 0 140 0 140 
% of Unexplained 54.9% 56.6% 56.4% 61.7% 67.7% 68.4% 67.2% 70.0% 67.1% 62.6% 73.2% 63.6% 
Table 6.27: Cotton 's decomposition (Model I) 
Model I 1988 1989 ^ 1991^ 1992 ^ 1994 i w 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage ^ ^ 6 9 O J ^ o l s o o T m 0 2 2 9 0 2 2 2 0225 0 2 3 6 O ^ I o U T 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
vocational school 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.019 -0.019 
senior high -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0:006 
junior high •0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 •0.001 •0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 
potential experience 0.152 0.134 0.153 0.156 0.130 0.106 0.115 0.115 0.101 0.108 0.116 0.126 
experience squared -0.130 -0.120 -0.131 -0.130 -0.116 -0.089 -0.095 -0.098 -0.082 -0.087 -0.094 -0.101 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Liaoning 0.003 0,000 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.030 -0.019 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0,005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
state-owned 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.018 0.026 0.029 0.033 0.029 0.036 0.042 0.029 0.038 
subtotal 0.048 0.033 0.046 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.022 0.026 0.034 0.011 0.026 
% of Explained 25.1% 19.6% 26.7% 17.0% 18.0% 15.5% 10.9% 10.1% 11.5% 14.5% 5.6% 11.7% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.051 0.046 0.047 0.053 0.057 0.063 0,073 0.073 0.071 0.070 0.065 0.065 
Nepotism 26.9% 27.4% 27.1% 29.7% 32.5% 32.8% 32.0% 33.1% 31.7% 29.7% 34,1% 29.6% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discrimination level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.059 0.049 0.050 0.058 0.060 0.066 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.067 0.083 
Discrimination 31.1% 29.0% 28.6% 32.3% 34.4% 34.0% 34.1% 35.2% 34.8% 33.9% 35.0% 37.8% 
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rot/g 6.2S: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model J) usine male wage equation as benchmark 
， d d i 1988 丨 989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 T ^ 
Lnnonunalwage ^ S l ^ T ^ o T i ^ m ^ 2 9 m ^ T ~ m 
薩 ^ e r 丨哦 0.014 0.030 0.021 0.023 0.014 0.027 0.030 0.032 0.036 0.030 0.028 0 0 3 3 
vocational school 0.000 -O.OOl -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -(XCm -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0 005 -0 008 -0 014 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0 005 -0 001 -0 005 
jumorhigh -0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0 001 -0 001 
potential expenence 0.143 0.125 0.140 0.149 0.109 0.086 0.099 0.094 0.104 0 106 0 098 0 117 
« p e n e n c e squared -0.113 -0.102 -0.107 -0.113 -0.085 -0.059 -0.074 -0.071 -0.081 -0.083 -0075 -0096 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0 003 0 002 
0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0 006 -0 028 -0 017 
0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0 001 -0 004 
� 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0 001 0 012 0 008 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0 002 -0 006 -0 007 
0.016 0.016 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.019 0.013 0 012 0 013 0 015 0 017 
administrative worker 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0 001 0 001 0 000 0 002 
How much men's earnines devi -0.003 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.014 0011 0 020 0 0 1 4 0011 
^ P ' ® " " * 0.060 0.067 0.072 0.064 0.046 0.058 0.068 0.064 0 062 0 068 0 0 5 2 0 046 
% of Explained ‘ 31.6% 39.4% 41.4% 35.6% 26.2% 30.2% 29.9% 28.9% 27.5% 28 8% 27 1% 20 7% 
Unexplained 0.131 0.102 0.106 0.116 0.129 0.135 0.160 0.158 0.163 0.168 0 139 0 175 
% of Unexplained 68.4% 60.6% 61.2% 64.3% 73.8% 69.8% 70.1% 71.1% 72.5% 71.2% 72.9% 79.3% 
Table 6.29: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model J) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model J 19M ^ ^ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0 225 0 236 0 191 0221 
university or college 0.038 0.037 0.031 0.046 0.026 0.040 0.050 0.048 0.057 0 059 0 047 0 034 
vocational school -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0 021 -0 012 
senior high -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.013 -0.008 -0.011 -0 010 -0 005 -0 004 
junior high -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 0 000 
potential experience 0.155 0.134 0.155 0.145 0.143 0.116 0.122 0.131 0.097 0.104 0 131 0 140 
experience squared -0.146 -0.134 -0.149 .0.132 -0.142 -0.114 -0.117 -0.130 -0.090 -0.094 -0.127 -0.125 
-0-001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.016 -0.007 -0.031 -0 021 
处ej ian 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0 001 -0 006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0 009 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.016 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011 -0 019 
0.027 0.032 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.043 0.026 0.018 0.025 0:026 0035 
administrative worker 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0 005 
commerce and service -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 
Explained 0.074 0.063 0.065 0.067 0.038 0.039 0.052 0.050 0.044 0 053 0 020 0 036 
% of Explained 38.6% 37.3% 37.4% 37.3% 21.8% 20.2% 22.9% 22.5% 19.5% 22.3% 10.5% 16 4% 
Unexplained 0.117 0.106 0.113 0.113 0.136 0.154 0.176 0.172 0.181 0.183 0.171 0 185 
% ofUneiplained 61.4% 62.7% 65.2% 62.7% 78.2% 79.8% 77.1% 77.5% 80.5% 77.7% 89.6% 83.6% 
Table 6.30: Cotton 's decomposition (Model J) 
ModelJ 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage ^ ^ 6 9 o l ^ o l i o o l ^ oToS 0^29 0 2 2 2 0225 0236 O J ^ o l l T 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
university or coUege 0.026 0.034 0.026 0.034 0.020 0.033 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.044 0.037 0.034 
vocational school 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 
senior high -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 
junior high -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 
potential experience 0.149 0.130 0.147 0.147 0.125 0.101 0.110 0.112 0.101 0.105 0.113 0.128 
experience squared -0.129 -0.118 -0.127 -0.122 -0.112 -0.085 -0.094 -0.099 -0.086 -0.088 -0.099 -0.110 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.029 -0.019 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 .0.005 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.011 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0 013 
cadre 0.021 0.023 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.031 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.020 0.025 
administrative worker 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 
commerce and service -0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.004 
subtotal 0.067 0.065 0.068 0.065 0.042 0.049 0.061 0.057 0.053 0.061 0.037 0.041 
% of Explained 35.0% 38.4% 39.5% 36.4% 24.1% 25.4% 26.6% 25.9% 23.7% 25.7% 19.4% 18.7% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.057 0.051 0.054 0.054 0.065 0.074 0.084 0.081 0.086 0.087 0.080 0.086 
Nepotism 30.1% 30.3% 31.3% 30.2% 37.5% 38.3% 36.7% 36.6% 38.0% 36.9% 41.7% 39.0% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.067 0.053 0.055 0.060 0.067 0.070 0.084 0.083 0.086 0.088 0.074 0.093 
Discrimination 34.9% 31.3% 31.8% 33.4% 38.4% 36.4% 36.7% 37.5% 38.3% 37.4% 38.9% 42.3% 
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ra&/e 6.31 ： Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model K) "sine male wage equation as benchmark 
， d 舰 . 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
L n n o m m a l w a g e ^ ^ ^ S m O S T ^ ~ m ^ m 
un.vers.ty or col ege 0.026 0.038 0.027 0.031 0.023 0.034 0.041 0.042 0.043 0 040 0 037 o S 
vocational school 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0 012 -0018 
鄉 肌 ’ t -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0006 -0002 -0007 
jm|u»rhigh - 0 0 0 2 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 - 0 0 0 2 
potential expenence 0.146 0.130 0.142 0.153 0.112 0.089 0.106 0.097 0.109 0 109 0 106 0 129 
experience squared -0.113 -0.103 -0.106 -0.114 -0.085 -0.059 -0,078 -0.070 -0.084 -0 081 -0 077 -0 101 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0 002 0 003 0 0 0 3 
i；"**：!""® 0.003 0.000 0,003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0 006 -0 028 -0 017 
^t』丨油 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0 001 0 001 -0 004 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0 001 0 0 1 2 0 008 
catering trade industry 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.016 0 017 0 014 0 010 
manufacturing & industrial 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0 003 -0 004 -0 005 
f x p l a ^ e d 0.060 0.060 0.064 0.060 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.063 0.060 0.061 0 048 0 039 
/ . of Explained 31.5% 35.6% 36.8% 33.3% 28.7% 27.5% 27.7% 28.5% 26.6% 26.0% 25 3% 17 8% 
Unexplained 0.130898054 0.108772768 0.109463928 0.119807336 0.124363505 0.140067757 0.165296244 0.158692266 0.165157527 0.174629381 0 142818367 0 18147156 
/ o o f Unexplained ： — — 6 8 ^ % 6 4 4 % 63.2% 66.7% 71.3% 72.5% 72.3% 71.5% 73.4% 74.0% 74.7% ‘ 82.2% 
Table 6.32: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model K) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model K 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Ln nominal wage o l ? ! 0.169 o T i o o T m 0 1 9 3 0 2 2 9 0 2 2 2 0 225 o l 3 6 o l ? ! o U T 
university or college 0.054 0.054 0.048 0.062 0.044 0.055 0.077 0.064 0 067 0 079 0 064 0 060 
vocational school -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0 019 -0 029 -0 024 
senior high -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.018 -0.011 -0.013 -0 012 -0 006 -0 007 
junior high -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0 006 -0 010 -0 006 -0 001 
potential experience 0.160 0.141 0.163 0.151 0.146 0,122 0.130 0.140 0 106 0 110 0 144 0 146 
experience squared -0.146 -0.136 -0.152 -0.134 -0.139 -0.116 -0.118 -0.136 -0.097 -0.094 -0.133 -0 121 
Beijing -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0 003 0 004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0,004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.016 -0.007 -0.032 -0 022 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0 006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0 009 
catering trade industry 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.015 0 007 
manufacturing & industrial 0.000 0.00 丨 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0 006 -0 003 
Explained 0.064 0.052 0.056 0.057 0.041 0.040 0.050 0.045 0.044 0 053 0 027 0 042 
% of Explained 33.7% 30.8% 32.3% 31.7% 23.3% 20.7% 21.8% 20,3% 19.5% 22 3% 14 3% 19 0% 
Unexplained 0.127 0.117 0.117 0.123 0.134 0.153 0.179 0.177 0.181 0.183 0 164 0 179 
% of Unexplained 66.3% 69.2% 67.7% 68.2% 76.7% 79.3% 78.2% 79.7% 80.5% 77.7% 85.7% 81.0% 
Table 6.33: Cotton's decomposition(ModelK) 
Model K 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 199S 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage O m 0.169 o l ^ 0.180 0.174 o I m 0.229 0 2 2 2 0 2 ^ 0 2 3 6 0191 o m T 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
university or college 0.039 0.046 0.037 0.046 0.033 0.044 0.058 0.052 0.054 0.058 0.050 0.050 
vocational school -0.001 -0.002 .0.006 .0.004 .0.004 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.020 -0.021 
senior high -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 -0:007 
junior high -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0 001 
potential experience 0.153 0.135 0.152 0.152 0.128 0.105 0.117 0.117 0.107 0.110 0.123 0 137 
experience squared -0.129 -0.119 -0.128 -0.124 -0.111 -0.086 -0.097 -0.101 -0.090 -0.087 -0.103 -0.110 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.030 -0 019 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.00 丨 -0 005 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0 009 
catering trade industry 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.008 
manufacturing & industrial 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 .0.005 -0 004 
subtotal 0.062 0.056 0.060 0.058 0.045 0.047 0.057 0.055 0.052 0.057 0.039 0041 
% of Explained 32.6% 33.3% 34.6% 32.5% 26.1% 24.2% 24.9% 24.6% 23.2% 24.2% 20.2% 18.3% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.062 0.056 0.056 0.059 0.064 0.073 0.085 0.084 0.086 0.087 0.076 0 083 
Nepotism 32.5% 33.5% 32.6% 32.9% 36.8% 38.0% 37.3% 37.7% 38.0% 36.9% 39.9% 37.8% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.067 0.056 0.057 0.062 0.065 0.073 0.087 0.084 0.087 0.092 0.076 0.097 
Discrimination 34.9% 33.3% 32.8% 34.6% 37.1% 37.8% 37.8% 37.7% 38.7% 38.9% 39.9% 43.9% 
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Toble 6.34: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model L) using male wage equation as benchmark 
， d e l L 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 I ? ^ 
Ln nommal wage ^ O I T ^ T W o W l ^ ^ = = = = O S 0 2 5 T m " T W 
un.vers.ty or college 0.011 0.028 0.017 0.020 0.011 0.021 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.022 0 023 0 030 
vocational school 0.000 -O.OO 丨 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0 004 -0 007 -0 013 
0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0,004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0001 -0005 
junior high 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0 001 0 000 -0 001 
potential experience 0.142 0.126 0.140 0.150 0.111 0.089 0.102 0.093 0.104 0.108 0 100 0 121 
« p e n e n c e squared -0.114 -0.104 -0.109 -0.115 -0.089 -0.065 -0.081 -0.073 -0.084 -0 087 -0078 -0.100 
-O.OOl -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0 003 0 003 
0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0 006 -0 028 -0 017 
？^Jian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0 001 -0 004 
Sichuan 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0 012 0 008 
stateowned 0.018 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.020 0.026 0.028 0.022 0.028 0.035 0 026 0028 
profess丨ona丨 & technician 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0 002 -0 004 -0 003 
c^dre 0.015 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.016 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.011 0 010 
administrative worker 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0 001 0 000 0 000 
commerce and service -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.007 0.003 0 005 0 007 0 008 0 010 
catering trade industry ‘ -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.010 0.011 0 012 0 013 0 009 0 006 
manirfacturing & industrial 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.00丨 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0 002 -0 002 -0 003 -0 004 
E 叩丨 ained 0.073 0.077 0.086 0.072 0.060 0.073 0.089 0.079 0 086 0 095 0 071 0 070 
% of Explained 38.4% 45.4% 49.6% 40.2% 34.3% 37.7% 38.9% 35.7% 38.1% 40 1% 37 3% 318% 
Unexplained 0.118 0.092 0.091 0.107 0.115 0.120 0,140 0.143 0.139 0 141 0 120 0 151 
% of Unexplained 6 1 ^ 54.6% 52.5% 59.7% 65.8% 62.3% 61.1% 64.3% 62.0% 59.8% 62.7% 68.2% 
Table 6.3S: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model L) using female wage equation as benchmark 
Model L 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.191 0.169 0.173 0.180 0.174 0.193 0.229 0.222 0 225 0 236 0 191 0221 
university or college 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.039 0.018 0.029 0.039 0.038 0.045 0.048 0.040 0 028 
vocational school 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 -0.009 
senior high -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0 003 
junior high -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0 000 
potential experience 0.154 0.136 0.157 0,150 0.142 0.114 0.122 0.137 0.099 0.107 0 139 0 142 
experience squared .0.146 -0.137 -0.153 -0.140 -0.143 -0.111 -0.117 -0.138 -0.094 -0.099 -0.135 -0.130 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0,002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0 004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.015 -0.007 -0.031 -0.021 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0,000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
stateowned 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.030 0.032 0.031 0,030 0.037 0.042 0.027 0 039 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.013 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0 008 -0 017 
cadre 0.024 0.028 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.038 0.022 0.014 0.022 0.023 0:031 
administrative worker 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 
commerce and service -0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
catering trade industry 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.002 
manufacturing & industrial -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0,000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0 001 
Explained 0.092 0.080 0.083 0.078 0.057 0.062 0.078 0.074 0.076 0.086 0.046 0 067 
% of Explained 48.2% 47.6% 48.1% 43.6% 32.9% 32.0% 34.2% 33.2% 33.6% 36.5% 23.9% 30 5% 
Unexplained 0.099 0.088 0.093 0.101 0.117 0.131 0.150 0.148 0.150 0.150 0.146 0 153 
% of Unexplained 51.8% 52.3% 53.9% 56.4% 67.2% 68.0% 65.8% 66.7% 66.5% 63.5% 76.1% 69.5% 
Table 6.36: Cotton's decomposition (ModelL) 
Model L 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 199S 1 9 % 1997 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.169 o T i o 0.174 o l w 0.229 0 2 2 2 U l S 0 2 3 6 o U T 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-disciminatory wage function 
university or college 0.021 0.029 0.021 0.030 0.014 0.025 0.031 0.032 0.037 0.034 0.031 0.029 
vocational school 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 
senior high -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 
junior high -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0:002 -0:001 
potential experience 0.148 0.131 0.148 0.150 0.126 0.101 0.112 0.114 0.102 0.108 0.118 0.131 
experience squared -0.130 -0.120 -0.130 -0.127 -0.115 -0.087 -0.098 -0.104 -0.089 -0.092 -0.105 -0.114 
Beijing -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0,002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Liaoning 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.029 -0.019 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0,000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 
Sichuan 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.009 
stateowned 0.025 0.022 0.025 0.019 0.025 0.028 0.029 0,026 0.032 0.039 0.026 0.033 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.009 
cadre 0.019 0.020 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.026 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.020 
administrative worker 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
commerce and service -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0,001 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
catering trade industry -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.008 0,009 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.004 
manufacturing & industrial 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
subtotal 0.083 0.078 0.085 0.075 0.059 0.068 0.084 0.077 0.081 0.091 0.059 0 0 6 9 
% of Explained 43.2% 46.5% 48.9% 41.8% 33.6% 35.0% 36,7% 34.5% 36.0% 38.4% 31.1% 31.2% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.048 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.056 0.063 0.072 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.068 0.072 
Nepotism 25.4% 25.3% 25.9% 27.2% 32.2% 32.6% 31.3% 31.6% 31.4% 30.1% 35.4% 32.4% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discimation level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.060 0.048 0.047 0.056 0.060 0.063 0.073 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.064 0.080 
Discrimination 31.4% 28.2% 27.3% 31.0% 34.2% 32.5% 32.0% 33.9% 32.7% 31.4% 33.5% 36.4% 
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Table 6.37 Summary of tables 6.1-6.36 
Panel A 
1988 
Ln nominal wage 0.19 
PanelB 
1989 
0.17 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 
Explained portion under Blinder Oaxaca decomposition using male wage equation as benchmark 
1994 
0.23 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Model A 
Model B 
Model C 
Model D 
Model E 
Model F 
ModelG 
Model H 
Model I 
ModelJ 
Model K 
Model L 
PanelC 
31.3% 
32.1% 
39.1% 
31.6% 
31.8% 
38.3% 
30.5% 
31.8% 
38.9% 
31.6% 
31.5% 
38.4% 
37.3% 
36.9% 
43.0% 
39.2% 
35 .5% 
44.9% 
36.3% 
36.9% 
43.4% 
39.4% 
35 .6% 
45.4% 
37.4% 
37.7% 
46.7% 
42.6% 
38.6% 
50.6% 
35.9% 
35.9% 
45.2% 
41.4% 
36.8% 
49.6% 
37.2% 
34.0% 
38.9% 
36.4% 
34.5% 
41.0% 
34.5% 
32.9% 
37.8% 
35.6% 
33.3% 
40.2% 
30.5% 
26.8% 
36.0% 
27.6% 
30.6% 
35.5% 
26.8% 
24.9% 
34.0% 
26.2% 
28.7% 
34.3% 
29.8% 
25.2% 
34.9% 
30.3% 
27.6% 
37.8% 
26.7% 
25 .1% 
35.0% 
30.2% 
27.5% 
37.7% 
30.9% 
24.7% 
34.9% 
30.2% 
27.9% 
38.8% 
29.5% 
24.4% 
34.7% 
29.9% 
27.7% 
38.9% 
Explained portion under Blinder Oaxaca decomposition using female wage equation as benchmark 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Model A 
Model B 
Model C 
Model D 
Model E 
Model F 
ModelG 
ModelH 
Model I 
ModelJ 
Model K 
Model L 
PanelD 
32.6% 
35 .7% 
46.1% 
39.3% 
35 .8% 
48.4% 
28.9% 
33.5% 
45 .0% 
38.6% 
33.7% 
48.2% 
36.3% 
34.7% 
45.4% 
39.0% 
34.0% 
49.1% 
30.6% 
31.3% 
43.1% 
37.3% 
30.8% 
47.6% 
32.9% 
35.4% 
46.9% 
39.0% 
36.0% 
48.9% 
28.8% 
31 .2% 
43.9% 
37.4% 
32.3% 
48.1% 
Explained portion under Cotton's decomposition 
Model A 
Model B 
Model C 
Model D 
Model E 
Model F 
Model G 
Model H 
Model I 
ModelJ 
ModelK 
Model L 
1988 1989 1990 
32.0% 
33.9% 
42.5% 
35.4% 
33.8% 
43 .2% 
29.7% 
32 .6% 
41.9% 
35.0% 
32.6% 
43 .2% 
36.8% 
35.8% 
44.2% 
39.1% 
34.7% 
46.9% 
33 .5% 
34.2% 
43 .3% 
38.4% 
33 .3% 
46.5% 
35 .2% 
36.5% 
46.8% 
40.9% 
37.3% 
49.8% 
32.5% 
33 .6% 
44.6% 
39.5% 
34.6% 
48.9% 
38.5% 
33.1% 
40.3% 
37.9% 
34.1% 
44.2% 
34.4% 
30.8% 
38.4% 
37.3% 
31 .7% 
43.6% 
1991 
37 .8% 
33 .6% 
39.6% 
37.1% 
34.3% 
42.6% 
34.5% 
31.9% 
38.1% 
36.4% 
32.5% 
41.8% 
25.8% 
23 .7% 
34.7% 
22.7% 
26.2% 
33 .6% 
20.3% 
20.8% 
32.3% 
21.8% 
23 .3% 
32.9% 
1992 
28.3% 
25 .3% 
35.4% 
25 .2% 
28.5% 
34.6% 
23 .7% 
22.9% 
33.2% 
24.1% 
26.1% 
33 .6% 
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25.3% 
20.6% 
32.7% 
20.2% 
21.9% 
32.2% 
19.7% 
19.3% 
31 .8% 
20.2% 
20.7% 
32.0% 
1993 
27 .6% 
23 .0% 
33 .9% 
25 .5% 
24.9% 
35 .1% 
23 .3% 
22.3% 
33 .5% 
25.4% 
24.2% 
35.0% 
29.2% 
23 .6% 
34.8% 
23 .8% 
23 .9% 
34.7% 
24.1% 
20.9% 
32.7% 
22.9% 
21.8% 
34.2% 
1994 
30.1% 
24.2% 
34.8% 
27 .2% 
26.0% . 
36.9% 
26.9% 
22.7% 
33.8% 
26.6% 
24.9% 
36.7% 
1995 
0.22 
1995 
30.8% 
25.1% 
33 .8% 
29.5% 
29.0% 
35.9% 
30.2% 
24.3% 
33.2% 
28.9% 
28.5% 
35.7% 
1995 
29.9% 
23 .7% 
33 .7% 
24.3% 
23.4% 
34.5% 
23.7% 
19.5% 
30.1% 
22.5% 
20.3% 
33 .2% 
1995 
30.4% 
24.5% 
33 .8% 
27.1% 
26.3% 
35.2% 
27 .1% 
22.0% 
31.8% 
25.9% 
24.6% 
34.5% 
1996 
0.22 
1996 
31.8% 
22.5% 
33 .6% 
27.2% 
25.9% 
37.3% 
31.9% 
22.9% 
34.3% 
27.5% 
26.6% 
38.1% 
1996 
36.5% 
22.8% 
36.7% 
20.9% 
22.3% 
34.5% 
29.8% 
19.0% 
33.2% 
19.5% 
19.5% 
33.6% 
1996 
34.0% 
22.7% 
35.0% 
24.2% 
24.2% 
36.0% 
30.9% 
21.1% 
33 .8% 
23 .7% 
23.2% 
36.0% 
1997 
0.24 
1997 
31.5% 
22.4% 
36.0% 
29.3% 
26.9% 
40.6% 
30.1% 
21.4% 
35.1% 
28.8% 
26.0% 
40.1% 
1997 
39.9% 
28.2% 
43.1% 
25.3% 
27.3% 
39.4% 
32.5% 
22.2% 
37.2% 
22.3% 
22.3% 
36.5% 
1997 
35.5% 
25.1% 
39.4% 
27.4% 
27.1% 
40.0% 
31.2% 
21.8% 
36.1% 
25 .7% 
24.2% 
38.4% 
1998 
0.19 
1998 
37.4% 
25.3% 
36.9% 
29.1% 
28.7% 
38.9% 
34.0% 
21.9% 
33 .9% 
27.1% 
25.3% 
37.3% 
1998 
37.7% 
23.4% 
35 .8% 
15.9% 
22.5% 
28.5% 
26.5% 
12.9% 
26.1% 
10.5% 
14.3% 
23.9% 
1998 
37.5% 
24.4% 
36.4% 
23 .0% 
25.8% 
34.0% 
30.5% 
17.7% 
30.2% 
19.4% 
20.2% 
31.1% 
1999 
0.22 
1999 
29.9% 
20.6% 
33.2% 
24.0% 
21.2% 
34.3% 
24.7% 
16.6% 
29.7% 
20.7% 
17.8% 
31.8% 
1999 
36.5% 
28.7% 
45.3% 
20.4% 
26.8% 
33 .6% 
25.9% 
19.6% 
36.9% 
16.4% 
19.0% 
30.5% 
1999 
33 .0% 
24.4% 
38.8% 
22.3% 
23 .8% 
34.0% 
25.3% 
18.0% 
33 .1% 
18.7% 
18.3% 
31 .2% 
Toble 6.38: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (ModdA) using male basic wage equation as benchmark 
”。似 A 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 丨朔 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 199^ 
Ln nominal wage 0.181 U T g ~ ^ O u E H O S T W s ~ 0 
yearofschoolmg 0.0 0 0.036 0.030 0.029 0.020 0.022 0.031 0.031 0.034 0 032 0 S " 0 02 
potential expenence 0.136 0.122 0.132 0.147 0.101 0,091 0.102 0.095 0.105 0 091 0 0 7 7 O o S 
. Z V ' l -0.087 - _ 9 -0.066 -0.052 -0.055 -0.054 -0.063 -0.049 -0.031 -0:0 
， P f T l ’ H 0.076 0.075 0.077 0.056 0.061 0.078 0,072 0.075 0.074 0 073 0 066 
/ . o f E x p i a t e d 40 9 : 45.8% 46.6% 47.7% 38.0% 36.7% 37.1% 33.3% 32.8% 33.0% 36.2% 316% 
y n e x 二脈 d = 0.090 0,086 0,084 0.091 0.105 0.132 0.144 0.154 0,151 0,128 0.144 
% of Unexplained 59J% ^ 52.3% 62.0% 63.3% 62.9% 66.7% 67.2% 67.0% 63.8% 68.4% 
Table 6.39: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model A^ using female basic wage equation as benchmark 
Mode 丨 A 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Lnnommalwage ^ ^ ^ ol?! ol^  UTe olu oUe 0^29 oIlS ^ I^TT 
yearofschoolmg 0.048 0.046 0.042 0.042 0.028 0.030 0.040 0.039 0.046 0 052 0 040 0 0 3 4 
potenhal experience ‘ 0.147 0.112 0.148 0.135 0.127 0.108 0.119 0.112 0.076 0.066 0 101 0053 
«per ience squared -0.120 -0.085 -0.121 -0.103 -0.106 -0.084 -0.083 -0.082 -0.035 -0 020 -0063 0 0 0 4 
E冲 lamed 0.074 0.074 0.069 0.074 0.048 0.053 0.076 0.068 0.087 0 098 0 077 0 091 
% of Explained 41.0% 44.6% 42.6% 45.8% 32.8% 32.2% 36.0% 31.7% 37.8% 43.7% 38 6% 43 3% 
Unexplained 0.107 0.092 0.093 0.087 0.099 0.113 0.135 0.147 0 142 0 127 0 123 0 119 
% of Unexplained 5 9 ^ 55.5% 57.4% 54.2% 67.2% 67.8% 64.0% 68.3% 62.1% 56.3% 61.4% 56.7% 
Table 6.40: Cotton's decomposition (Model A) of basic wage gap 
Model A 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 l i 
Ln nominal wage 0.181 0.166 0.162 0.161 0.147 0.166 0.211 0.216 0.229 0.225 0 2 0 0 0211 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-disciminatory wage function 
yearofschoolmg 0.039 0.041 0.036 0.035 0.024 0.026 0.035 0.035 0.039 0 041 0 033 0 028 
potential experience 0.141 0.117 0.140 0.141 0.113 0.099 0.110 0.103 0.091 0.079 0 088 0 077 
experience squared -0.105 -0.083 -0.103 -0.101 -0.085 -0.067 -0.068 -0,067 -0.050 -0 035 -0 046 -0 028 
卯 btota 丨 0.074 0.075 0.072 0.075 0.052 0.057 0.077 0.070 0.081 0 085 0 075 0 078 
% of Explained 41.0% 45.2% 44.6% 46,8% 35.6% 34.5% 36.6% 32.6% 35.2% 38.0% 37.3% 37.0% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.052 0.044 0.045 0.042 0.047 0.054 0.064 0.069 0.067 0.060 0 057 0 056 
Nepotism 28.8% 26.8% 27.6% 26.0% 32,1% 32.4% 30.4% 32.2% 29.3% 26.6% 28.6% 26.4% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discimation level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.055 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.048 0.055 0.070 0.076 0.081 0.079 0 068 0 077 
Discrimination 30.2% 28.0% 27.8% 27.2% 32.4% 33.1% 33.0% 35.2% 35.5% 35.3% 34.1% 36.6% 
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raWg 6.41 ： Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model B) using male basic wage equation as benchmark ”義 1 卯8 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 iglT Ln nominal wage m ^ J T l ^ m m O T T ^ ~ ~ = 0 225 0 2 0 0 ~ ^ H T T 
yearofschoohng 0.030 0.037 0.029 0.029 0.020 0.020 0.028 0.028 0.027 GG2 0022 0022 
potenbal experience 0.137 0.127 0.134 0.144 0.102 0.095 0.102 0.094 0.103 0 094 O o S 0101 
experience squared -0 095 -0.089 -0.090 -0.096 -0.068 -0.059 -0.060 -0.057 -0.072 -0.060 -0 036 -0 063 
0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 0 002 0 0 0 0 
Jllfonmg 0 0 0 2 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.015 -0.004 -0.021 - 0 0 1 2 
fh^J 丨 an 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0,000 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0 001 -0002 
^chuan 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.010 0 002 0011 0 0 0 5 
. ^ 0 075 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.053 0.054 0.068 0.064 0.053 0.057 0.055 0 051 
/ . o f E x p l a i n e d 41.4% 45.9% 46.3% 46.4% 35.8% 32.7% 32.1% 29.8% 23.3% 25 6% 27 6% 24 3% 
Unexp amed 0.106 0.090 0.087 0.087 0.094 0.112 0.143 0.151 0.176 0.167 0 145 0 159 
/ . o f Unexplained 5 J M 5 J M 53.7% 53.7% 64.2% 67.3% 67.9% 70.2% 76.7% 74.4% 72.4% 75.7% 
Table 6.42: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model B) using female basic wage equation as benchmark 
Model B 1988 1989 1990 丨991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 " l i i T Ln nominal^  0.181 0^66 O?! Oji? ol^  oITl oHe oIm ^ ？ITT 
year of schooling 0.048 0.048 0.041 0.043 0.027 0.027 0.037 0.036 0 037 0 044 0 036 0 033 
potential experience 0.145 0.121 0.150 0.139 0.128 0.110 0.125 0.116 0.089 0 078 0 104 0 064 
experience squared -0.118 -0.099 -0.123 -0.109 -0.107 -0.090 -0.094 -0.092 -0 064 -0 045 -0 073 -0 010 
Beijing -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0,002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0 001 0 002 0 001 
Liaonmg 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 -0.017 -0 005 -0 025 -0 017 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 -0.00 丨 0 000 -0 003 
Sichuan 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.010 0 002 0011 0 006 
Explained 0.077 0.071 0.070 0.069 0.046 0.046 0.065 0.059 0.055 0 074 0 056 0 073 
% of Explained 42.8% 42.9% 43.4% 42.7% 31.5% 27.5% 31.0% 27.5% 23.8% 33.1% 28 2% 34 9% 
Unexplained 0.104 0.095 0.091 0.092 0.101 0.121 0.145 0.156 0.175 0 150 0 144 0 137 
% of Unexplained 5 7 ^ 57.0% 56.6% 57.3% 68.5% 72.5% 69.0% 72.4% 76.2% 66.9% 71.8% 65.1% 
Table 6.43: Cotton 's decomposition (Model B) of basic wage gap 
Model B 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 i j p T 
Ln nominal wage 0.181 0.166 0.162 0.161 0.147 0.166 0.211 0.216 0.229 0.225 0.200 0.211 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
year of schooling 0.038 0.042 0.035 0.035 0.023 0.023 0.033 0.032 0.032 0 034 0 029 0 027 
potential experience 0.141 0.124 0.142 0.141 0.114 0.102 0.113 0.104 0.096 0.087 0.089 0 083 
experience squared -0.106 -0.094 -0.106 -0.102 -0.087 -0.074 -0.076 -0.073 -0.068 -0.053 -0 053 -0 039 
Beijing 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0 001 0 002 0 000 
Liaoning 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.016 -0.004 -0 023 -0 015 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0 000 -0 002 
Sichuan 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.002 0 011 0 006 
subtotal 0,076 0.074 0.073 0.072 0.050 0.050 0.067 0.062 0.054 0.065 0 056 0 062 
% of Explained 42.1% 44.5% 44.9% 44.6% 33,7% 30.2% 31.6% 28.7% 23,5% 29.1% 27.9% 29.2% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0.051 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.048 0.057 0.069 0.074 0.082 0.071 0 067 0 064 
Nepotism 28.0% 27.6% 27,2% 27.5% 32.7% 34.6% 32.8% 34.2% 36.0% 31.6% 33.4% 30.3% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.054 0,046 0.045 0.045 0.049 0.058 0.075 0.080 0.093 0 088 0 077 0 085 
Discrimination 29.9% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 33.5% 35.2% 35.6% 37.1% 40.5% 39.3% 38.7% 40.5% 
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rable 6.44: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model F) usins male basic waee equation as benchmark 
M。如 IF 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 T ^ 
L n n o m m d w a g e o l 6 6 ^ 0 1 6 6 O H ~ 6 O S ^ H m 
yearofschoohng 0.016 0.026 0.021 0.022 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.015 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 4 
potential experience 0.131 0.123 0.132 0.142 0.102 0.095 0.102 0.090 0.101 0 094 0 0 8 丨 0 110 
experience squared -0.095 -0.092 -0.092 -0.099 -0.074 -0.064 -0.069 -0.062 -0.076 -0 067 -0 049 -0 081 
0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0,002 -0.001 -0.005 0 001 0 002 0 000 
Liaoning 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.014 -0.004 -0 020 -0 012 
Zhejwn 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 -0 001 0 000 -0 002 
Sichuan 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.010 0 002 0011 0 006 
state owned 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.027 0.019 0.026 0.032 0 020 0 028 
profess丨ona丨 & technician 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0 002 
cadre 0.013 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.008 0,008 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.010 0 012 0 012 
administrative worker 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0,000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0 000 0 000 
commerce and service 0.008 0.016 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.009 0 006 0 000 0 014 
catering trade industry 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.010 0 013 0 007 
manufacturing & industrial 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.00 丨 -0.001 0,000 0.000 -0.001 -0 001 -0 004 -0 004 
Explained ‘ 0.094 0.105 0.103 0.092 0.071 0.080 0.101 0.086 0.091 0.096 0.076 0 090 
% of Explained 51.9% 63.6% 63.4% 57.1% 48.2% 47.8% 47.8% 40.0% 39.9% 42.9% 38 0% 42 9% 
Unexplained 0.087 0.060 0.059 0.069 0.076 0.087 0,110 0.129 0.138 0 128 0 124 0 120 
% of Unexplained 48.1% 36.4% 36.6% 42.9% 51.8% 52.2% 52.2% 60.0% 60.1% 57.1% 62.0% 57.1% 
Table 6.45: Blinder Oaxaca decomposition (Model F) using female basic wage equation as benchmark 
Model F 1988 ^ ^ ^ ^ 19W ^ ^ 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ln nominal wage 0.181 0.166 0.162 0.161 0.147 0.166 0.211 0.216 0,229 0.225 0 2 0 0 0211 
year of schooling 0.026 0.028 0.020 0.030 0.013 0.015 0.019 0,019 0.019 0.026 0.021 0 016 
potential experience 0.138 0.117 0,145 0.139 0.126 0.111 0.127 0.128 0.104 0,090 0.126 0 093 
experience squared -0.119 -0.103 -0.129 -0.117 -0.117 -0.099 -0.110 -0.120 -0.096 -0.070 -0.111 -0.062 
Beijing 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Liaoning • 0,002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.017 -0.005 -0.024 -0.016 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.00 丨 0.005 -0.001 0.000 .0.003 
Sichuan 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.012 0.007 
state owned 0.025 0.029 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.035 0.035 0.023 0.031 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.011 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 
cadre 0.020 0.023 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.015 0,034 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.019 0,030 
administrative worker 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
commerce and service -0.001 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
catering trade industry 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.006 0.011 0:004 
manufacturing & industrial 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
Explained 0.096 0.100 0.092 0.088 0.062 0.062 0.086 0.075 0.079 0.097 0.068 0.084 
% of Explained 53.3% 60.3% 56.7% 54.5% 42.1% 37.3% 40.6% 34.9% 34.6% 43.1% 34.1% 39.7% 
Unexplained 0.085 0.066 0.070 0.073 0.085 0.104 0.125 0.140 0.150 0.128 0.132 0.127 
% of Unexplained 46.7% 39.7% 43.3% 45.5% 57.9% 62.7% 59.3% 65.1% 65.4% 56.9% 65.9% 60.3% 
Table 6.46: Cotton's decomposition (Model F) of basic wage gap 
Model F 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999_ 
Ln nominal wage O j i l 0.166 0.162 o l i l 0.147 0.166 o I T l 0 l l 6 0.229 0225 0 2 0 0 o H F 
Difference due to endowments weighted by the non-discriminatory wage function 
year of schooling 0.021 0.027 0.021 0.026 0.012 0,014 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.015 
potential experience 0.135 0.120 0.138 0.141 0.113 0,102 0.114 0.108 0.103 0.092 0.102 0.102 
experience squared -0.107 -0.097 -0.110 -0.108 -0.094 -0.081 -0.089 -0.089 -0.086 -0.069 -0.078 -0.072 
Beijing 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.002 0.000 
Liaoning 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.016 -0.004 -0.022 -0.014 
Zhejian 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 
Sichuan 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0,001 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.011 0.006 
state owned 0.020 0.026 0.025 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.026 0.021 0.031 0.034 0.022 0.029 
professional & technician 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0,000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 
cadre 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.024 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.020 
administrative worker 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
commerce and service 0.004 0.011 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.006 
catering trade industry 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.003 0,008 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.006 
manufacturing & industrial 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
subtotal 0.095 0.103 0.097 0.090 0.067 0.071 0.094 0.081 0.086 0.097 0.072 0.087 
% of Explained 52.6% 62.0% 60.2% 55.9% 45.3% 42.8% 44.4% 37.6% 37.4% 43.0% 36.2% 41.4% 
How much men's earnings deviate from what they would have received in the absence of discriminatory treatment (nepotism) 
subtotal 0,041 0.032 0.034 0.035 0,041 0.050 0.059 0.066 0.071 0.060 0.061 0.059 
Nepotism 22.8% 19.2% 20.8% 21.8% 27.6% 29,9% 28.2% 30.7% 30.9% 26.9% 30.7% 28.1% 
How much women's earnings deviate from the non-discriminatory level (discrimination) 
subtotal 0.044 0.031 0.031 0.036 0.040 0.045 0.058 0.068 0.073 0.068 0.066 0.064 
Discrimination 24.6% 18.8% 19.0% 22.3% 27.1% 27.3% 27.4% 31.7% 31.8% 30.1% 33.1% 30.5% 
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Chapter 7. Change of the Gender Wage Differentials from 1988 through 1999 
In order to facilitate the decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap into 
a portion due to gender-specific factors and a portion due to changes in the overall 
level of wage inequality, we follow Juhn et al.'s (1991) method. The method presumes 
that males and females have the same income-generating process and the same prices 
for their observed skills, so that the wage equation for males also applies to females. 
The approach constrains the prices of the observed skills to be identical for males and 
females and a priori eliminates the change in relative prices for observed skills as a 
possible cause for the change of the wage gap. This presumption may be justified 
because men and women in China are sent to the same schools and receive same 
quality of education. The procedure for empirically implementing the decomposition 
is described in Chapter 2.3 and is therefore briefly summarized below. 
The difference in the gender wage gap between 2 years, 0 and 1, can be 
decomposed: 
Di - D o = ( A X i - AXo) pi + AXoCPi- po) 
+ (ABi - Aeo)cJi + AQo (ACTI - Agq) 
The first term in the above equation is the relative quantity effect for the 
observed skills; and the second term is the general price effect for observed skills. The 
third term captures changes in the relative positions of males and femalesthat is 
whether females are moving up or down within the distribution of males; it gives the 
contribution to the change in gender wage gap that would result if the level of residual 
male wage inequality had remained unchanged and only the percentile rankings of the 
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female wage residuals had changed, so we call it the relative quantity effect for 
unobserved skills. The fourth term captures the effect of changing inequality; it 
measures the contribution to the change in the gender gap that would result if the 
percentile rankings of the female wage residuals had remained unchanged and only 
the male residual wage inequality had changed, so it is named as the general price 
effect for unobserved skills. In carrying out this decomposition, we should be aware 
of some of the residual differential between men and women reflects discrimination, 
so the third and the fourth terms do not restrict straightly to the price and quantity 
effects of unobserved skills. 
With the purpose of comparing the mean log wage changes over time, we divide 
nominal wage by consumer price index to obtain real wage. Then, we take each 
individual's real wage logarithmic value to obtain the arithmetic mean of the 
logarithmic values. W e use separate consumer price indices for Beijing and each cities 
surveyed for Liaoning, Zhejiang, Sichuan and Guangdong. The consumer price index 
is set to be 100 for each individual city in 1988. 
7.1 Decomposing the change of the overall gender wage gaps, 1988-1999 
The change in the difference of male-female log real wage from year 1988 to 
year 1999 is 0.032 log points. This suggests that a slight divergence of the gender 
wage gap has occurred. The decomposition results based on Juhn et al. (1991) are 
reported in Table 7.1. The relative quantity effects of both measured skills and 
unmeasured skills have a negative value. In exact terms, the former is equal to -204% 
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in the Table 7.1 and the latter is equal to -73% using a simple specification^ ^ Using a 
fUll specification 17, the former equals -269% whereas the latter equals -85%. 
Therefore, these two effects, which sum up to gender-specific factors point to the 
edge of convergence of the gender wage gap. 
Table 7.1: Decomposition of changes in the gender pay gaps, 1988-1999 
Simple Specification Full Specification 
Descriptive statistics: 
Male residual standard error* 
1988 0.3941 0.3894 
1999 0.5730 0.5489 
Female residual standard error* 
1988 0.4600 0.4489 
1999 0.6600 0.6245 
Mean female residual*: 
1988 -0.1297 -0.1180 
1999 -0.1785 -0.1496 
Decomposition of change: 
Change in differential (D99-D88) 0.03154 100% 0.03154 100% 
Observed X's: -0.0642 -204% -0.0850 -269% 
Observed Price: 0.0469 149% 0.0848 269% 
Gap -0.023 -73% -0.0268 -85% 
Unobserved prices 0.0718 228% 0.0584 185% 
sum gender specific -0.087 -277% -0.112 -354% 
sum wage structure 0.119 377% 0.143 454% 
* Estimated using male wage regressions. The change in the differential is the change in the male-female log wage differential 
between 1988 and 1999. 
16 The simple specification used years of schooling, experience, experience squared and province 
dummies as independent variables. 
17 The full specification is similar to Model F, using years of schooling, experience, experience 
squared, province dummies, occupational dummies, ownership dummy and industry dummies. 
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However, the general price effects of both measured and unmeasured skills have 
a totally opposite impact on the gender wage gap. The first accounts for 149% (269%) 
of the total change in the gap and the second accounts for 228% (185%) of the change 
using the simple (full) specification. Their sum that is named as the effect of changing 
wage structure more than offsets the effect of gender-specific factors. In fact, it drives 
the net gender wage gap to widen slightly. We may conclude that the gender gap from 
1988 to 1999 has not changed much over the 12 years because the effect of rising skill 
prices for both skills cancelled out the effect of gender specific factors. 
Blau and Kahn's (1997) finding of a substantial decline of the male-female pay 
gap during the period of 1979 - 1988 shows that the gender-specific factors were 
more than sufficient to counterbalance the changes in both measured and unmeasured 
prices that worked against women in the United States. They found the observed X's 
effect contributed to 50% of the narrowing of the gap and explained it by the fact that 
the improvements in women's relative qualifications, especially their experience and 
occupations, and a larger negative effect of deunionization on male than female 
workers. The gap effect accounts for 96% of the convergence of the gender gap and 
the authors wrote, "since women improved their relative level of measured 
characteristics, it is plausible that they also enhanced their relative level of 
unmeasured characteristics." Like Blau and Kahn, we have found the observed X's 
effect and the upstream swimming of women against the changing wage distribution 
narrowed the gender wage gap. However, in our finding, the upgrading of Chinese 
women's labor market skills is not sufficient enough to counteract the effect of 
increasing wage inequality and higher rewards to measured skills that act to retard 
women's progress. It is not difficult to understand that as the Chinese labor market 
became more open, females were more likely to acquire the same level of skills as 
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males do. For example, average female years of schooling have caught up with those 
of average males. The converging skill of males and females tried to close the gender 
wage gap over the 1990s, but at the same time increase in returns to unobserved and 
observed skills tried to enlarge the gap as market forces take greater hold of the 
economy. The effects of changes in wage structures dominated the effect of 
gender-specific factors, thereby causing a slight divergence of the gender wage gap. 
Turning to unexplained part of the pay gap as a whole, Blau and Kahn (1997) 
found it declined substantially and viewed the decline as either an upgrading of 
women's unmeasured labor market skills or a decline in labor market discrimination 
against women. They interpreted the decline by the fact that women improved their 
relative level of measured and unmeasured endowments, and women increased their 
commitment to the labor force and their other job skills, possibly diminishing any 
statistical discrimination against them. Different from Blau and Kahn's findings on 
the United States, we find the unexplained part of the pay gap in China over 
1988—1999 period is increasing rather than decreasing. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the unexplained pay gap especially the unexplained basic wage gap has increased over 
the 12-year period, so the extent of gender discrimination might be more severe. 
Another explanation is that there is a large increase in unmeasured skill premia. The 
most (unmeasured) skilled group has a higher composition of males than females, so a 
significant labor demand shift toward the most skilled workers, a shift toward 
industries that demand more skilled workers or a technological shift with industries 
toward production methods favoring the most skilled would increase the returns to 
unmeasured skills. This inevitably unflavored women and widened the gender gap. 
The effects of observed and unobserved prices in both simple and full 
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specifications go in the same direction; and changes in measured X，s and the gap 
effects also go in the same direction. This gives us some confidence in separating out 
the effects of gender-specific factors from those of the wage structure on the gender 
pay gap. 
7.2 Inter-temporal change of gender wage gaps, 1988-1994 & 1994-1999 
If we look at the mean log wage gap between males and females closely, we shall 
see that the gap diverges vastly from 1988 to 1994. The divergence is 0.037 log points. 
Decomposition results in Table 7.2 indicate that the divergence is largely caused by 
the general price effect of measured and unmeasured skills, each of which accounts 
for 89% (163%) and 116% (92%) respectively of the change in the wage gap using 
simple (full) specification. W e see that the counteracting observed skills' relative 
quantity effect which amounts to -105% (-130%) of the change using simple (full) 
specification. Again, the effects of observed and unobserved prices in both simple and 
full specifications go in the same direction. 
It is interesting to point out the mean gender log wage gap converges slightly by 
0.005 log points from 1994 to 1999. Firstly, there is a slight convergence from 1994 to 
1995; this might be due to the establishment of Labor Law that enforces egalitarian 
treatment of female and male workers. Secondly, the convergence can be accounted 
for by unexpected change of wage gap in 1997-1998 as an impact of Asian financial 
turmoil on wage structure of China's labor market. 
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Table 7,2: Decomposition o f changes in the gender pay gaps, 1988-1994 
Simple Specification Full Specification 
Descriptive statistics: 
Male residual standard error* 
1988 0.3941 0.3894 
1994 0.5033 0.4878 
Female residual standard error* 
1988 0.4600 0.4489 
1994 0.5793 0.5556 
Mean female residual*: 
1988 -0.1297 -0.1180 
1994 -0.17285 -0.1429 
Decomposition of change: 
Change in differential (D94-D88) 0.03726 100% 0.03726 100% 
Observed X's: -0.0392 -105% -0.0483 -130% 
Observed Price: 0.0332 89% 0.0606 163% 
Gap -0.00001 0.02% -0.0093 -25% 
Unobserved prices 0.0432 115.8% 0.0342 92% 
sum gender specific -0.039 -105% -0.058 -155% 
sum wage structure 0.076 205% 0.095 255% 
* Estimated using male wage regressions. The change in the differential is the change in the male-female log wage differential 
between 1988 and 1999. 
7.3 Inter-temporal change of gender wage gaps, 1997-1998 
There is a peculiar change from 1997 to 1998; the average gender wage gap 
closes significantly by 0.04 log points. This level of convergence is bigger than the 
divergence level from 1988 to 1994. Decomposing the gap using the same method, 
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we find the gap effect accounts for 119% (72%) of the change in the simple (full) 
specification (Table 7.3). This means that women rank considerably higher within the 
male residual wage distribution in 1998 than in 1997 holding the male residual wage 
inequality unchanged. Relative to the unobserved characteristics of males, the 
unobserved characteristics of females valued by the labor market went up during 1997. 
The female residual mean (in the male wage equation) actually climbs up from -0.184 
(-0.142) log points in 1997 to -0.146 (-0.123) log points in 1998 using simple (full) 
specification. 
Table 7.3: Decomposition of changes in the gender pay gaps, 1997-1998 
Simple Specification Full Specification 
Descriptive statistics: 
Male residual standard error* 
1997 0.5973 0.5818 
1998 0.6174 0.5969 
Female residual standard error* 
1997 0.6607 0.6324 
1998 0.6453 0.6134 
Mean female residual*: 
1997 -0.1837 -0.1422 
1998 -0.1464 -0.1227 
Decomposition of change: 
Change in differential (D98-D97) -0.04135 100% -0.04135 100% 
Observed X's: -0.0136 33% -0.0275 66% 
Observed Price: 0.0096 -23% 0.0058 -14% 
Gap -0.0493 119% -0.0298 72% 
Unobserved prices 0.0119 -29% 0.0102 -24% 
sum gender specific -0.063 152% -0.057 138% 
sum wage structure 0.022 -52% 0.016 -38% 
* Estimated using male wage regressions. The change in the differential is the change in the male-female log wage differential 
between 1988 and 1999. 
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7.4 Decomposing the change of basic wage gaps, 1988-1999 
Table 7.4: Decomposition o f changes in the gender basic wage gaps，1988-1999 
Simple Specification Full Specification 
Descriptive statistics: 
Male residual standard error* 
1988 0.3347 0.3286 
1999 0.5317 0.5071 
Female residual standard error* 
1988 0.3732 0.3624 
1999 0.6067 0.5756 
Mean female residual*: 
1988 -0.1060 -0.0870 
1999 -0.1633 -0.1256 
Decomposition of change: 
Change in differential (D99-D88) 0.03151 100% 0.03151 100% 
Observed X's: -0.0562 -178% -0.0782 -248% 
Observed Price: 0.0304 97% 0.0710 225% 
Gap -0.0319 -101% -0.0291 -92% 
Unobserved prices 0.0891 283% 0.0678 215% 
sum gender specific -0.0881 -280% -0.1073 -340% 
sum wage structure 0.12 380% 0.14 440% 
* Estimated using male wage regressions. The change in the differential is the change in the male-female log wage differential 
between 1988 and 1999. 
Table 7.4 shows the decomposition of the change of the gender basic wage gaps 
between 1988 and 1999 using the simple and full specifications. The change in the 
difference of male-female log real basic wage from year 1988 to year 1999 is 0.0315 
log points which carry the same sign and similar magnitude as the change in the 
gender total wage gap. Gender basic wage gap has slightly diverted. Following the 
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Juhn et al. (1991) method, we find that the relative quantity effect of both measured 
skills and unmeasured skills have a negative value. The former is equal to -178% 
(-248%) and the latter is equal to -101% (-92%) using the simple (full) specification. 
In sum, the gender-specific factors close the basic wage gap by 0.107 log points. 
However, the sum wage structure, that is, the general price effects of both measured 
and unmeasured skills have a totally opposite effect on the basic wage gap to 
overwhelm the effect of gender specific factors. The first accounts for 97% (248%) of 
the total change in the gap and the second accounts for 283% (215%) of the change 
using the simple (full) specification (Table 7.4). It can be concluded that the widening 
of the gender basic wage gap over the 12 year-horizon and the widening of the total 
wage gap both are caused by the greater impact of the increasing prices for 
unobserved and observed skills, dominating the impact of gender specific factors. 
This conclusion is the same for the total wage gap. 
7.5 Limitation 
The analysis may not be completely appropriate when gender wage gap reflects 
both skill differences and market discrimination. Suen (1997) argues that the 
empirical implementation of wage residual decomposition implicitly assumes that 
labor market discrimination is unimportant. The interpretation of the third and the 
fourth terms as the effects of unmeasured skills and prices is only valid if the 
percentile rankings are independent of the standard deviation of wage residuals. 
Nevertheless, this cannot be the case since the presence of a change in wage 
dispersion can lead to a change of the gap effect. More dispersed distribution has 
thicker tails and for a fixed wage at the lower end of the distribution, any increase in 
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dispersion will raise its percentile rankings. Suen's argument does not vitiate the 
decomposition outlined above but it makes us become cautious in our economic 
interpretation of these terms. For instance, the term (A6i - A6o)ai could be due to 
either unobserved skill convergence of females and males, causing females to move 
up in the male residual wage distribution, or a reduction in discrimination. However, 
it is still considered as a gender specific factor regardless of the causes. 
7.6 Decomposition of wage gaps of synthetic age cohorts 
Suen (1997) proposed to calculate the wage gap for synthetic cohorts so as to 
resolve the two alternative interpretations of the change in residual wage gap. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the convergence in unmeasured skills is given by the term 
atAO((sft - Smt) - (d/cTt)) from equation (7). In this section, we try to track synthetic 
18 
age cohorts by birth years and impose the restriction that Sft - Smt is constant over 
time. Then, according to the unobserved skills interpretation of the residual wage gap, 
the above convergence term should be zero; in contrast, according to the pure 
discrimination interpretation of the residual wage gap, the term should be positive 
when the standard deviation of the male wage residual at has risen over the period. 
Due to the limited sample size, we identify two age cohorts一a group bom 
between 1963 and 1972, and a group bom between 1953 and 1962. The former is 
called a younger cohort and the latter is called an older cohort. From Table 7.5 the 
male residual standard error in the older cohort has increased but the male residual 
18 We should be cautious of this assumption because each individual is exposed to a unique 
environment, so the restriction that Sft - s^t is constant may not be effective. 
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standard error in the younger cohort has decreased. Therefore, if the unobserved 
theory of the residual wage gap holds, the convergence in unmeasured skills would be 
simplified to atAO(sft - Smt) and this term will correspond correctly to the gap effect 
under empirical decomposition of Juhn et al. W e could then expect gap effect for both 
cohorts to be zero. However, the gap effect for the older cohort contributed to 27% of 
the change in total wage gap and that for the younger cohort contributed to 114% of 
the change in total wage gap. Therefore, the attribution of the gap effect to changes in 
unobserved skill level accordingly is not supported. Through Suen's analysis, we 
emphasize the important contribution of increasing gender discrimination to the 
widening of the gender wage gap over time. Juhn et al. method did not take care of 
any changes in gender discrimination and subsequently assumed the changes of the 
residual wage gap as the sole effect of unobserved skills and prices. The rationale for 
the increase of the residual wage gap is subtle; it is partly due to increasing 
discrimination over the period and partly due to a surge of unmeasured skill prices 
resulting from rapid growth in demand for unmeasured skilled workers. 
Figure 7.1 and the associated Tables 7.6 and 7.7 indicate the gender mean wage 
gap of the older cohort is consistently larger than that of the younger cohort. This may 
be due to the possibility that the discrimination against women is more serious for 
older cohort, and/or the productivity of younger women are closer to that of younger 
men, and/or the older women receive lower returns to skills than older men receive 
for skills. 
The observed characteristics effect closes the gap for both younger and 
older cohorts due to the fact that both younger and older women have improved their 
relative levels of skills over time. Nevertheless, the opposing observed price effect 
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and the widening of the residual gap^ ^ cancel out and dominate the converging effect 
aforesaid. Over time older men's skill prices increase to a larger extent than the 
younger men's skill prices. The increase of price effect accounts for 55% of the 
widening of the older cohort gap but it only accounts for 28% of the widening of the 
younger cohort gap (Table 7.5). The residual gap of the older cohort accounts for 79% 
of the widening of the total wage gap of the older cohort; but the residual gap of the 
younger cohort accounts for 109% of the total gap of the younger cohort. 
Table 7.5: Decomposition of changes in the gender basic wage gaps, 1988-1999 
Older Cohort Younger Cohort 
Descriptive statistics: 
Male residual standard error* 
1988 0.3697256 0.6452493 
1999 0.5451616 0.5447907 
Female residual standard error* 
1988 0.4392142 0.6900996 
1999 0.6622908 0.6556628 
Mean female residual*: 
1988 -0.12234 -0.028025 
1999 -0.220071 -0.183238 
Decomposition of change: 
Change in differential (D99-D88) 0.12312 100% 0.14290 100% 
Observed X's: -0.0426 -35% -0.0520 -36% 
Observed Price: 0.0680 55% 0.0396 28% 
Gap 0.0337 27% 0.1625 114% 
Unobserved prices 0.0641 52% -0.0072 -5% 
sum gender specific 0.0337 -7% 0.1625 77% 
sum wage structure 0.13 107% -0.0072 23% 
* Estimated using male wage regressions. The change in the differential is the change in the male-female log wage differential 
19 The residual gap is the total of the gap effect and the unobserved price effect. It can also be called 
the unexplained part of the gender wage gap mentioned before. 
175 
between 1988 and 1999. 
Table 7.6: Gender mean log wage gap of younger cohort，born between 1963 and 1972 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 6.7869274 6.7518236 0.0351038 
89 6.8187329 6.7780576 0.0406753 
,90 6.9267433 6.8764013 0.050342 
91 7.0607684 7.0714524 -0.010684 
92 7.3126026 7.1900354 0.1225672 
93 7.4374379 7.3188475 0.1185904 
94 7.5785745 7.4228399 0.1557346 
95 7.6473303 7.5196937 0.1276366 
96 7.6797069 7.5405508 0.1391561 
97 7.7460907 7.6075917 0.138499 
98 7.8770623 7.7662591 0.1108032 
^ 8.0285647 7.8505657 0.177999 
Table 7.7: Gender mean log wage gap of older cohort，born between 1953 and 1962. 
Year Female Male Differential 
88 7.3495205 7.2236952 0.1258253 
89 7.2831628 7.1924365 0.0907263 
90 7.3985306 7.3107149 0.0878157 
91 7.4809224 7.3523686 0.1285538 
92 7.6043275 7.4857778 0.1185497 
93 7.6563604 7.5487697 0.1075907 
94 7.7960658 7.6048547 0.1912111 
95 7.8594636 7.6765898 0.1828738 
96 7.8781522 7.6546045 0.2235477 
97 7.9052577 7.68549 0.2197677 
98 7.9436821 7.7898668 0.1538153 
^ 8.0783549 7.8294094 0.2489455 
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Figure 7.1. Mean log wage gaps by synthetic age cohorts 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
This thesis uses data from 1988 to 1999 Urban Household Surveys to carry out 
an empirical analysis of gender wage differentials in urban China. W e find that after 
all China has a more egalitarian pay between the genders than most other nations. 
From this study, China's female/male wage ratio is over 80%, but other studies show 
the ratio 66% in Canada, 67% in Ireland, 70% in the USA, 68% in the UK, 48% in 
Japan and 79% in France (Ferber, 1991). Further, the urban Chinese labor market is 
characterized by a slight rising gender total wage gap during the 1990s, specifically, 
the female to male total wage ratio declines by only 2.6% from 82.6% in 1988 to 80% 
in 1999. This is different from Blau and Kahn's (1997) finding of a falling 
male-female pay gap in the U.S. labor market. 
Looking at the components of the total wage, we find that the basic wage 
accounts for 70 to 80% of the total wage and the remaining 20 to 30% are bonuses. 
Most of the gender wage differential is due to the basic wage gap rather than the 
bonus gap. Similar to Meng's (2000) remark of an equal distribution of profit-related 
bonuses, we have an empirical implication that bonuses are distributed more equally 
between males and females. 
Another major finding from the present study is that the returns to education 
have surged continuously since 1988. Although the rate was slightly lower than that 
found in the other developing countries in the late 1980s, the rates have risen to as 
high as 12% in the late 1990s. The rising rates of return can be seen using various 
specifications. Also, we find that the rate of returns increases with the level of 
education. Apparently, our regressions also support the proposition of rising 
provincial income inequality especially inequality between coastal and interior 
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regions in China. Coastal provinces are granted to be pioneer in economic reforms 
and they provide more international trade and foreign investment. Their speed of 
economic development and advances to technology are faster than the inner regions. 
Thus, a larger spatial income disparity arises. 
Utilizing the Blinder-Oaxaca and Cotton's decompositions, we show that over 
half of the gender gap is due to differences in coefficients between genders. This 
substantial unexplained portion of the wage gap can be interpreted as a consequence 
of discharging the suppression of gender discrimination against women in the 
pre-reform period. It might also reflect differences due to unmeasured characteristics 
of males and females. The unexplained part of the gender wage gap increases very 
slightly. Apart from this, the unexplained portion of the basic wage gap is smaller than 
that of the total wage gap before mid 1990s. Employers tend to discriminate more 
against women in valuing total wage than in valuing basic wage during the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s. In the late 1990s, the basic wage gap nearly reflects the entire 
total wage gap due to the shrinking share of bonus in the total wage after 1994. 
Using Juhn et al.'s method, we tried to understand the reason why the wage gap 
did not vary much and only had a little divergence over the 12 years. Rising wage 
inequality and higher rewards to skills constituted to the widening of the gap albeit the 
gender-specific factors worked to counterbalance and narrowed the gender pay gap. 
Specifically, the rising male return to education in the 1990s weighted the female 
schooling skill deficit more heavily and increased the wage gap substantially although 
improvements in women's relative qualifications, especially their years of education 
contributed to the narrowing of the gap. Labor forces have taken their hold to reward 
employees more on marketable skills, so the prices of measured and unmeasured 
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skills raised a lot over the period. The effect of theses prices, however was found to be 
slightly larger and in an opposite direction to the concurrent effect of converging skill 
levels between men and women. As a result, the gender wage gap did not change 
much and only widened to a little extent. 
To avoid falling into the trap of arbitrary assigning the price and quantity effect, 
wage gaps for synthetic age cohorts are decomposed. The unobserved skill theory of 
the wage gap is not supported. This arouses our attention in interpreting changes in 
the residual gap as changes in unmeasured skill quantity and prices under Juhn et al. 
decomposition. Increasing discrimination over time and rising returns to measured 
and unmeasured skills dominates and the gender wage gap nets out to be slightly 
larger. 
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Appendix: Alternative Treatments of Schooling Years and Potential Experience 
One may argue that most employees in the sample included in the study did not 
go to school until the age of 8 and they only received 5 years of elementary school 
education and 3 years of junior high school education and 2 years of senior high 
school education. Taking this into account, we illustrate three alternative treatments of 
calculating schooling years and imputed working experience. Treatment 1 is the one 
discussed in the main text. The years of schooling under Treatment 1 are 16 for 
university, 14 for college, 12 for vocational school and senior high school, 9 for junior 
high school and 6 for primary school or others. The potential experience equals age 
minus schooling year minus 6. Under Treatment 2, the years of schooling are 14 for 
university, 12 for college, 10 for vocational school and senior high school, 8 for junior 
high school and 5 for primary school or others. The potential experience will then be 
equal to age minus redefined schooling year minus 8. Treatment 3 sets the year of 
schooling as the same as that under treatment 1 but assumes the age of starting 
education to age 8 rather than 6, so the imputed experience will be equal to age minus 
the schooling year minus 8. Appendix Tables 1 and 2 give the mean of all, male and 
female employees' schooling years and potential experience respectively under each 
alternative treatment. Appendix Tables 3 and 4 show the regression results of log 
wage for male and female samples under Treatment 2. Appendix Tables 5 and 6 show 
the regression results of log wage for male and female samples under treatment 3. 
Though the returns to schooling and experience differ when compared to the one 
under Treatment 1 as in Table 5.14 for male sample and as in Table 5.26 for female 
sample, the estimates of schooling returns exhibit similar increasing trend using 
alternative treatments. Results of Blinder Oaxaca decomposition and Juhn et al.'s 
method under Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 are similar to Treatment 1. 
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Appendix Table 1: Mean of schooling year for various samples under different treatments 
All employees Male employees Female employees 
Year/Treatment 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
88 10.53 9.07 10.53 10.96 9.45 10.96 10.08 8.67 10.08 
89 10.66 9.18 10.66 11.06 9.53 11.06 10.23 8.8 10.23 
90 10.83 9.31 10.83 11.18 9.63 11.18 10.44 8.97 10.44 
91 10.84 9.33 10.84 11.21 9.66 11.21 10.44 8.96 10.44 
92 11 9.65 11 11.24 9.91 11.24 10.73 9.38 10.73 
93 11.03 9.69 11.03 11.26 9.95 11.26 10.77 9.4 10.77 
94 11.23 9.89 11.23 11.44 10.13 11.44 11 9.63 11 
95 11.26 9.94 11.26 11.48 10.19 11.48 11.01 9.66 11.01 
96 11.29 9.97 11.29 11.49 10.2 11.49 11.06 9.71 11.06 
97 11.31 10 11.31 11.52 10.22 11.52 11.09 9.75 11.09 
98 11.48 10.16 11.48 11.63 10.33 11.63 11.3 9.96 11.3 
99 11.63 10.31 11.63 11.76 10.45 11.76 11.49 10.16 11.49 
Appendix Table 2: Mean of potential experience for various samples under different treatments 
All employees Male employees Female employees 
Year/Treatment 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
88 20.56 20.02 18.55 21.69 21.2 19.68 19.38 18.79 17.38 
89 20.61 20.09 18.6 21.64 21.17 19.63 19.51 18.94 17.5 
90 21.08 20.59 19.07 22.26 21.8 20.26 19.8 19.27 17.79 
91 20.97 20.48 18.96 22.29 21.83 20.28 19.55 19.03 17.54 
92 21.01 20.36 19.01 22.13 21.47 20.13 19.79 19.14 17.78 
93 21.37 20.71 19.37 22.46 21.77 20.45 20.2 19.57 18.19 
94 21.32 20.66 19.32 22.47 21.78 20.47 20.05 19.42 18.05 
95 21.55 20.87 19.55 22.65 21.95 20.65 20.32 19.67 18.32 
96 21.98 21.3 19.98 23.11 22.4 21.11 20.72 20.07 18.72 
97 22.26 21.58 20.26 23.51 22.81 21.51 20.88 20.22 18.88 
98 22.25 21.58 20.25 23.52 22.82 21.52 20.8 20.15 18.8 
99 22.24 21.57 20.24 23.56 22.87 21.55 20.73 20.08 18.73 
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